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The Partnership Approach to Environmental Governance: the Case of the Moor Trees 
Partnership Network. 
Academic discussion of policy-making and governing indicates a significant shift in the model 
of governance away from top-down state control to the bottom-up approach of engaging non- 
state actors (Goodwin and Painter, 1996; Jessop, 1998; Stoker, 1993,1998). Central to 
governance theory are new forms of policy organisation, in effect, a shift from state monopoly 
of decision-making towards partnering with non-state (and, therefore, non-elected) actors for 
the formulation and delivery of sustainability objectives. It is argued that these partnerships 
are a key aspect of governance, which, in turn has become one of the main themes in 
environmental politics (Imrie and Raco, 1999; MacKinnon, 2000; Goodwin and Painter, 1996; 
Stoker, 1998). In part, the growing prominence of environmental partnership-working is a 
recognition that sustainability cannot be achieved through top-down government, but requires 
the active involvement of a broad range of non-state stakeholder groups spanning all sections 
of society to ensure that sustainability strategies are context -o rie nted and meet the needs of 
local populations. This study refers to these objectives as 'environmental plans, policies and 
programmes' (EPPP). 
I suggest that contemporary academic debate is lacking in conceptual and empirical focus on 
partnership-working as a delivery mechanism for environmental governance. This thesis aims 
to address this gap by; (i) assessing the implications of the state's devolution of responsibility 
for the delivery of EPPP to the community level; (ii) investigating the democratic legitimacy of 
these non-state actors; (iii) appraising the financial and operational accountability of state- 
non-state partnerships; and (iv) furthering the understanding of the practical issues that 
environmental partnership-working must address in order to become an effective delivery 
vehicle for environmental policy objectives. 
In meeting these objectives, this thesis has conceptualised the formulation and delivery of 
EPPP via the Policy Implementation Continuum. The continuum is stratified into four sectors: 
state', 'QUANGO', 'third', and 'private'. I argue that the success of these partnerships revolves 
on actors from across all four layers meeting the three requirements of; (i) accepting 
responsibility, (ii) acquiring legitimacy, and (iii) providing accountability. To this end, I argue 
that these three constructs are critical components of the Effective Partnership-working 
model. I argue that, without achieving all three, partnerships cannot work effectively and that 
the implementation gap between policy and practice will remain. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
1.1 Conceptualising the Partnership Approach to Environmental Governance 
Much discussion of policy-making and governing indicates a significant shift in the model of 
governance away from top-down state control to the bottom-up partnership approach of 
engaging non-state actors (Goodwin and Painter, 1996; Jessop, 1998; Stoker, 1993,1998). 
Governance was defined by the Commission on Global Governance, (1995, in Rauschmayer et 
ol., 2009: 42) as: 
'... the sum of the many ways individuals and institutions, public and private, manage 
their common affairs. It is a continuing process through which conflicting or diverse 
interests may be accommodated and co-operative action may be taken. It includes 
formal institutions and regimes empowered to enforce compliance, as well as informal 
arrangements that people and institutions either have agreed to or perceive to be in 
their interest'. 
Stoker (1998: 17) concurred that governance brings together public and private actors, when 
arguing that 'governance refers to the development of governing styles in which boundaries 
between and within the public and private sectors have become blurred'. Goodwin and Painter 
(1996: 636) also argued that: 
'Governance is central government, a range of non-elected organisations of the state 
(at both central and local levels) as well as institutional and individual actors from 
outside the formal political arena, such as voluntary organisations private businesses 
and corporations, the mass media and, increasingly, supra-national institutions such as 
the European Union. ' 
I 
Central to governance theory are new forms of policy organisation, in effect a shift from state 
monopoly of decision-making towards closer cooperation with non-state actors in the 
formulation and implementation of sustainability objectives. The argument that governance 
represents a 'shift' is also supported by Rhodes (1997), who asserted that it is a changed 
condition of ordered rule or a new method by which society is governed. Stoker (1997) argued 
that because governance is about government, NGOs, community groups and private citizens 
working in partnership, community involvement can be regarded as a key aspect of 
governance. Thus, governance has become one of the main themes in environmental politics, 
as governments devolve many environmental responsibilities towards grassroots actors and 
contract out services and activities to private (non-elected) actors (Imrie and Raco, 1999; 
MacKinnon, 2000; Goodwin and Painter, 1996; Stoker, 1998). Local knowledge, territorial 
identity (localness), collective learning and increased discourse through improved 
communication channels are offered as further reasons for the governance approach (Evans, 
2004). This partnering between state and non-state actors for service delivery and strategic 
decision-making draws further attention to the governance concept, with cross-sector 
partnerships now increasingly becoming normal practice (Day, 1998; Goodwin, 1998). In this 
context, partnership-working is increasingly seen as an indispensable part of the transition 
towards meeting sustainability objectives. 
In part, their growing prominence can be read as a recognition that sustainability cannot be 
achieved through top-down government but requires the active involvement of a broad range 
of non-state stakeholder groups spanning all sections of society in order to ensure that 
sustainability strategies are context-oriented, and meet the needs of local populations. These 
new 'environmental partnerships' were first brought to the attention of international policy- 
makers and commentators via the 'local approach' of the 1992 Rio Earth Summit, where 
partnership-working under-pinned many approaches to environmental issues and set out the 
Local Agenda 21 framework for environmental governance to implement global aims through 
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national, regional and local policies (Evans, 2004; Mackinnon, 2002; Mert, 2009; Raco et aL, 
2006; Sampford, 2002; Savan et oL, 2004; Vogler, 2005). This study has contextualised these 
objectives by referring to 'environmental plans, policies and programmes' (EPPP). 
The importance of partnerships gained further expression in the adaptation of Type 2 
outcomes at the World Summit on Sustainable Development (WSSD) in 2002 (Evans 2004, 
Mackinnon 2002, Sampford 2002, Raco et aL, 2006). These partnerships were announced at 
the summit by the United Nations, who invited them to register with the secretariat of the 
Commission for Sustainable Development, a sub-committee of the UN Economic and Social 
Council. Sampford (2002: 81) argued that for this trans-boundary governance concept to be 
effective, a multi-faceted and multi-disciplinary approach is required, with Mackinnon (2002) 
further supporting the broader neoliberal strategy of community involvement and 
empowerment, or, governing through community. In furthering the neoliberalist discussion, 
Boonstra (2006: 303) more recently argued that 'Neoliberalism, which transferred 
responsibility for public issues from the state to individuals and companies, became a popular 
response to these governmental problems'. 
Placing this discussion into the UK context, in 1997, New Labour promoted partnerships as 
their approach to governance in health, social care and regeneration (Ranade and Hudson, 
1999). This was subsequently formalised via UK Government White Papers promoting 'self 
help' and 'active citizenship'. Goodwin (1998) explored this approach as the interface between 
the market-led economy and a redistributive social policy which was underpinned by 
Foucauldian governmentality theory of the liberalist governing 'through communities' as 
opposed to society (see also Raco et oL, (2006) and Ward and McNicholas (1998: 37)). The 
Rural White paper of 2000 reinforced the state's commitment to 'People living in rural areas 
being fully involved in developing their community, safeguarding its valued features and 
shaping the decisions that affect them', and that 'a healthy voluntary and community sector is 
3 
essential to the effective functioning of society - urban and rural. ' The UK has subsequently 
seen a shift in support policies from a sectoral approach to one that is territorial' and runs 
through local authorities and regional strategies (Scott, 2004; Hodge, 2001). With an increasing 
focus on the environment, there is now a more multi-dimensional approach to issues such as 
community networks, environmentalism, sustainability and micro-business investment aiming 
at stimulating a significant reappraisal of environmental resources (Marsden and Murdoch, 
1998; Sampford, 2002; Scott, 2004). These processes sit within the conceptual framework of 
building the capacity of communities and improving links with local economies where the state 
partners with non-state actors (Marsden and Murdoch, 1998; Yarwood, 2002; Scott, 2004; 
Stoker, 1998). 
This governance approach is subject to extensive debate, but consideration should also be 
given to the state's continued desire to shape, monitor and steer local authority practice 
through a distinct set of managerial technologies, including budgetary management, audit and 
targets (Mackinnon, 2000; Thompson, 2005). This was argued by Hodge (2001: 107) as 'the 
institutional and financial environment created by government' (see also Thompson, 2005). 
Conceptualised by Mackinnon (2000 and 2002) as 'managerial technologies', this arguably 
dilutes the idea of participatory democracy, as stakeholders are still subject to constraints and 
processes designed to control outcomes and guide delivery and still have limited resources 
that restrict effective engagement (Day, 1998; Scott, 2004; Wilson, 2004). This re-working of 
environmental governance to include previously marginalised actors is an important political 
and intellectual debate that also revolves around Liverman's (2004) commodification of 
nature. Various factors are attributed to this theory, including the neoliberal policies of state 
cle-regulation, budget cuts, privatisation and clecentralisation, social activism and techno- 
centrism (Bailey and Wilson, 2009; Higgins and Lockie, 2002; Liverman, 2004; MacKinnon, 
2002; Mol, 2006; Sonnenfield and Mol, 2002). It is suggested that partnerships have become 
I The implementation of local development programmes geared to local requirements. 
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key to the successful implementation and management of environmental governance. The 
focus of this study is the exploration of this argument, including the conceptualisation of 
partnerships as a subset of the environmental governance paradigm. Particular attention is 
paid to the themes of responsibility, legitimacy and accountability of non-elected actors 
funded by public sector money but often considered to be lacking in auditing and review 
procedures that are suitable to the non-state actor context (Hodge, 2001: 107; Goodwin, 1998; 
Shortall, 2004; Stoker, 1998: 20; O'Toole and Burcless, 2004). 
Partnerships are defined as an arrangement existing between two or more organisations 
working towards a defined goal and are deemed essential for the development of 
collaborative advantages when seeking to solve environmental problems (Darlow and Newby, 
1997; Huxham, 1996; Healy, 1992). In terms of governance, the ultimate partnership activity is 
the formation of self-governing networks including state and non-state actors that will 
influence policy, play a role in governing and facilitate the delivery of programmes (Goodwin, 
1998; Marsden and Murdoch, 1998; Rhodes, 1996; Stoker, 1998). To begin to place 
partnerships into the environmental context, Bennet and Krebs (1991) and Scott (2004) 
discussed the bringing together of stakeholders from the public, private and voluntary sectors 
to work towards a common end. Worthington et aL (2003) further highlighted the need for 
cross-sector partnerships to address complex environmental issues. Partnerships, however, 
although historically operating on an informal or commercial basis, now increasingly feature in 
more formal political and governing frameworks. As such, these relationships are coming 
under increased pressure regarding their democratic legitimacy. 
There is little doubt that governance is radically changing the boundaries between state and 
non-state actors. I assert, however, that its expression in the form of partnership-working 
raises a number of questions regarding the democratic legitimacy of state-devolved 
responsibility for EPPP delivery, the representativeness of the non-state actor partnerships, 
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and the robustness and appropriateness of associated financial and operational accountability 
mechanisms. At its most fundamental, sound environmental governance depends on effective 
regulation and due regard for the rule of law (Turner, 2006). O'Toole and Burcless (2004: 441) 
argued that, unlike local government, community groups 'do not possess the vital factors of 
legitimacy, accountability and assured sources of long-term funding'. These questions 
surrounding partnership legitimacy and effectiveness are further considered by authors such 
as Connelly et aL (2006), Eden et oL (2006), Jepson (2005), Liverman (2004), O'Toole et ol. 
(2004), Raco et oL (2006) and Yarwood (2002). Legitimacy is a key debate regarding 
governance and accountability as it is a multi-faceted concept that operates differently in 
different contexts. It is also unclear how it is to be understood now that the criteria 
appropriate to a representative democracy is not applicable to non-elected actors (Connelly et 
oL, 2006; Jepson, 2005). Whilst adopted in an attempt to broaden policy engagement, doubts 
also arise around the intra-network power dynamic, with partnership inclusiveness and 
effectiveness affected as certain stakeholders are intentionally excluded and therefore subject 
to selective inclusivity (see Evans, 2004 and Yarwood, 2002). If such norms are to become 
accepted principles for legitimate rural governance, then more work is needed to establish the 
acceptability of governance by the wider population and the capacity for democratic deficit 
that is evident in poorly constructed governance and partnership frameworks (Connelly et ol., 
2006; Hutchinson, 1994; Lowndes and Skelcher, 1998; Ranade and Hudson, 2003). 
When considering the issues of legitimacy it is also important to consider the concept of 
responsibility (Savan et aL, 2004; Stoker, 1998; Raco et al., 2006). It could be argued that a 
weakness in the governance approach is the dilution of care, liability, accountability and 
responsiveness as power moves from the state to new multi-actor, cross-sector networks. This 
is especially relevant at community level where funding streams support independent (non- 
elected) groups in the delivery of sustainable development objectives (O'Toole and Burdess, 
2004; Ward and McNicholas, 1998). The implications of self-governing autonomous networks' 
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accountability has become an important issue, with it being theorised that each sector of 
society should be characterised by a distinct accountability regime (Jepson, 2005; Rhodes, 
1997; Stoker, 1998; Turner 2006). The governance concept can then be applied to maintain 
and strengthen these legitimacy claims by establishing and over-seeing accountability streams 
that recognise that public trust is built on the cumulative evidence of legitimacy (Jepson, 
2005). This study conceptualised three types of accountability - hierarchical, holistic, and zero - 
which are analysed in Chapter 7. 
Having introduced the concepts of environmental governance and partnerships, I now briefly 
present how they are used for the operationalisation of environmental sustainability 
objectives. Environmental governance and partnerships are increasingly linked to the delivery 
of sustainable development objectives through the creation of the third sector (Connelly et ah, 
2006; Raco et al., 2006; Vogler, 2005). The third sector, also known as 'The Voluntary and 
Community sector', is subject to various state experiments that challenge existing decision- 
making structures to operationalise the concepts of sustainable development. In part, this is 
due to the perceived state-centric failure to deliver Elkington's (1997) 'triple bottom line' of 
economic, social and environmental sustainability (see also, amongst others, Dryzek, 1997; 
Lawrence, 2006). In this new approach to EPPP formulation and delivery, the use of managerial 
technologies to steer and control non-state partnerships (established within the third sector) is 
also seen as an evolving ecological modernisation paradigm. I highlight this evolution as an 
important concept within this study, with the paradigm shift by the state towards the 
economic feasibility of environmental protection and the engagement of 'entrepreneurial 
agents and economic / market dynamics, and the building of new and different coalitions to 
make environmental protection politically feasible' (Fisher and Freudenburg, 2001: 703). These 
new coalitions refer to the partnerships that are argued to present a greater chance of success 
against environmental challenges due to the pooling of strengths and skills and the merging of 
audiences to increase the appeal of potential solutions (Edwards et oL, 2000; Hutchinson, 
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1994; Stoker, 1993). The structure, functionality and efficacy of these partnerships are the 
focus of this study. By conceptualising the Policy Implementation Continuum (see Section 
3.3.1), 1 explore how actors from the public, Quasi Non-Governmental Organisation 
(QUANGO), third and private sectors work in partnership to formulate and deliver EPPP. The 
empirical focus analyses the opportunities and challenges of local knowledge, the synergies of 
collaborative-working, the power structures resulting from 'partnership principals' and state 
interference, and the representativeness of these partnerships. To conclude the conceptual 
background to this study, I now consider the applied side of these theoretical approaches by 
briefly discussing the empirical focus for this thesis. 
I assumed the role of researcher-practitioner throughout this study. As a researcher, I studied 
the partnership approach to environmental governance. As a practitioner, I worked as a 
Director of Moor Trees, a small environmental charity based in the South West of England 
working on the restoration of native broadleaved woodland in and around Dartmoor National 
Park. My dual status presented the opportunity for the study of Moor Trees as an 
environmental actor, plus its associated partnership network, collectively referred to in this 
study as the 'Moor Trees Partnership Network', or, the 'MTPN' (see Section 4.6). The network 
included approximately 400 actors from across all four levels of the Policy Implementation 
Continuum. These actors played various roles in the formulation and delivery of EPPP, which, 
collectively, I considered to be representative of the wider environmental sector. Thus, the 
MTPN formed the over-arching case study for this research. I also focused on a number of case 
studies from within the network. Particular focus was given to the Moor Trees Voluntary 
Carbon Offset Programme (see Section 4.8) as a market-based approach to environmentalism 
that engaged previously marginalised actors, especially the private sector (Goodwin, 1998; 
Lowndes and Skelcher, 1998; Stoker, 1998). 
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It is argued by some that the private sector is responding to the demands of sustainable 
development (Muller, 2006; Smith, 2003; Wilenius, 2004; Liverman, 2004). Consumer demand 
and reputational risk require corporate responsibility, triple-bottom line accounting and 
market re-positioning. Companies actively addressing these issues, often by working with Non- 
Governmental Organisation (NGO) partners, can gain significant market advantages over less- 
concerned competitors (Clark and Hebb, 2005; Liverman, 2004; Smith, 2003; Wilenius, 2004). 
This has led to a growing philosophy within the green sector that, to influence and facilitate 
change, it is better to work within 'the system' than against it, and that the market-based 
approach is increasingly beneficial for managing and protecting the environment (Liverman, 
2004; Slavikova et aL, 2010). To explore this engagement of business with the environment, 
the (unregulated) voluntary carbon markets provided an interesting case study, especially 
regarding the themes of responsibility, legitimacy and accountability. 'Carbon offsetting' was 
originally introduced as a market-based instrument by the Kyoto Protocol. 
The voluntary carbon markets provide an interesting example of an entrepreneurial 
interpretation of the original Kyoto mechanism. Being non-statutory and with no tangible 
product or service purchased, 'going carbon neutral' is increasingly used by state and non- 
state actors alike (though predominantly the private sector) in response to increasing ethical 
consumerism and stakeholder pressures. Initial refusals to commit to meaningful action on 
climate change was historically justified in terms of the potential ensuing economic damage 
2 of 
legally binding emissions targets, but committing to climate change action via the voluntary 
market is increasingly used for public relations and corporate responsibility purposes. This 
market exists for reasons other than regulatory compliance, so is unregulated and presents 
issues regarding accountability and legitimacy. 
Loss of competitiveness, price increases, and unemployment 
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1.2 The Knowledge Gap 
Existing research has examined the governance concept in considerable detail, the reasons for 
this new approach to governing, and the various forms of network developed at international, 
national and local level to develop and oversee the delivery of policy goals. Texts by authors 
including Goodwin and Painter (1996) discuss non-elected actor networks, government, 
community groups and supra-national institutions such as the European Union. Rhodes (1997) 
argued that governance changes the conditions for ordered rule and Stoker (1997,1998) 
discussed the five propositions of governance (see Table 2.1) and the associated blurring of 
public and private sector boundaries. These authors placed their discussions around the 
broader concept of governance, with Goodwin and Painter (1996), Imrie and Raco (1999) and 
Mackinnon (2000) further discussing the contracting-out of local services and programmes to 
private (non-elected) actors. The rising profile of sustainable development in the 1990s also 
brought a new focus for governance literature on environmental issues. Authors such as Stoker 
(1994,1997), Goodwin (1998) and Sampford (2002) discussed the community-based approach 
('governing through community'), including the continuation of the state as a central actor 
through managerial technologies, QUANGOs and governance issues resulting from the lack of 
participatory democracy (see also Mackinnon, 2000). Governance, therefore, (and, more 
specifically, environmental governance) is well-researched by a range of social science authors. 
With regard to partnerships, Huxham (1996), Hastings (1996) and Stoker (1998) have discussed 
public-private sector partnerships as becoming a new norm for public service delivery. Darlow 
and Newby (1997), Pratt et a/. (1998) and Tilson et oL (1997) have also encouraged further 
debate around the structure and value of partnerships for the delivery of environmental 
objectives. Partnerships develop social capital and engage in community-based sustainable 
development. It has also been argued by Edwards et oL (2001) that the merging of public, 
private and voluntary sectors can leverage resources to yield outputs greater than the sum of 
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its parts and, subsequently, enclogenous clevelopment3 . From this, further scholarship by Eden 
et oL (2006) (who discuss NGOs' and stakeholder scientific legitimacy) and Evans (2004) (who 
argued that the local approach creates path dependency where local knowledge and expertise 
used to formulate plans are then essential for delivery) has explored the role of partnerships 
as a specific expression of the governance approach. These arguments all stem from the 
notion that governments do not hold the monopoly of knowledge and implementation 
expertise for successful programme delivery, an idea further discussed by Goodwin (1998) who 
contended that no single actor holds these attributes. Partnerships are also seen as 
contributing to the rescaling of governance through the redistribution of power to the local or 
community level. An idea that has brought new scholarly contributions is the idea of 
environmental and sustainable development partnerships (Stoker, 1993; Hutchinson, 1994), 
recognising the limitations in top-down government in dealing with sustainability issues in a 
way that gives adequate recognition to the need for stakeholder legitimation and involvement 
in the local sustainability strategies (Dryzek, 1997; Edwards et oL, 2000). 
Partnerships are often considered in the same discussions as the 'hollowing out of the state', 
where powers and responsibilities are taken away from the state and invested in the public, 
private and voluntary sectors. State managerial technologies, however, are argued to still exist 
to initiate, structure, finance and regulate these new partnerships (Edwards et oL, 2001; Imrie 
and Raco, 1999; Mackinnon, 2000). With a cross-over into governance discussions and 
research by, amongst others, Rhodes-(1996), Goodwin (1998) and Marsden and Murdoch 
(1998), more recent papers (Sorenson, 2005; Connelly et oL, 2006) focus on identifVing; (i) the 
various types of partnerships formed; (ii) key prerequisites for the effective functioning of 
partnerships, and (iii) critiques of partnerships in practice. 
3 Growth affected by (social) behaviour as well as policy, or, an integrated 'bottom-up' approach involving local 
actors and communities (Mackinnon, 2002: 307). 
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Although partnerships are well recognised as an important and necessary part of the 
broadening out of government to governance, it has been argued that this redistribution of 
power and the emergence of non-elected local governance raises the issues of democracy, 
inclusivity, legitimacy, accountability and responsibility (Connelly et aL, 2006; Goodwin, 1998; 
Imrie and Raco;, 1999). Specific literature is, however, lacking on these issues in the context of 
the environment and sustainability strategies. Additionally, the related issues of selective 
inclusivity (Yarwood, 2002; Evans, 2004) and democratic deficit (Hutchinson, 1994; Lowncles 
and Skelcher, 1998; Ranade and Hudson, 2003; Connelly et ah, 2006) have also received some 
review. These papers do provide some details, few explicitly address these issues and no real 
detail (or empirical focus) exists in the governance and partnership context. This thesis aims to 
contribute to this gap in existing knowledge through qualitative and quantitative research. 
1.3 Aim and Objectives 
The aim of this thesis, therefore, is to consider the partnership approach in environmental 
governance by using the case study of the MTPN. In order to address this aim, the study has 
the following four objectives: 
0 Using the MTPN as a case study, to analyse whether and to what extent the state is 
devolving responsibility and authority for environmental decision-making and the 
delivery of EPPP to the non-state, or grassroots, actor level through discourses of 
community responsibility, partnership-working and self-governing. 
0 To assess if democratic legitimacy is lost through the inclusion of non-elected, non- 
state actors in the formulation and delivery of EPPP. 
* To explore the financial and operational accountability framework(s) of the MTPN and 
to analyse the implications of quantitative and qualitative reporting mechanisms. 
12 
To critically assess the Moor Trees Partnership Network to further the understanding 
of the practical issues that environmental partnerships must address in order to 
become effective delivery vehicles for EPPP. 
1.4 Structure of Thesis 
To meet these aims and objectives, Chapter 2 reviews the existing body of knowledge on 
governance, partnerships, responsibility, legitimacy, accountability and the voluntary carbon 
offset sector. Chapter 3 discusses the multi-method approach that was used for the collection 
and analysis of quantitative and qualitative data. Chapter 4 reviews the Moor Trees 
Partnership Network, which formed the over-arching empirical focus of this study, and from 
where mini-case studies were also drawn. Chapters 5,6 and 7 discuss the themes of 
responsibility, legitimacy and accountability respectively, with their empirical findings and 
conclusions then contributing to Chapter 8's analysis and discussion of partnership-working. 
Chapter 9 forms the conclusion to this study, including directions for future research. 
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Chapter 2: Exploring Environmental Governance and Partnerships 
Part 2 of this thesis reviews existing research on partnerships and governance in order to 
contextualise their role and issues in relation to local environmental management. The 
discussion focuses on the rise of the partnership approach and examines the issues of 
responsibility, legitimacy, democratic deficit and accountability that form the basis of the 
current study. 
Section 2.1 reviews existing knowledge on governance and its increasing profile as an 
approach to sustainable development. This sets the scene on how new actors and processes 
are drawn into the governing of local sustainability strategies. Section 2.2 then reviews 
partnerships as a tool for delivering more context-specific governance. It begins by introducing 
partnerships and discussing their use for the formulation and implementation of EPPP. Public- 
private partnerships are then further discussed in relation to Agenda 21 and their increasing 
profile in the WSSD agenda. The section concludes by reviewing the benefits and key 
characteristics of partnerships, focusing on community involvement and the contracting-out of 
public services. Section 2.3 explores the concept of governance as a theoretical framework for 
analysing how environmental partnerships ýre used to include previously marginalised non- 
state actors in the formulation and delivery of EPPP. Section 2.3.1 provides a background on 
the origins and formulation of partnerships and also considers the critical issues facing these 
multi-actor and often complex networks in the environmental context. It also considers the 
constraints imposed on partnerships by government control through the monitoring, review 
and auditing processes in place as a result of state funding conditions. Sections 2.3-2,2.3-3, 
2.3.4 and 2.3.5 focus on responsibility, legitimacy, democratic deficit and accountability, 
individually identified as key issues by Connelly et aL (2006), Eden et aL (2006), Hodge (2001), 
Jepson (2005), O'Toole and Burdess (2004), Turner, (2006) and Yarwood (2002) but as yet, I 
suggest, not explored as a whole in sufficient empirical depth. Finally, Section 2.4 reviews the 
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key challenges for environmental governance raised by the increasing prominence of 
partnership activities and the way partnership-working deals with the issues of responsibility, 
legitimacy and accountability. It then brings the main threads of environmental governance 
and partnerships together and summarises the key findings along with gaps in existing 
knowledge and the opportunities for further research. 
2.1 Governance in the Environmental Context 
Stoker (1997: 10) defines the shift from government to governance as: 
'Government is used to refer to the formal institutional structure and location of 
authoritative decision-making in the modern state. The concept of governance is wider 
and directs attention to the distribution of power both internal and external to the 
state. Its focus is on the interdependence of governmental and non -govern menta I 
forces in meeting economic and social challenges. Governance is about governmental 
and non-governmental organisations working together. Its concern is with how the 
challenge of collective action is met and the issues and tensions associated with this 
shift in the pattern of governing. 
This definition, although originally discussed in the economic and social context, provides the 
conceptual framework within which this study has situated environmental partnership- 
working. Stoker's argument regarding the 'interdependence of governmental and non- 
governmental forces', in particular, is a constant thread throughout this thesis, with multiple 
references to 'state' (governmental) and 'non-state' (non-govern mental) actors. The 
'distribution of power' is also examined more closely in Section 2.3.4, as part of the democratic 
deficit discussion. Stoker (1998) added that governance, as a new process of governing, is 
ultimately concerned with creating the conditions for ordered rule and collective action and its 
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outputs are, therefore, the same as government. He further argued that, despite varying 
scholarly contributions, there appeared to be a baseline agreement that governance refers to 
the development of governing styles leading to the 'blurring' of public / private sector 
boundaries (see also Ferguson, 2010; Logan and Wekerle, 2008). Whilst I concur that this 
'blurring' is indeed a result of state / non-state interaction, I suggest that this concept has, as 
yet, been given little empirical focus regarding its operationafisation. Indeed, my concluding 
comments in this UK-based study suggest an alternative construct where the state has 
'thickened' its boundaries to extend its influence, thus contending with Stoker's arguments 
regarding distribution of power. 
Proposition Critical Issue 
1. Governance refers to a set of There is a divorce between the complex 
institutions and actors that are drawn reality of decision-making associated with 
from but also beyond government. governance and the normative codes used to 
explain and justify government. 
2. Governance identifies the blurring The blurring of responsibilities can lead to 
of boundaries and responsibilities for blame avoidance or scape-goating. 
tackling social and economic issues. 
3. Governance identifies the power Power dependence exacerbates the problem 
dependence involved in the of unintended consequences for 
relationships between institutions government. 
involved in collective action. 
4. Governance is about autonomous The emergence of self-governing networks 
self-governing networks of actors. raises difficulties over accountability. 
5. Governance recognises the capacity Even where governments operate in a 
to get things done which does not rest flexible way to steer collective action 
on the power of government to governance failure may occur. 
command or use its authority. It sees 
government as able to use new tools 
and techniques to steer and guide. 
Table 2.1: The Five Propositions of Governance (Stoker, 1998: 18) 
Stoker's (1998) seminal paper 'Governance as theory: five propositions', presents five 
propositions of governance, which provide the five 'pillars' of a governance framework. Whilst 
governance theory implies a more inclusive, 'bottom up' approach to EPPP formulation and 
delivery, the reality is that each proposition has its own critical issue (or dilemma). These 
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issues form the key discussion throughout this study, with the EPPP providing the context, and 
the MTPN the empirical focus. 
Jessop (1998: 29), meanwhile, whilst initially offering the very broad definition that governance 
can 'refer to any mode of co-ordination of inter-dependent activities', also referred to 
governance as a 'heterarchical structure, with various forms including self-organising 
interpersonal networks, negotiated inter-organisational co-ordination and clecentred, context- 
mediated, inter-systemic steering'. His comment regarding 'heterarchical structures', in 
particular, is explored in Chapter 5, where it is suggested that the state is paradoxically 
devolving responsibility whilst at the same time retaining a hierarchical framework through 
Yarwood's (2002: 289) 'government from a distance' (see also Raco and Imrie, 2000). These 
definitions do, however, carry the similar thread to Stoker (1997,1998) by arguing that 
governance aims towards a multi-stakeholder model, through the formation of networks and / 
or partnerships and new inter-sectoral relationships. Hanberger (2009), also highlighted the 
multi-actor model, a model which he argues is governance through networks and communities 
i. e. where public actors and institutions join networks and partnerships in order to resolve 
pressing problems and challenges. 
Jessop (1998: 29) also argued that governance had 'only recently entered the standard 
anglophone social science lexicon and become a 'buzzword' in various lay circles', and that 
$even now social scientific usages are often 'pre-theoretical' and eclectic; and lay usages are 
just as diverse and contrary'. However, Mackinnon (2000,2002) argued that in the UK it was 
the Conservative reforms of the 1980s that started the transition from local government to 
local governance (or 'hierarchical' to 'network' governance (see Table 2.2)). This was 
operationalised, Mackinnon argued, through the establishment of (non-elected) QUANGOs, 
the introduction of compulsory competitive tendering, and the increasing number of private 
and voluntary agencies in programme delivery. Although 1980s government rhetoric promoted 
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decentralisation and community involvement, this move from government to governing was 
also argued to be a product of neoliberalism and, as such, clarified the relationship between 
neoliberalism and governance. It is argued by some that neoliberalism, in this context, is the 
creation of a free market which will protect nature better than environmental regulation 
through individual decision-making and the creation of new markets for environmental 
services (Pennington, 2005; Slavikova et ol., 2010). The definition of neoliberalism per se, 
however, remains a deeply contested subject, though Polanyi's (1944) reference to the 'self- 
regulating market' appears to hold credence with many. Within his analysis of the term, he 
presents a market that is 'increasingly wide in its geographic scope, comprehensive as the 
governing mechanism for allocating all goods and services, and central as a metaphor for 
organising and evaluating institutional performance' (Polanyi, 1994, in McCarthy and Prudham, 
2003). More recently, Burchell (1996) defined neoliberalism as constructing the conditions for 
enterprise and competition to flourish, whilst Castree (2009) argued that neoliberalism 
contains morketisotion and privotisotion as key criteria, whilst also arguing that 'empirically, it 
is no surprise to discover that, however defined, 'neoliberalism' does not 'ground itself' 
unchanged from place to place' (Castree, 2006: 1). Indeed, McCarthy and Prudham (2003: 275) 
also argued that 'connections between neoliberalism, environmental change, and 
environmental politics remain under-explored in critical scholarship'. 
The Conservative neoliberalist agenda of the 1980s and early 1990s, however, was considered 
by the likes of Jessop (1997) and Goodwin (1998) to yield little benefit. They argued that if left 
to its own devices, the market cannot guarantee economic or social development. Hodge 
(2001: 103) also argued that development challenges cannot be dealt with through 'free 
market environmentalism' and that, although a market framework offers a variety of 
advantages, the absence of government support means that 'private organisations fail to 
represent the full range of public interests and most only operate with substantial government 
support'. Goodwin (1998: 5) concurred, when arguing that the debate had 'shifted from 
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whether old-style public intervention is better than the free market, or vice versa, to one in 
which the major questions now concern the ways in which state and market can be integrated 
to provide the most effective co-ordination'. 
Market Hierarchy Network 
Normative Basis Contract - Employment Complementary 
Property rights Relationship strengths 
Communication means Prices Routines Relational 
Conflict Resolution Haggling / Courts Supervision (flat) Reputational 
concerns 
Degree offlexibility High Low Medium 
Commitment Low Medium High 
Tone or climate Precision / suspicion Formal / bureaucratic Open-ended, 
mutual benefits 
Actor choice Independent Dependent Interdependent 
Table 2.2: Modes of Governance (Adapted from Powell in Lowncles and Skelcher, 1998) 
The argument for and against neoliberalism is further explored throughout this thesis. Section 
5.3, in particular, explores the third sector resource deficit and the market-based approaches 
that are increasingly adopted by some sector actors (see also Liverman's (2004) discussion 
regarding the commodification of nature). 
New Labour subsequently came into power in 1997, with their'Third Way' agenda (see Section 
2.2 for further review) attempting to fuse a market-led economy with a redistributive social 
policy based on restoring social cohesion, social justice and the values of local community 
(Goodwin, 1998; Pearce and Mawson, 2003; Taylor, 2007). This new agenda presented 
partnership-working as integral to New Labour's politics by seeking to reduce bureaucracy and 
the inequity of market solutions (Lowndes and Sullivan, 2004). Thus, partnerships aimed to 
merge the resources and competencies of state and non-state actors (including public, private 
and voluntary sectors). These new approaches to economic and social development were 
subsequently labelled as the new structures of governance (Jessop, 1997). The primary focus 
19 
was on community involvement which, traditionally nested within the context of 
neighbourhood renewal, was now the focus for a modernising government and the promotion 
of democratic renewal through broadening citizen engagement and devolving decision-making 
to local communities (Pearce and Mawson, 2003). Pearce and Mawson (2003: 54) listed the 
following eight potential outcomes of the devolved approach as contributing to delivering the 
government's agenda: 
1. Establishing the needs, priorities and aspirations of key players and individuals and 
ensuring that solutions are designed to accommodate local needs; 
2. Building community capacity by promoting community participation, commitment and 
leadership; 
3. Enhancing and legitimising the role of local elected members; 
4. Encouraging continuous innovation in services, through joined-up working and 
community involvement; 
S. Developing the enabling role of local authorities by attracting the involvement of local 
stakeholders in area-wide strategic and local partnerships; 
6. Providing a territorial focus for cross-cutting measures; 
7. Focusing local authority main programmes and budgets on neighbourhood priorities; 
and 
8. Developing evaluation frameworks to assess practice and mechanisms for exchanging 
best practice. 
In the environmental context, the past three decades have seen a shift in the general approach 
to the management of environmental issues. The United Nations Conference on the Human 
Environment (1972) first introduced the notion 'that international progress on strictly 
environmental issues requires the incorporation of development concerns' (Vogler, 2005: 844), 
a concept further highlighted in 1992 by the introduction of Local Agenda 21 that aimed to 
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make Sustainable Development a priority for the 21'ý century (Gibbs and Jonas, 2000). The 
WSSD and discussions in the Global Ministerial Environmental Forum of the United Nations 
Environment Programme (UNEP) also made specific references to environmental governance 
(Vogler, 2002). These three events reflected the broader move from governmental approaches 
to pollution control to the inclusion of the developing world as trans-boundary issues became 
apparent and the ideas of the precautionary approach and sustainable development were first 
mooted. These moves by the international community to address the increasingly complex 
nature of environmental problems, Meadowcroft (2000: 175) argued: 
I ... reflect change in the prevailing management paradigm as a re-conceptualisation of 
the scales at which environmental problems (and potential solutions) are to be 
approached. From the vantage point of the later understanding, it appears that on 
each dimension there has been movement from a narrow or partial view to a broader 
a more comprehensive vision: from some countries to all countries; from naive self- 
confidence to a more mature appreciation of complexity; from reliance on a single 
dedicated ministry to insistence on all ministries; from clean-up to prevention; from 
almost exclusive dependence on regulation to a balanced portfolio including 
negotiation and tax-based instruments; from national responsibility to international 
collaboration; and so on'. 
Rauschmayer et aL (2009: 43) also argued that 'Environmental issues are typically characterised 
by physical and social complexity, uncertainty, large temporal and spatial scales, and 
irreversibility'. These arguments highlight the necessity for the global move towards a more 
inclusive form of governing due to the trans-boundary and increasingly complex nature of 
environmental issues. In its most basic sense, no one government has the authority to instigate 
global policy and, as such, lead actors are forced into a more embracing style of governing 
through partnership development and international collaboration. Having recognised the need 
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for a global approach to governing the environment, the issues of collaboration, multi-actor 
responsibilities and negotiated instruments all firmly relate to the paradigm shift of 
environmental governance towards increased stakeholder engagement and the community- 
based approach. The Rio Earth Summit aimed to 'implement global aims through a set of 
scaled national, regional and local policies for action' that increasingly require multi-actor 
collaboration and scaled local governance (Evans, 2004: 270). This initiative aimed to bring the 
global environmental agenda to the local level. Broadly speaking, it aimed to do this by firmly 
introducing the concept of environmental governance to the political stage through the 
inclusivity, responsiveness and partnership rhetoric of local governance. Sampford (2002: 79) 
argued that this bottom-up approach reflected an increasing value placed on local knowledge 
and the idea that environmental governance is about involving and implementing human 
solutions .... through values, institutions and practices. Finding those solutions and 
implementing them are the challenges of environmental governance'. 
It is argued by Rauschmayer et ol. (2009: 44), however, that the focus on the 'local scale needs 
to be tempered with the consideration that many of these local interactions are caused by 
trends and interactions at higher levels', and that: 
'Local and global processes are deeply intertwined: what happens at one scale is not 
only connected to other scales (e. g. the influence of global markets on local land-use 
change for agriculture), but is to some degree itself part of processes at other scales 
e. g. national governments agree to global treaties, global agreements enforce or 
weaken the rights of local actors, local resource-use decisions result in global climate 
change, national law stimulates or resolves local conflicts'. 
Sampford further argued that the trans-boundary nature of environmental issues has led to 
questions about whether the traditional political system(s) can offer the policy co-ordination 
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required to manage environmental problems. Sorenson and Torfing (2005) related this idea of 
the move from government to governance to the Westphalian political systems, where the 
idea of a sovereign state that governs society top-down through laws, rules and detailed 
regulations has lost its grip and is replaced by new ideas about a cle-centred governance based 
on interdependence, negotiation and trust. Sampford's appraisal of the failings of the 
Westphalian model in the environmental context leads to the conclusion that a new approach 
to (trans-boundary) governance is required that includes not only governments, but also a 
wide range of non-state actors. In other words, a multi-actor network of state and non-state 
actors is required to govern the environment through a multi-faceted and multi-disciplinary 
approach. This more inclusive multi-actor approach is discussed further by Savan et aL (2004) 
in their consideration of the shifts in environmental governance towards a more citizen-based 
model. They argue that it is the changing process of governing that demands increased 
inclusivity and that governance plays an important role within the sub-sector of the 
environmental sector due to inter-related processes and the need for the state / non-state 
partnership approach. Whilst this multi-actor approach does seem to provide an efficient 
means for governing the environment, it also raises questions, however, regarding the 
democratic validity of these un-elected, and often selectively inclusive, networks made up of 
semi-autonomous actors (see Section 2.3.4 regarding democratic deficit). 
What emerges from these studies is the argument that governance, whilst originating in social 
and economic development programmes, is not new as a concept or socio-political framework, 
but is increasingly seen as a prerequisite for the governing of the environment at all scales, 
from global to local. This paradigm shift from government to governing is a direct result of the 
need for inclusivity, the community-based approach and multi-actor partnerships. Thus, 
partnerships are widely considered as a delivery mechanism for public policy, or, in this 
context, as the means for operationalising the governance concept. In 1990, the OECD (1990, 
in Greer, 2001: 752) defined partnerships as: 
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'Systems of formalised co-operation, grounded in legally binding arrangements or 
Informal understandings, co-operative working relationships, and mutually adopted 
plans among a number of institutions. They involve agreements on policy and 
programme objectives and the sharing of responsibility, resources, risks and benefits 
over a specified period of time. ' 
In addition to policy arenas such as urban regeneration and social Inclusion, partnership- 
working has become embedded as a significant vehicle for the implementation of rural 
development policy in the UK (Edwards et oL, 2001). Their emergence, In part, reflects a 
growing shift from government to governance (Marsden and Murdoch, 1998; Murdoch and 
Abram, 1998), and Is a recognition of complex economic, social and political changes, which 
have transformed the manner In which policy Is made and delivered (Greer, 2001). This 
includes an increasing acknowledgement of the multi-faceted nature of EPPP, the Inter- 
connectedness of environmental decisions taken at the local, regional and international levels, 
and the Increasing fragmentation of policy delivery. The purpose of the next section is to 
review the approach and styles of partnerships and to explore the links between partnerships 
and governance. 
2.2 Partnerships: a Tool for Environmental Governance? 
Partnerships are defined by Darlow and Newby (1997: 74) as 'an arrangement existing between 
two or more organisations working towards a defined goal. ', where they also emphasise the 
high degree of interdependency and shared working that characterise partnerships, so setting 
them apart from the network approach of inter-agency co-ordination and collaboration. 
Skelcher (1996) sees these networks as the basis on which formal partnerships develop and 
Stoker (1998: 23) describes self-governing networks as the 'ultimate partnership activity. 
Partnerships exist along a broad continuum of theory and practice, with Pratt et & (1998) 
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arguing that they require a wide range of commitment and working arrangements extending 
from competition to cooperation, coordination and coevolution, with shared goals only a 
feature of the latter. Mattesich and Monsey (1998) make similar distinctions, the most 
important of which is between types of joining-up, where partners maintain their individual 
authority but cooperate on some issues (often at the margins of their main 'business'), and 
types of joining-uP where partners pool authority. The instinctive desire to maintain 
organisational autonomy implies the necessity for strong political leadership within all 
potential partner organisations committed to working together. Those involved in joint 
encleavour must perceive that there is credibility to be gained from persevering despite the 
difficulties. Inter-agency relationships are complex and with varying actor priorities, so clarity 
of purpose, a clear set of objectives and a coherent and feasible programme are essential for a 
successful partnership (Section 8.6.1 of this study draws on theoretical and empirical findings 
to present the components of effective partnership-working). 
Although written in the urban context, Haughton's (1999) paper entitled 'Information and 
Participation within Environmental Management', presents some interesting arguments 
regarding the key components of processes for informed and participatory environmental 
management and planning. In addition to discussing technical expertise, it emphasised the role 
of the community in understanding the environment and helping develop appropriate 
responses and discussed how these fit within the broader debates on 'good governance'. 
'Whilst there is much rhetoric about commitment to public participation, too often the 
reality is that this is lacking. In part, this reflects unreasonable expectations of 
community groups and a reluctance by state authorities to invest in capacity-building 
for this sector - too often, attachment to participation reeks of seeking to off-load 
responsibilities without shifting resources, or of attempts at bureaucratic capture, 
keeping groups tied to small revenue streams without allowing them to build up the 
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asset base from which they can develop their own revenue streams' (Haughton, 
1999: 61). 
The above extract includes a number of points that this study has expanded on, including 
Haughton's themes of 'rhetoric vs. reality' of public participation (see sections 6.3.1 and 6.3.2), 
the off-loading of responsibilities (see Section 5.2.2) and the lack of third sector capacity- 
building (see Section 5.3). The delivery of government policies has, however, become 
dominated by ideas of networks and partnerships. This approach is perceived as politically and 
financially beneficial because it seeks to bring together the multiple parties with an interest in 
a particular locality or and / or interest. Sometimes such approaches have been locally 
initiated, while in other cases they are a prerequisite for entry into central government and 
European funding programmes (Lowncles et a/., 2007). The last decade has also witnessed a 
significant move towards new modes of governing that are based on coordination and 
collaboration (Imrie and Raco, 1999). In particular, local level partnerships (i. e. Local 
Biodiversity Action Plans) have been widely introduced around the world and have become a 
key means for the governing and implementation of environmental policies at the local level 
i. e. putting policies into practice. 
This is a direct reflection of the increasingly complicated nature of the trans-boundary 
(political, social and territorial) nature of these policies which has subsequently led to the 
embracing of the concepts of partnerships, alliances, collaborations and networks. 
Environmental problems, however, appear on different and more or less distinct spatial scales. 
As Newig and Fritsch (2009) point out, a loca lised pollution incident can lead to a wider socio- 
ecological impact cutting across established administrative territorial jurisdictions, and that to 
effectively respond to such challenges, the scale of governance institutions should be adapted 
to that of the environmental issue. This has led partnerships to range from community-based, 
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locally self generated and voluntary initiatives, to top-down, centrally-steered and 
govern ment-d riven structures (see Section 7.3 regarding managerial technologies). 
Partnerships are well researched and there is a large body of existing knowledge (Connelly et 
aL, 2006; Darlow and Newby, 1997; Goodwin, 1998; Hutchinson, 1994; Imrie and Raco, 1998; 
Mackinnon, 2002; Raco et of., 2006; Skelcher, 1996; Stoker, 1998). Tilson et al. (1997) state 
that partnerships are not a new concept, but a well established instrument for the formulation 
and implementation of public policy. In the political context, Hastings (1996) and Stoker (1998) 
discuss public-private partnerships in the Thatcher years as formed to alleviate the economic 
issues associated with chronic urban housing problems. This concept of the public-private 
partnership has now evolved to become an operational norm in a wide range of government 
programmes. Although partnership projects can be initiated by government, they rely heavily 
on, and increasingly expect, voluntary support and public help in order to succeed. Whilst 
some commentators suggest that partnerships have 'merely created a series of marriages of 
convenience between disparate factions' (Tilson et oL, 1997: 1) and that voluntary effort and 
active citizenship are necessary to compensate for the withdrawal of state provision of 
services (Kearns, 1992; Murdoch, 1997; Stoker, 1998), the more positive appraisal is that it 
gives local ownership, increases capacity to deliver and provides the community-based 
platform that is essential for sustainability (Pearce and Mawson, 2003; Yarwood, 2002). 
Indeed, Chapter 28 of the 1992 Rio Earth Summit's Agenda 21 ('Local Authorities' Initiatives in 
Support of Agenda 21') outlined the objectives of LA21 and the actions required, detailing how 
local governments should foster partnerships with other organisations in order to both 
mobilise support and to promote knowledge and local capacity (Evans et aL, 2006; Gibbs and 
Jonas, 2000). At this local level, LA21 led to local authorities adopting the partnership 
approach to sustainable development by including previously marginalised actors through the 
creation of cross-sector collaborations between public, private and voluntary sector 
stakeholders (Day, 1998; United Nations, 1993). LA21 sought to achieve this by including all 
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community interests and stressed the need to involve local businesses (Worthington et oL, 
2003). 
Partnerships are now considered by policy and research communities as central to 
sustainability and environmental programme delivery due to an increasing governance-based 
approach through 'bottom-up' participatory processes and the crossing of political divides and 
geographic boundaries (Connelly et aL, 2006; Hutchinson, 1994; Sorensen, 2005). Davies 
(2002: 190) concurred: 
'Within policy circles, multi-sector partnerships, despite their inherent slipperiness in 
terms of definition, distinction and containment, are seen as an important mechanism 
whereby sustainable development can be operationalised and in particular local 
governance structures can be strengthened'. 
The outcomes of the Rio Earth Summit arguably provided the foundation for the 
environmental sector's subsequent focus on sustainable development, partnerships and 
governance discourse throughout the 1990s (Davies, 2002). This included 'sustainable 
development' and 'grass roots community understanding and action' becoming the accepted 
responses by contemporary society when presented with increasingly pressing issues (Smith et 
o/., 2000). Its core themes certainly brought focus to partnerships by including the need to 
develop collaborative advantage when seeking to solve environmental issues and the assertion 
that global partnerships are only effective if based on new levels of co-operation between key 
sectors of society and government. Huxham (1996) argued that partnerships gain this 
collaboration advantage when an objective is met that could not be done by a single partner, 
i. e. through synergistic gain and programme enhancement from the sharing of resources in a 
collaborative as opposed to competitive manner. As mentioned above, one of the five key 
documents to come out of the Rio Earth Summit was Agenda 21, which called on governments 
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to adopt national strategies for sustainable development by addressing social, economic and 
environmental processes. Core to this principle were partnerships, with Agenda 21's Chapter 2 
emphasising (on a global level) the need for trans-national corporations, business, regional, 
state, provincial and local governments, NGOs and community groups to work together. 
The WSSD then identified the need for partnership models to include key components, 
including targets, timetables, monitoring, coordination and implementation mechanisms, 
arrangements for predicted funding and technology transfer. Closely related to these 
objectives was the need for clear acknowledgement of the perceived advantages that these 
collaborations could bring. In financial terms, for example, a clear incentive may be access to 
additional funding. Partnership-working may also facilitate innovative service developments 
that depend on the joint input of complementary professional skills, with scientific credentials 
particularly relevant in the environmental sector (Eden et ah, 2006; Marsden and Murdoch, 
1998; Yarwood, 2002). It is also important, however, to identify and acknowledge the potential 
threats to each partner so that there will be mutual sensitivity to their difficulties, together 
with recognition that certain risks are undertaken (Hardy et aL, 1992; Springett, 1995). 
According to Thomson (1999), it is the demonstration of these tangible opportunities and 
threats on all sides that sustains collaborative working. A clear indication of willingness to co- 
operate based on a sense of the potential advantages also helps counteract the pressure to 
preserve organisational autonomy (these power structures and rights of authority are 
examined in greater detail in Section 7.2) and to avoid Tilson et Ws (1997: 1) 'marriages of 
convenience'. 
The autonomy of partnerships is an important issue and, despite some authors arguing that 
governance presents the opportunity for flexible and less-formalised structures (Connelly et 
oL, 2006; Papadopoulus, 2003; Stoker, 1997), many partnerships still rely on external funding 
from central government and the European Union that limits their capacity to adjust to local 
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context (empirical findings in Chapters 5 and 7 support this assertion). Lowncles et a/. 
(1997: 334) also argued that, during the 1990s, multilateral partnerships of state and non-state 
actors were developed partly in response to 'local imperatives and debates about building 
healthy and sustainable communities, but also ... stimulated by central government funding 
programmes'. These local partnerships are then faced with a dilemma; firstly that central 
government sets the agenda, yet the partnerships are also expected to respond to local needs 
and requirements. Secondly, when the external funding is discontinued, the sustainab ilitY4 of 
the partnership arrangements themselves is then called into question (Peck and Tickell, 1995). 
Findings from the MTPN certainly suggest that difficulties in securing replacement funding for 
partnerships and projects can leave both a 'funding gap' and a 'capacity gap' (see Section 5.3 
regarding the resource deficit and the steps taken by some third sector actors to build 
programme financial sustainability). 
The partnership concept implies 'inclusivity, equitability and transparency' (Davies, 2002: 192), 
so the ideal scenario is where there are comparable levels of contribution in terms of finance 
and other resources, and that all partners have the same degree of involvement and 
management control. In reality, however, partners invariably have varying technical and 
financial resources. Although a partnership may arise out of informal processes of networking 
based on trust and mutual benefit, as mentioned above, it may then subsequently be 
formalised in order to access funding (i. e. government, European, or philanthropic - see 
Appendix G for details and classifications of various environmental funders). The priority that 
the access to funding assumes in actor's day-to-day business activities is emphasised by Alter 
and Hage (1993: 109), who comment that 'organisational decision-makers' primary focus is on 
finding and defending an adequate supply of resources' (findings supported this assertion). 
This focus, argued Lowncles et ah (1997), may then lead to the creation of hierarchical 
4 Sustainability in this context means continuation of a partnership after end of the initial funding. For example, if a 
partnership was formed and funding provided to carry out a three year biodiversity project, then the partnership 
may dissolve at the end of the three year term. In some case, this may be acceptable, but findings suggest that most 
partnerships seek to continue. 
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structures based on rules and status, with subsequent contractual, market-based relationships 
constructed to allocate resources for the delivery of a programme. If / when this situation 
arises, then the heterarchy of the governance concept is potentially compromised, with new 
power structures built, and the creation of 'partnership principals' may occur (see Section 
7.2.2 regarding how an actor can adopt the position of 'partnership principal'). Where there is 
this type of significant imbalance, it is reasonable to query whether there can ever be a 
genuine partnership, with Alter and Hage (1993) suggesting that partners have to be of a 
similarsize and Hardy etol. (1992) also arguingthat there should be no junior portners. These 
are interesting arguments, but ones that this study do not support due to the very nature of 
the governance approach engaging with a wide variety of actors invariably bring differing 
levels of resources and expertise to partnerships. 
Bennett and Krebs (1991) further emphasise organisational relationships by discussing the 
bringing together of public, private and voluntary sector actors to establish agreements 
working towards a common end. The common end in this context is sustainable development, 
which Smith et aL (2000: 215) argued provides the challenge 'where globally agreed goals are 
formally expressed at national level, yet assumed to be delivered by grass-roots action'. 
Increasingly discussed by leading authors, partnerships are placed in the environmental 
context as a multi-level collaborative activity that is rooted in environmental governance, 
where stakeholder collaboration becomes an important feature in the multi-dimensional 
nature of many environmental problems and approaches (Connelly et oL, 2006: Day, 1998; 
Evans, 2004; Goodwin, 1998; Imrie and Raco, 1998; Jepson, 2005; Jessop, 1998,2002; 
Mackinnon, 2002; Raco et aL, 2006; Scott, 2004; Stoker, 1998; Thompson, 2005; Yarwood, 
2002). O'Donnell and Thomas (1998: 122) outline the key characteristics of these partnerships: 
0 The process involves a combination of consultation, negotiations and bargaining. 
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The partnership process is heavily dependent on a shared understanding of the key 
mechanisms and relationships in any given area. 
The process reflects interdependence between the partners. The partnership is 
necessary because no party can achieve its goals without a significant degree of 
support from others. 
Partnership is characterised by a problem-solving approach designed to produce 
consensus, in which various interest groups address joint problems. 
Partnership involves trade-offs both between and within interest groups. 
New Labour has attempted to seat these notions of grassroots action, state / non-state 
collaboration, community action and social organisation at the local level within its third Way 
political framework, which recognises the new freedom for individuals, 'autonomy of action' 
and wider community involvement (Curry, 2001; Giddens, 1998: 65). In turn, new relationships 
between the individual and the community are required that are constant with the notions of 
'no rights without responsibilities' and 'no authority without democracy' (Giddens, 1998: 68). 
This study unpacks these notions through its exploration of responsibility and legitimacy. 
Hutton (1999: 73) argued that these new relationships between individuals and community are 
inextricably linked through the notion of 'the stakeholder economy and society', and that this 
new political thinking also introduced the ideas of social cohesion, trust, co-operation, long- 
termism, participation, active citizenship, rights and obligations. This new value system, argued 
Curry (2001), is used to address government policies which now rely on the development of 
state / non-state partnerships to being grassroots action and build stakeholder responsibility. 
In addition to this new local action and responsibility paradigm, Hutton (1991) argued that the 
state actively sought to involve non-state actors in policy-making and implementation to bring 
broader social benefits, as well as more direct local community advantages. 
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Although the third Way agenda was set by New Labour in the late 1990s, Curry (2001) points 
out that the concept has a longer history, with the notions of subsidiarity and citizenship being 
presented in the 1980s by the Conservative government. Whilst perhaps originally created by 
the then government to widen consumer choice and increase public service customer- 
orientation and value for money, policies also began to emerge that gave local communities a 
stronger voice and greater responsibility (Curry, 2001). There was not, however, a dovetailing 
of Thatcherism and New Labour agendas, with Curry also pointing out the substantive 
difference between government ethos, i. e. that New Labour sought to strengthen the rights 
and access to information to exercise a collective influence over bureaucratic and corporate 
power (as opposed to a stronger voice in the market). As a result of this, the need for state / 
non-state collaborations increased, with the ensuing partnerships and associated notions of 
active citizenship, social cohesion and stakeholder empowerment becoming key components 
of governance (for further examination of active citizenship see Ranade and Hudson, 2003; 
Raco et oL, 2006; Snape and Taylor, 2003). 
With Old Labour's 'command and control' systems seen as 'outmoded' and the 'market-type 
solutions' of the Conservative 80's ideologically and practically condemned, the third Way 
subsequently produced a stream of legislation, policy guidelines, 'best practice' and additional 
funding. It aimed to develop partnerships between the statutory, voluntary and private sectors 
and increase and diversify stakeholder engagement, especially local communities, also known 
as 'community governance' (Goodwin' 1998; Lowndes and Skelcher, 1998; Raco et aL, 2006). 
This new form of governance was operationalised by the state around the South West region 
by the South West Regional Development Agency, which, for example, lists the requirement 
for spatial or thematic partnerships to access their Rural Renaissance programme (South West 
Regional Development Agency, 2004). Authors such as Wilson (2004) and agencies such as the 
South West Rural Affairs Forum, consider formerly politically marginalised actors such as 
environmental and community groups as becoming part of the new decision-making and policy 
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formulation network. Some also argue that these new 'rural' partnerships go hand-in-hand 
with the changing vision of newly empowered rural community stakeholders and apparent 
shift in attitudes towards greater environmental stewardship (Winter, 1996; Jessop, 1998; 
Mackinnon, 2000). 
2.3 Environmental Partnerships 
2.3.1 Background and the Environmental Context 
Worthington et al. (2003) argued that the unique challenges produced by the environmental 
sector cut across disciplinary boundaries and, therefore, require cross-sector collaborations. 
These complex collaborations, suggest Bulkeley et ah (2003: 235), involve actors from 'local, 
national and international levels, and from public, private and civil society spheres, and that 
the shift from government to governance, or from a more linear, state-dominated political 
system to one which involves non-hierarchical relations between a dense web of state and 
non-state actors'. Findings suggest that this is indeed the case, though this study agrees (see 
Chapter 7) with their subsequent assertions that 'no one tier or sphere is necessarily dominant 
in any particular case, and the ensuing policy outcomes will be a result of the processes which 
occur within and between arenas of governance'. Wallington et aL (2003) argue that these 
multi-level partnerships have been championed as the most appropriate vehicle for solving 
environmental problems due to their sharing of skills, resources and knowledge, and the 
ensuing legitimacy attributed to plans, policies and programmes. This argument is also 
supported by Jordan et oL (2003) who discussed the emergence of governance and the fact 
that no single actor has the resources, knowledge or information to solve complex 
environmental problems whilst also retaining the desired triple-bottom-line of environmental, 
social and economic sustainability. others have argued that no single organisation working 
alone is able to achieve this goal as effectively as a number of partner organisations working 
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together to create the desired added volue sought by most partnerships (Darlow and Newby, 
1997; Lowncles and Skelcher, 1998; Ranade and Hudson, 2003). However, whilst organisations 
working together will (for the most part) benefit from shared resources and bring added value 
to their activities, Edwards et ol. (2000) argued that differing partnership alms and structures 
often produce different obstacles to effective partnership-working and may therefore require 
different strategies for good practice. Lockwood (2009: 170) concurred: 
'Devolved and collaborative governance arrangements are intended to provide more 
co-ordinated approaches to the challenges presented by complex problems, and 
attempt to integrate activities of diverse public and private actors, instruments and 
institutions. In environmental matters, the challenge is coping with multiple values, 
multiple stakeholders, different interests, multiple functions of natural resources such 
as water, and high stakes'. 
Debate over the partnership approach has led Mackintosh (1992) to theorise three partnership 
models. The first model is that of synergy, with sub-group resource synergy resulting from 
same-sector collaborations where organisations combine efforts for mutual gain and policy 
synergy, where differing public and private sector views, resources and objectives are 
combined to increase profit value, policy innovation or solutions (see also Hastings, 1996). The 
second model is transformation, where partnership-working changes or challenges the aims 
and operating cultures of each other to either find common ground for mutual benefit or 
move the other towards their own ideas. This process is further sub-grouped into 
unidirectional transformation where one partner changes and adapts to another's core values, 
and mutual transformation where all partners carry out change. The final model is budget 
enlargement, where the primary reason for the partnership is to extract additional resources 
from another party. This is common in the environmental sector where access to funding is 
often achieved through partnering with a trust, charity or voluntary sector organisation. The 
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partnership approach is usually formed as a result of; (1) being able to address a defined 
problem; (2) being able to provide clear partner benefits; and (3) partner motivation and 
commitment. Stoker and Young (1993) list six factors for partnership sustainability: 
0 Recognition of dependency 0a mutual orientation 
0 pooling of resources 0a commitment over the long haul 
0 development of trust between 0 clear remit 
partners5 
Partnership-working and the adoption of a sustainable approach are considered by many to be 
critical in achieving desired outcomes. Social, economic and political factors need to be 
considered hand-in-hand with the core theme of environmental sustainability (i. e. biodiversity, 
allocation of natural resources and pollution) if there is to be a lasting impact. Joint ventures 
present a greater chance of success against the challenges increasingly facing the environment 
through both the pooling of strengths and skills, and the merging of audiences to build 
stakeholder support and programme legitimacy. The added benefits of increasingly effective 
political lobbyists, social integration through enterprise and community involvement and 
potential project longeVitY6 increases the credibility and effectiveness of partnerships. Social 
enterprise and community involvement are becoming the key delivery methods of 
environmental programmes and, alongside project longevity and funding, are increasingly 
considered to be central to the overall success of an environmental project (Edwards et aL, 
2000; Hutchinson, 1994; Stoker, 1993). In the rural context, for example, research suggests 
that the post-prod UCtiViSt7 era in the agricultural landscape has broken down traditional 
government / private sector relationships, allowing formerly politically marginalised actors 
5 It could be argued that this is not such a central feature within the environmental sector due to the largely non- 
commercial and not-for-profit nature of projects. 
6 Partnership duration can also be limited by funding or short-term nature (Hutchinson 1994, Edwards et oL 2001). 
7 Post-Productivist: exte nsifi cation, diversification and dispersion of agricultural production. Indicators: policy 
change; organic farming; counter-urbanisation; inclusion of environmental NGOs at the core of policy-making; 
consumption of the countryside; and on-farm diversification activities (Wilson and Rigg, 2003). 
36 
such as environmental and community groups into the decision-making and policy formulation 
network (Wilson, 2004). This change in levels and trajectories of governance through local 
stakeholder empowerment is eroding corporate and state powers as sole advisors and shapers 
of policies and decisions affecting the rural sector as a whole (Boonstra, 2006). This whole 
process, referred to by Wilson (2004) as 'post-productivist rural governance', supports the 
arguments by Winter (1996), Jessop (1998) and Mackinnon (2000) that it goes hand-in-hand 
with the changing vision of newly empowered community stakeholders and a subsequent shift 
in attitudes away from destructive environmental practices. Thus, multiple environmental and 
development goals can be achieved by partnership networks adopting a broad range of 
technologies, policies, and measures that explicitly recognise the linkages between 
environmental problems and human needs (MacKinnon, 2000). 
Edwards (2001: 290) argued that partnerships may represent 'a new approach to government, 
rather than the emergence of competing forms of governance'. He further suggests that 
partnership-working is representative of institutional transition away from the 'spatially 
contiguous top-down and hierarchical system of the local state' towards both the steering of 
semi-autonomous and collaborative networks and a rescaling of governance through the 
transferring of power and responsibility (downwards) to community level. It is this inclusion of 
non-elected actors that raises the issues of responsibility, legitimacy and accountability that I 
argue are core socio-political issues surrounding the successful and democratic conversion of 
environmental policy into practice (referred to by Smith et ol. (2000, in Davies 2002: 192) as 
'translating statements of intent into practical actions'. 
I argue that the three core issues of responsibility, legitimacy and accountability represent the 
over-arching framework for understanding effective partnership-working. This thesis also 
argues that Stoker and Young's (1993) factors for partnership sustainability form distinct 
subsets of this framework. For example, it could be argued that an actor would not accept 
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responsibility if it did not have a 'commitment over the long haul'. I also suggest that the 
'development of trust between partners' sits within the construct of legitimacy, and that a 
'clear remit' is required to provide the required operational and financial accountability. 
Further notions of power and trust, also sit within the accepting of responsibility and the 
acquisition of legitimacy, respectively. 
The following sub-sections focus specifically on these three issues of accepting responsibility, 
acquiring legitimacy and providing accountability, with further empirical foci being brought in 
chapters 5,6 and 7 through researcher-practitioner experiences of the MTPN. 
2.3.2 Responsibility 
The European Union consists of a group of nation states with varying constitutional systems, 
ranging from unitary to federal (Fairbrass, 2003). The UK has traditionally been considered a 
unitary state, but New Labour's 1997 start of tenure began a period of constitutional reform, 
including the 1998 devolution of power and clecentralisation of decision-making powers to 
bodies in Scotland, Wales, Northern Ireland and the English regions. This new, regional 
governance was advocated as a means of locating governance closer to local communities to 
enhance democracy, increase stakeholder engagement, and reduce the need for regulatory 
intervention (Lane et al., 2004). This new governance, argued Pellizzoni (2004: 542), entailed an 
'enhancement or a change in the relations of responsibility. One policy area that has been 
devolved as part of this process, argued Fairbrass (2003), is environmental policy, with 
authority for environmental decision-making devolved to the sub-national level, requiring local 
authorities and a variety of non-state actors to shoulder responsibility for the delivery of 
environmental protection measures. This has, in part, been due to the problems associated 
with traditional 'command-and-control' strategies of government (Pellizzoni, 2005), including 
38 
over-legalisation, lack of local context, and the 'bureaucratic drag" and audit culture of central 
government (Jepson, 2005: 517; see also Chapter 7 for further discussion). Thus, this 
governance approach has seen the state replacing direct intervention with new constructions 
of 'active' and 'responsible' citizens (Ferguson, 2010). This transferring of power and 
responsibility (downwards) to the community level brings new community involvement and 
the sharing of responsibilities between the state and non-state actors through partnership- 
working, and is seen as s central pillar of the broader discourse of sustainable development 
and key components of environmental governance (Raco, 2006; Thompson, 2005). However, 
this contracting-out of public services, or 'hollowing out of the state', makes it difficult for 
citizens to attribute responsibility for environmental programme quality, effectiveness and 
efficiency of delivery to any one actor due to the devolution of power and their (multi-actor) 
complexity and unelected nature (Jepson, 2005; Jessop, 1998; Shortall, 2004; Yarwood 2002). 
Stoker (1998: 18) argued that this blurring of responsibilities between state and non-state 
actors 'can lead to blame avoidance and scape-goating'. It is further argued by Savan (2004) 
that this partnership (or non-state) approach results in more responsibility devolved into 
communities, which then effectively gives the government an opportunity to withdraw from 
their responsibilities. Thus, he argues, partnerships 
..... can be constructed to limit the ability of government to shirk its responsibilities, 
while building a more informed citizenry that is able to provide opportunities and 
resources for the general public while observing elements of the local environment 
that are not seen by government agencies' (Savan, 2004: 617). 
Whilst Savan's argument highlighted the importance of localness (see also Evans, 2004), 
Higgins and Lockie (2002) also argued that this devolution of responsibility for environmental 
governance is not fully supported with the necessary resources (technical, financial, human) to 
B'Costly bureaucracy that will divert scarce resources from the cause and do little to enhance efficiency and impact' 
(Jepson 2005: 517). 
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meet the aim and objectives of the programmes they have been engaged to deliver9 (this 
argument receives an empirical focus in Section 5.3). Additionally, and perhaps paradoxically, it 
could also be argued that whilst many aspects of environmental programme delivery have 
been devolved downwards to community groups and NGOs, EPPP formulation has also shifted 
upwards to the supranational level such as the European Union (EU), i. e. the 1992 Habitats 
Directive and 2002 Waste Directive(s) (Fairbrass, 2003). What is speculated here, therefore, is 
that the state (at national level) has not only shifted responsibility for the development and 
delivery of environment programmes to multi-actor networks and supra-national 
organisations, but has also neglected to allocate sufficient resources to empower particularly 
lower-level organisations. 
However, one of the main reasons for the partnership approach to environmental governance 
is to overcome problems in the implementation of environmental programmes through 
community involvement and stakeholder engagement in the decision-making process 
(Sorensen and Torfing, 2005; Volger, 2005). As a result, joint responsibility and ownership of 
programmes are theoretically developed, leading to improved support and actor commitment. 
It could be concluded, therefore, that for environmental programmes to assume this added 
level of responsibility, they 'must acknowledge interdependence, expand transparency, and 
emphasise the accountability of all parties for their own actions' and that 'clear and publicly 
available agreements should be developed which outline the respective responsibilities of 
citizens groups and government' (Savan et oL, 2004: 617). This also raises issues concerning 
how the public will respond to these new governance structures and shared responsibility, the 
success of which is dependent on attitudinal and behavioural change at grassroots level 
(Goodwin, 1998; Jessop, 2002; Jordan, 1999; Wilson, 2004). The degree of actual, as opposed 
to desired, stakeholder engagement is also examined by Jepson (2005: 522), who argued that 
9 This is especially topical in the voluntary and community sector in the UK, where the current government is 
looking to indirectly assist the sector through the introduction of 'full cost recovery' (FCR). FCR aims to secure 
funding for overhead costs and make delivery agents sustainable. In recognition that public services have often 
suffered from a shortfall In funding due to project only (and not core) funding. FCR ensures that funding for 
programmes reflect the true cost of delivery. 
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responsibility and moral accountability are increasingly placed with NGOs in their role as 
community representativeslo, where: 
'Most citizens might have a deep-seated need to believe in NGOs because to do 
otherwise would dismantle the civil structures through which citizens can abrogate 
their feelings of moral concern and responsibility for issues that are beyond their 
direct sphere of influence. ' 
It is evident, therefore, that the new devolved governance arrangement aims to create a 
shared responsibility for environmental sustainability amongst both state and non-state actors 
through environmental partnerships. These new relationships, however, need to: 
1. Retain a steering presence by the state"; 
2. Assign stakeholder responsibilities to enable clear accountability and legitimacy; and 
I Uphold the key discourses of sustainable development (community and participation). 
This downwards 'redistribution of state functions' to regions and outwards to non-state actors 
suggests 'a reconsideration of the ways in which legitimacy and authority have been 
reconfigured' (Bulkeley, 2005: 879). 
2.3.3 Legitimacy 
Suchman (1995, in Jepson, 2005: 519) defined legitimacy as 'A generalised perception or 
assumption that the actions of an entity are desirable, proper, or appropriate within the 
socially constructed system of norms, values and beliefs and definitions'. Although Jessop 
(1990: 343) highlighted that 'the nature and forms of [state] legitimation vary and so do the 
10 Thus indicating that responsibility is automatically attributed by citizens to these community representatives. 
11 Through managerial technologies and sufficient allocation of resources. 
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various functions and activities which states perform on behalf of the community', for there to 
be legitimacy of governance environments, Welch (2002: 443) argued that there must 'either 
be legitimacy of key constituent parts, or a general understanding of (and legitimacy accorded 
to) the whole'. Legitimacy is further examined by Dryzek (2001: 651), who argued that actions 
only become legitimate when the actor has the approval of society and that 'outcomes are 
legitimate to the extent they receive reflective assent through participation in authentic 
deliberation by all those subject to the decision in question'. This argument is robust in theory, 
yet practice can prove to be challenging due to the wide stakeholder engagement that it 
suggests (this is further explored in Section 2.3.4). Indeed, Parkinson (2003: 180) argued that 'in 
complex societies deliberative participation by all those affected by collective decision-making 
is extremely implausible'. In the context of environmental partnerships, however, Connelly et 
al. (2006: 268) concurred with Dryzek: 
'rhe legitimacy of these structures (partnerships) is usually not specified but merely 
asserted, with partnerships presented as intrinsically good and their legitimacy as self- 
evident, without the necessity of new legitimising mechanisms to replace those 
inherent in representative democratic structures and that collaborative approaches 
are argued to secure legitimacy for these policies, by giving citizens and civil society 
organisations direct access to previously remote decision making processes, as equal 
'stakeholders". 
Connelly et oL (2006: 269) added that legitimacy is necessary for democracy as it exercises 
'power without coercion'. Their argument included Schmitter's (2001: 2) comments that for the 
actions of those 'that rule to be accepted voluntarily by those who are ruled, legitimacy must 
convert power into authority. To contextualise, it is the conceptual underpinning of 
environmental governance that key programmes are shaped through collaborative 
deliberation between stakeholders, with these partnerships arguably securing legitimacy 
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through community involvement and public participation by providing access to previously 
remote decision making processes (Boonstra, 2006; Connelly et aL, 2006). This is particularly 
true since the turn to the paradigm of sustainable development and the adoption of Agenda 
21, which highlighted the need for the involvement of non-state networks. Indeed, Steffek 
(2009: 314) argued that 'as a good deal of voluntary collaboration is required and change 
towards sustainable lifestyles cannot be pushed through in a top-down fashion, institutional 
legitimacy is not only some normative asset but a functional imperative'. Given that there are 
a range of different actors involved in environmental governance, each with their own agenda 
to fulfil and potentially large individual as well as collective benefits, the key players have to be 
both legitimate and accountable. As such, there are also issues surrounding the legitimacy of 
actor's environmental knowledge and contributions (Eden et a/., 2006). In exploring this issue, 
Connelly et aL (2006: 267) suggested that 'each arena's legitimacy was a hybrid, justified 
through a complex mix of competing rationales and that legitimacy is always conditional, in 
need of maintenance and susceptible to challenge' (see also Beetham, 1991). Jepson 
(2005: 515) added that: 
'One role of governance is to maintain and strengthen these legitimacy assets by 
establishing and over-seeing accountability streams that recognise that public trust is 
built on the cumulative evidence of legitimacy ... trust and legitimacy is generated 
by 
the belief that NGOs (for example) act in accordance with what the public perceives as 
the qualities and values that characterise the movement. These might include ... being 
the voice of nature, independent, honest, idealistic, grounded and cost effective'. 
This argument is well-justified when considering the political role of NGOs, but potentially 
lacking when taking into account the potential for their subjective scientific contributions (as 
has recently been suggested by the media regarding climate change). This is especially 
pertinent when considering that environmental issues are usually defined as science-related 
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ones, where expert knowledge can be considered to be more important than the opinions, 
demands or needs of citizens (Sun et a/., 2009). Further, whilst political legitimacy is claimed by 
some of the larger NGOs due to their high numbers of members, this is a different validation 
criteria to scientific legitimacy i. e. an academic institution will bring this to a partnership but 
with little or no complementary political status due to its non-elected nature and lack of 
membership (Eden et aL, 2006). However, whilst 'scientific expertise remains the principal 
form of legitimisation in the leading environmental organisations', political, in addition to 
scientific, legitimacy must also be sought (Yearley, 1991: 38). 
On examining the concept of legitimacy in a deliberative democracy, Parkinson (2003: 182) 
argued that legitimacy is subject to 'legality, justifiability and consent' - pre-conditions that can 
be achieved through having the appropriate interests, qualifications and / or experience (see 
also Connelly et aL, 2006 and Stoker, 1998). Choosing partners and maintaining networks with 
these legitimacy attributes are, therefore, essential for sponsoring agencies such as central 
government and are equally important for local communities if the partnership is to retain 
trust and confidence. This issue of legitimacy is also highlighted by Boonstra (2006: 303), who 
stated that it 'becomes more problematic to rely on the authority of representatives 
concerning policy choices, and that constituencies no longer felt normatively obliged to accept 
agreements made by their representatives'. This is due to the fact that, unlike locally elected 
government officials, actors within many partnerships do not carry the mantle of legitimacy 
due to their autonomous, non-elected nature. Boonstra (2006: 303) adds: 
'it was common practice to reach a consensus over implementation with the 
representatives of the different, organised interest groups on a national and provincial 
level. However, the public at local levels did not accept these consensuses any longer. 
The support base of the traditional representatives weakened due to their fragmented 
constituency, which problematised consensus'. 
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However, an element of consistency with the principles of the representative democracy, 
including Goodwin's (1998: 8) 'simple legitimacy of elected democracy and accountability', 
should be maintained by partnerships (O'Toole et aL, 2004). This is further argued by O'Toole 
and Burdess (2004: 239) who, when discussing local development committees, asserted that 
'Members of the development groups gain legitimacy through their coordinating functions as 
local representatives'. Legitimacy is, therefore, considered to be a precondition for effective 
governance and a means of delivering programmes whilst promoting stakeholder interests. For 
example, an (unelected) NGO receiving European or government funding for the delivery of 
Local Biodiversity Action Plan objectives, i. e. woodland regeneration, is not subject to the 
same monitoring and review as an Area of Outstanding Natural Beauty or local council office. 
As such, it could, therefore, be considered to be lacking in legitimacy regarding the 
quantifiable delivery of government objectives (Ward and McNicholas,, 1998). Where there is 
room for further discussion, however, is in the consideration of the smaller NGOs that do not 
benefit from such funding, but do still contribute to the formulation and delivery of EPPP- 
Additionally, if an NGO provides powerful actors (government agency, corporation or donor) 
with something of value, then it will be considered legitimate in their eyes but arguably lacking 
in community backing. 
Legitimacy in the environmental context brings further discussion regarding the increasingly 
community-based approach of many environmental programmes leading to the inclusion of 
non-elected semi-autonomous actors. This raises questions surrounding knowledge and 
contributions. However, Connelly et al. (2006) argued that partnerships are considered to be 
intrinsically good and it appears that no single conclusion can be drawn about the legitimacy of 
environmental partnerships beyond that the principles remain grounded in representative 
democracy. As argued by Jepson (2005), accountability, therefore, becomes a process of 
legitimacy management and development and the structuring and oversight of these 
processes are key to environmental governance. 
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To conclude this discussion on the legitimisation of EPPP, I draw on Connelly et al. 's (2006: 276) 
findings, which also lead to the next section's discussion regarding democratic deficit: 
'Despite their perceived faults, traditional representative forms of governance are still 
very widely accepted - by the mass of the population, by many policy makers, and by 
many political analysts. In contrast, new participatory and partnership approaches rely 
on norms of deliberation which may only be accepted by (some of) the relatively 
limited circle of stakeholders directly involved. More generally, if norms of deliberative 
democracy are to take their place as accepted principles for legitimate rural 
governance, then a great deal of work is needed to discursively establish their 
acceptability both in networks of governance and with the wider population'. 
2.3.4 Democratic Deficit 
Since governance is the changing 'state-society' relationships in which state and non-state 
actors are equal partners in governing (Rhodes, 1996), the transformation of governance 
requires not only the devolution of power from the public to the private sector, but also the 
involvement of citizens in the process of decisio n-ma king, which is an issue that lies at the 
heart of democracy (Sun et oL, 2009). 'Democratic deficit' refers to a lack of trust in state 
actors, especially with the increasing prominence of private actors in environmental 
governance leading to a loss of democratic oversight and parliamentary control (Ferretti, 2006; 
Steffek, 2009). Ferretti (2006: 19) argue that 'transparency, accountability and improved 
participation can remedy this', he also suggests that participation can 'increase institutional 
inefficiency, generate frustration and mistrust, and even anger among the public, or simply 
waste precious public resources'. I suggest that Dryzek's (2001: 651) arguments regarding 
i reflective assent', 'participation' and 'authentic deliberation by all those subject to the 
decision in question' are indeed profound in the context of legitimising EPPP. His arguments, 
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however, do not appear to be supported by Imrie and Raco (1999), who argued that the new 
local governance is part of the emergence of a post-bureaucratic state, which is not necessarily 
bound by the need for local democratic process and accountability, and also by O'Toole and 
Burcless (2004) who suggested that 'Unlike locally elected officials of a democratic 
institution ... community groups do not carry the mantle of legitimacy that entities them to 
represent the 'interests' of their community'. These arguments present, therefore, the issue of 
democratic deficit where the state can fall short of meeting democratic obligations. This is 
indeed a challenge that links to Stoker's (1997: 10) discourse regarding the 'distribution of 
power' between the state and unelected non-state actors and Arnstein's (1969, in Savan et 0/., 
2004) earlier 'ladder of citizen participation' concept, the latter of which presents public 
participation ranging from tokenistic through to the inducement of significant social reform. 
From a governmentality perspective, Swyngedouw (2005) argued that the shift from 
'government' to 'governance' can empower the economic elite and clisempowers community 
groups, reduces democratic participation and, therefore, leads to a democratic deficit. 
The principles of governance reflect an inclusive and democratic approach to governing and 
are argued by many authors as including the move from representative to deliberative 
democracy (Connelly et oL, 2006; Goodwin 1998). This idea of a more deliberative approach is 
argued by Sorenson and Torfing (2005: 197) as creating 'public purpose' and by Connelly et ol. 
(2006: 269) as exercising 'power without coercion' - both concepts grounded in the idea that 
grassroots acceptance is needed for effective programme delivery. In the environmental 
context, programmes should benefit from this situated (context-orientated) legitimacy to 
ensure grassroots uptake. This is, arguably, obtained through the process of this new 
deliberative democracy, which should generate the conditions of impartiality, rationality and 
knowledge of the relevant facts and therefore lead to moral (and political) legitimacy. In the 
partnership context, Hodge (2001) argued that actors within these new environmental 
partnerships are more flexible and less bureaucratic than many government agencies, given 
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their generally smaller size and the lack of democratic accountability. An initial conclusion can 
be drawn, therefore, that democratic deficit can occur when these new governance structures 
fail in fulfilling the principles of democracy in their practice and operation due to the non- 
elected and self-selecting nature of some actors (Lowndes and Skelcher, 1998). 
Partnerships can also play a significant role in altering the democratic balance of an area due 
to their non-representativeness, thus bringing further complications regarding their legitimacy 
and accountability (see Curry, 2001, regarding the representativeness and public 
accountability of community participation projects). From a policy perspective, it is important 
to identify if partnerships are actually providing avenues for the sustainable development 
ideals of democracy and participation at grassroots level. Indeed, Lowndes et ol. (1997: 342) 
suggest that 'At one level, the spread of networks and partnerships can be seen as 
symptomatic of a political malaise, where unrepresentative groupings fill the democratic 
deficit in local politics'. Lowndes and Skelcher (1998: 316) also argued that '... partnerships may 
be criticised as reflecting a broader democratic deficit in which non-elected bodies and self- 
selected representatives gain power at the expense of elected politicians'. Perhaps the time 
has also come, therefore, to take proactive steps to strengthen the social side (capital and 
justice) of environmental governance, an idea argued by Boonstra (2006) who wrote that: 
'If people are not socialised in these values they are not able to co-operate with each 
other and the state. Consequently, a decline of social capital is supposed to lead to 
civic disengagement and political apathy, which undermines good democratic 
governance. ' 
Through New Labour's employment of concepts like 'social capital', 'social enterprise', 
'community development', 'partnerships' and 'community building', local people and 
organisations are increasingly encouraged to play a greater role in the provision of local 
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services Le. playing a role in governing, as opposed to being governed. The credibility of the 
bottom-up (or active citizenship) approach is built when considering how stakeholder 
engagement can overcome the implementation gap between EPPP formulation and delivery 
through the empowerment paradigm of joint responsibility and ownership (Evans 2004, 
Fairbrass 2003, Jepson 2005, Lowndes and Skelcher 1998, Raco et ol., 2006; Sampford, 2002). 
During the late 1990s, this approach evolved into new forms of community-focused 
governance, much of it based on emerging discourses of sustainable development and in 
reaction to the perceived local democratic deficit of the Thatcher years (Parker, 2002; Raco, 
2003). 1 suggest that the political legitimacy that is sought by the partnership approach, 
however, is a concept that is lacking in scholarly contribution in the environmental context. 
Furthermore, the non-elected and semi-autonomous natures of the actors engaged in this 
partnership approach also raise issues regarding accountability, which is now explored in the 
next section. 
2.3.5 Accountability 
Accountability mechanisms and structures are redrawn in arrangements of governance- 
beyond-the-state (Rhodes, 1999; Swyngedouw, 2005). Accountability is the process of 
reporting to a recognised entity to which actions are held responsible, with Swyngedouw 
(2005: 2000) arguing that 'it is assumed to be internalised within participating groups. 
However, given the diffuse and opaque systems of representation, accountability is generally 
very poorly, if at all, developed! He further suggests that: 
'The combined outcome of this leads to often more autocratic, non-transparent 
systems of governance that - as institutions - wield considerable power and, thus, 
assign considerable, albeit internally uneven power, to those who are entitled 
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(through a selective random process of invitation) to participate' (see also Goodwin, 
1998, regarding selective representation, and Section 6.2.2). 
Jepson (2005) suggested that moral accountability is an actor's responsibility to its mission, 
value and stakeholders whom it represents. For example, an NGO is accountable to donors for 
the successful delivery of the programme for which it has been funded. Goodin (2003: 376), 
however, argued that 'NGOs are often not themselves accountable to anyone, incorporating 
them might merely exacerbate the democratic deficit. ' Accountability reporting can be geared 
towards major donors as opposed to the membership or stakeholders whom the NGO 
represents. The issue of accountability has, therefore, gained new relevance in the 
environmental sector for a number of reasons, primarily due to the sub-contracting of 
programme delivery to non-elected, multi-actor partnerships making it difficult for 
stakeholders to attribute responsibility for quality and / or effectiveness of programme 
delivery (O'Toole and Burcless, 2004). Jepson (2005) also highlighted: 
'The growing perception that together these aspects of neoliberal economic theory 
and globalisation are enabling publicly unaccountable markets, corporations and inter- 
governmental bodies to become overly dominant in dictating the values and polices 
that form the context of everyday fife. '
These issues have subsequently been compounded by partnerships' willingness to support the 
move from top-down to community-based programme delivery frameworks due to the 
benefits of; (i) increased (and diversified) funding streams" (grants, contracts and 
philanthropy); and (ii) the new capacity for political influence, the latter of which results from 
new forms of environmental governance and can arguably be seen as non-specific to the 
12 In the UK, the allocation of public money is increasingly undertaken through organisations and agencies which 
have not been elected by the public. For example, the amount of public money spent by QUANGOs represented 
f46.6 billion In 1993, nearly one third of the total public spending (Hutchinson, 1994). 
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programme for which the partnership was originally engaged. This is an argument that can be 
developed further by the idea that different accountability regimes are adopted depending on 
the actor's role i. e. either programme delivery or political advocacy (Jepson, 2005). However, if 
new actors become involved at this level (programme development (politically) and delivery 
(operationally)), they must themselves be fully accountable, otherwise their own legitimacy 
will be eroded and, therefore, their ability 'to deliver' undermined due to reduced stakeholder 
engagement. In consideration of the political context surrounding this discussion, Mackinnon 
(2002: 297) argued that this neoliberalist approach to local governance 
'-directs itself against the technologies of welfarism by seeking to 'free' subjects from 
collective forms of social provision as it strives to (re)construct the conditions in which 
'enterprise' and competition can flourish. Consequently, economic government has 
been 'de-socialised' in an effort to stimulate entrepreneurship by reducing social 
obligations and costs'. 
Mackinnon's discussion occurred in the context of local economic governance, but I suggest 
that the principles remain the same for EPPP formulation and delivery. it is, however, an 
argument that theoretically goes against the very principles of environmental governance 
through its disconnection ('de-socialising') with the very communities it is trying to engage, but 
is also one supported by the idea that markets and initiatives are the most efficient means for 
achieving growth and service delivery. There is also a risk that inappropriate accountability 
methodology may be implemented that subsequently dilutes the independent change-agent 
grassroots role that is offered to previously marginalised actor networks by the governance 
approach (Jepson, 2005). For example, the application of a bureaucratic state monitoring and 
review process, whilst a prerequisite regarding the allocation and spend of public funds, can 
restrict an actor's capacity to deliver the programme for which they have been contracted or 
funded. This is due to the need for collecting evidence on how the funds have been spent and 
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the subsequent delivery of programme aims and objectives (both 'core' expenses for the 
delivery partner, but often not funded by 'the project'). Jepson (2005: 515) argued that: 
'One manifestation of this was the extended contracting of public service-cle livery to 
outside bodies including NGOs and the need for these bodies to adopt a culture of 
setting and auditing targets of performance and procedural efficiency. Many believe 
the audit culture has .......... reduced the time available to professionals 
for front-line 
service delivery. Such views are common-place within those ENG OS13 that have 
received grants managed by development agencies and witnessed the way the 
associated bureaucracy either ties up experienced field staff in endless rounds of grant 
writing, evaluation and reporting and / or necessitates the hiring of staff from 
development agencies. ' 
Also referred to by Jepson (2005: 517) as 'bureaucratic drag', the UK government requirement 
to implement performance metrics and reporting reduces programme efficiency and impact, a 
concept that is highlighted by this research through an empirical focus of the relationship 
between Moor Trees and the Community Boost Fund. 
To conclude this section, I suggest that the environmental sector needs to develop a distinct 
and credible accountability regime to establish and maintain public trust whilst enabling 
efficient and reviewable EPPP delivery. Although community involvement is a key component 
of environmental governance, sustainable development and active citizenship, a compromise 
is required between the accountability of non-elected actors in the use of public funds and the 
merits of the bottom-up framework within which many modern environmental programmes 
are required to work (Imrie and Raco, 1999; Mackinnon 2000,2002). Perhaps the solution is an 
inter- as opposed to intra-actor accounting process that could also bring a new era of not just 
13 ENGOs: Environmental NGOs 
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accountability and transparency, but also one of collaboration (see Christensen, 2003), or, 
improved partnership-working. 
2.4 Conclusion 
Literature has shown extensive research on governance and partnerships, and the growing 
relationship between the two in the environmental sector, specifically as part of the 
sustainable development paradigm. The concepts of responsibility, legitimacy and 
accountability are also well researched, though lacking in conceptual and empirical focus in the 
environmental partnership context. Part 3 of this thesis provides detail on actors, networks 
and data collection techniques that I used to contribute to this research gap. 
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Chapter 3: Methodology 
3.1 Introduction 
To introduce the empirical component of this study, this chapter reviews the methodological 
approach used for data collection and analysis to meet the following objectives: 
0 Using the MTPN as a case study, to analyse whether and to what extent the state is 
devolving responsibility and authority for environmental decision-making and the 
delivery of EPPP to the non-state, or grassroots, actor level through discourses of 
community responsibility, partnership-working and self-governing. 
0 To assess if democratic legitimacy is lost through the inclusion of non-elected, non- 
state actors in the formulation and delivery of EPPP. 
0 To explore the financial and operational accountability framework(s) of the MTPN and 
to analyse the implications of quantitative and qualitative reporting mechanisms. 
0 To critically assess the Moor Trees Partnership Network to further the understanding 
of the practical issues that environmental partnerships must address in order to 
become effective delivery vehicles for EPPP. 
To meet these objectives, a multi-method approach was used to carry out a quantitative and 
qualitative analysis of actors and partnership networks (predominan tly14 ) around the South 
West of England. The aim of this thesis is to consider the partnership approach in 
environmental governance and to research the issues of responsibility, legitimacy and 
accountability, using the case study of the MTPN. This network has been chosen as an example 
of partnership-working across the environmental sector as a whole, partly because I was 
embedded within the environmental sector through employment with Moor Trees, and also 
14 Some actors were interviewed outside of this geographical boundary due to their national remits. 
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because it provided a reliable basis upon which to draw general conclusions. Thus, action 
research and participant observation enabled an in-depth assessment of the associated actors 
and networks. The nature of this study, i. e. the study of inter- and intra-actor relationships and 
network dynamics, meant that my often exclusive access to MTPN actors was vital in meeting 
the research objectives. This chapter outlines the various methods that were used to bring an 
empirical focus to these actors and networks and gives the conceptual underpinning for each 
research method. Section 3.2 discusses triangulation as the rationale for using multiple sources 
of evidence gathered from more than one standpoint to bring together a more objective and 
focused analysis. Section 3.3 discusses the MTPN case study, which was set within the 
geographical context of South West England and drew upon the advantages of my position as 
a researcher-practitioner. Section 3.4 considers participant observation and action research, 
where my embeddedness within the MTPN enabled my working with network actors towards 
the change and improvement of partnerships. Section 3.5 discusses the secondary data 
collected and analysed from a variety of sources, including actor websites, literature, reports 
and government statistics. Section 3.6 introduces questionnaires as the method used to 
provide quantitative data via an online survey and from'which I received a 77% response rate. 
Section 3.7 discusses the semi-structured Interviews used for a conversational approach to 
qualitative data collection. Section 3.8 considers the issues of ethics, reflexivity and objectivity 
of the embedded researcher, while 3.9 brings this chapter to a conclusion. 
3.2 Triangulation: Rationale for using Multiple Sources of Evidence 
3.2.1 Strengths and Weaknesses of Triangulation 
'Social scientists have borrowed the term triangulation to help describe how the use of 
multiple approaches to a research question can enable the researcher to Izero in, on 
the answers or information sought' (Singleton et oL, in Oppermann (2000: 142). 
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Philip (1998) argued that 'multi-method' research is becoming an obvious choice due to the 
multi-dimensional nature of human geography and because no single method will fully capture 
the meaning of the social world. This approach enables the verification of the reliability and 
validity of other techniques, with reliability achieved when results can be trusted by the 
researcher when a test or procedure produces similar results under constant conditions on all 
occasions (Hoggart et ol., 2002; Sarantakos, 1998; Williams, 2003). Validity is achieved when 
an item measures or describes what it is supposed to measure or describe, or, whether the 
'explanation fits the description' (Denzin and Lincoln, 2003: 69, see also Brewer and Hunter's 
(1989: 83) assertion that 'Multi-method research tests the validity of measurements, 
hypotheses, and theories by means of triangulated cross-method comparison'). This has 
become known as 'triangulation', where multiple methods are used to answer a specific 
question. Triangulation is one of the most powerful techniques for strengthening credibility. It 
is based on the idea of convergence, when multiple sources provide similar findings their 
credibility is considerably strengthened (Baxter and Eyles, 1997: 514). For example, a 
structured questionnaire could be used alongside interviews, secondary sources and 
participant observation (Frankfort-Nachmias and Nachmias, 1996: 206; Sarantakos, 1998). 
Oppermann (2000: 145) concluded that this combination of qualitative and quantitative 
techniques is about the 'verification of results and, in the process, identifying and eliminating 
methodological shortcomings, data or investigator bias. A multi-method approach allows 
researchers to be more confident about their results'. 
Triangulation is considered by Hoggart et al. (2002: 67) to be a principal outcome of the multi- 
methods approach, whereby a series of complementary methods are used to gain a deeper 
insight into a research problem by enhancing the researcher's capacity to interpret meaning 
and behaviour. They add that triangulation 'strengthens confidence in conclusions by providing 
multiple routes to the same result'. Triangulation can, therefore, be broadly defined as the use 
of different data sources and collection procedures to research a single issue. Flick (1998: 229) 
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defined triangulation as 'used to name the combination of different methods, study groups, 
local and temporal settings, and different theoretical perspectives in dealing with a 
phenomenon'. Denzin (1978) lists four types of triangulation; (I) Data (gathering data through 
several sampling strategies, so that slices of data at different times and social situations are 
gathered); (ii) investigator (using multiple researchers in an investigation, thus reducing error 
and bias); (iii) Theory (using more than one theoretical scheme in the interpretation of the 
phenomenon); and (iv) Methodological (involves using more than one method to gather data 
Le. interviews, questionnaires, and secondary sources). Denzin (1978: 38) argued that 
triangulation "remains the soundest strategy of theory construction', i. e. 'the greater the 
triangulation, the greater the confidence in the research findings'. Hoggart et al. (2002: 69) 
further argued that 'conclusions are strengthened if they are confirmed from different 
theoretical perspectives' and that 'conviction about a perspective is enhanced by evaluation of 
alternative interpretations'. The strengths of triangulation as a research method are further 
discussed by Yin (1994: 92), who argued that multiple sources of evidence allow the researcher 
to address a broader range of 'historical, attitudinal and behavioural issues and that the 
ensuing converging lines of enquiry' bring together more convincing and accurate findings 
through the comparison of quantitative findings with qualitative evidence. Yin's argument 
under-pins my own rationale for triangulation, where I collected and analysed quantitative and 
qualitative data to explore the attitudinal and behavioural characteristics of MTPN actors. 
Robson (2002: 371) argued that multiple questions, rather than focusing on a 'specific research 
question, may be used to address complementary issues within a study and also enhance 
interpretability through the discussion of otherwise purely statistical analyses' (from, for 
example, questionnaires). 
However, triangulation can also bring discrepancies and disagreements from different sources. 
Indeed, this study brought examples of this when comparing secondary data (see 3.7) with 
primary data collected from semi-structured interviews (see 3.6) and via the participatory 
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approach (see 3.4). This conflict arose on a small number of occasions when comparing 
organisation vs. individual responses. This was mainly due to organisations' published stance 
toward partnership-working occasionally conflicting with the views of individual employees. 
Williams (2003) argued that such individual response bias can distort method or findings, so I 
carefully assessed the inferences made between responses (Eyles and Smith, 1988), finding 
that this sometimes proved to be a positive outcome when it led to the questioning of a 
presumed conclusion i. e. that 'all partnerships are good'. Some researchers have argued, 
however, that multiple methods do not guarantee better results (Blaikie, 1993; Silverman, 
1985; Williams, 2003). Triangulation may, for example, lead to: 
Incorrect research conditions and or research foundations 
Difficulty in replicating a mixed methodology 
Adaptation to suit researcher bias 
Varying results leading to the need for complex collation and comparison techniques 
Difficulties in transferring data for comparison between methods 
It is argued that each method still needs to be tested thoroughly and independently to build 
reliability and validity. Sarantakos (1998: 169) also argued that 'the number of methods that 
are most appropriate in each research design must be evaluated in the context of the project 
in question. ' 
3.2.2 Triangulation in the Partnership Research Context 
Environmental partnerships are both multi-faceted and complex by nature. According to 
Cohen and Manion (1986: 254), triangulation attempts to 'map out, or explain more fully, the 
richness and complexity of human behaviour by studying it from more than one standpoint'. 
This argument was particularly relevant to this study, with my embeddedness suggesting that a 
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semi-structured interview approach would be effective due to the existing professional 
relationship with many of the participating actors, as well as the in-depth investigations that 
could be carried out. To expand on this otherwise singular approach to data collection, I used 
the following qualitative and quantitative methods: 
" Participant Observation and Action Research (Section 3.4) 
" Questionnaires (Section 3.5) 
" Semi-structured interviews (Section 3.6) 
" Secondary Sources (Section 3.7) 
Triangulation of results increased objectivity and reduced the researcher bias resulting from 
my professional association as practitioner by accounting for the potential for the artificial or 
biased construction of meanings by constructing or reconstructing knowledge born out of 
practical experience. The data collected from this approach was then triangulated to answer 
the research question. As further discussed by Remenyi et aL (2000) and Arksey (1999), this 
multiple evidence-collection method and use of multiple informants and cases assisted in 
testing and retesting the degree of 'fit' between data and interpretation to overcome the 
problems of bias and to improve validity. Robson (2002: 324) argued that there are four 
intertwined areas of bias; (i) selective attention - overcome 'by making a conscious effort to 
distribute your attention widely and evenly'; (ii) selective encoding - 'overcome by starting 
with an open mind'; (iii) selective memory -'overcome by prompt writing-up of narratives and 
field notes; and (iv) interpersonal factors - possibly through differing levels of engagement 
with multi-actor groups. Triangulation, therefore, brought a focused approach to my research 
objectives and enabled a robust evaluation of key issues. The empirical focus for this 
methodology was a multi-actor case study that was identified as representative of 
environmental partnerships and accessible due to researcher embeddedness. The next section 
discusses this case study. 
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3.3 Case Study Approach 
The MTPN provided the empirical focus for this study due to its actors' inclusion in the various 
levels of the Policy Implementation Continuum (see Figure 3.1) i. e. it contained numerous 
actors from the government, QUANGO, third and private sectors. To address this study's 
objectives, the MTPN case study provided an empirical focus through the study of: 
0 How non-state actors are increasingly accepting responsibility for the delivery of EPPP 
0 Whether its third sector actors are legitimate vehicles for the delivery of state EPPP 
0 The accountability of MTPN partnerships to funders and stakeholders 
* The practical issues that environmental partnerships must address in order to become 
effective delivery vehicles for EPPP. 
3.3.1 Strengths and Weaknesses of the Case Study Approach 
Case study research involves the study of individual cases over time (longitudinal analysis) 
using a number of data collection and analysis methods (Sarantakos, 1998). Yin (1991: 23) 
defines case study research as 'An empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary 
phenomenon within its real-life context when the boundaries between phenomenon and 
context are not clearly evident; and in which multiple sources of evidence are used'. Yin listed 
five distinguishing characteristics differentiating case studies from other research methods: 
1. They study whole units in their totality and not aspects or variables of these units 
2. They employ several methods primarily to avoid or prevent errors and distortions 
3. They often study a single unit and one unit is often one study 
4. It perceives the respondent as an expert, not just a source of data 
5. It studies atypical case 
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The MTPN case study analysed partnerships including public, QUANGO, third and private 
sector actors. It was largely set within the geographical boundary of the South West of 
England, with some wider UK actors included. The multi-actor nature of the network avoided a 
narrow focus on a particular type of actor i. e. QUANGOs, and presented a sufficient number of 
cases to enable generalised conclusions and a robust development of theory (Yin, 1993). Figure 
3.1 presents this study's stratification of the MTPN as a multi-layered EPPP implementation 
model adopted by the state. This hierarchy of networks conceptualises how EPPP are 
formulated at the state level, with responsibility for delivery then devolved downwards to non- 
state actors (see also Section 9.3 re: the 'thickening of the state'). 
EPPP 
Formulation 1 PUBLIC's 
(state) 2 QUANGO 
Delivery 3 THIRD SECTOR 
(non-state) NATE SECTOR 
Figure 3.1 The Policy Implementation Continuum 
Adapted from Winter (1990) in Wilson et aL (1999) 
This model has been influenced by implementation theory employed by Wilson et a/ 
(1999: 186), where layers within which the 'political and administrative processes that occur 
between a policy decision and its eve ntua I outcome in practice' are discussed. Their discussion, 
adapted from Winter (1990), is a response to the arguments that policy implementation is 
either 'top-down, 'in-between' or 'bottom-up'. They argued that the three are combined and, 
therefore, all have their own value due to the constant reinterpretation of policy goals, 
definition of measures and delivery frameworks. This is a key discussion in this research, 
is in this context: multi-layered and multi-faceted i. e. all elected actors engaged in the act of governing, such as 
Whitehall, Regional Assemblies, Regional Development Agencies, County and District Councils, and National Park 
Authorities. 
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whereby partnerships are argued to be multi-actor and cross-sector (Wilson et aL, 1999). As a 
member of the third sector, Moor Trees sits in level 3, though the wider MTPN spans each 
level. Having considered the case study approach, the next section discusses the rationale for 
the selection of Moor Trees and its partnership network as the case study for this thesis. 
3.3.2 Why Moor Trees? 
The environmental sector contains a large number of organisations and individuals, all of 
which play a role in the governing of the environment and most being involved in some form 
of partnership-working. The MTPN was chosen for the following reasons. 
1. My embeddedness as researcher-practitioner presented me with not only privileged 
access to, and insights into, partnership-working, but also the opportunity of changing 
and improving the Moor Trees network, thus enabling a participatory, action research 
approach to partnership networks - methods that are discussed in the next section. 
2. Geographically, the network is based in and around Dartmoor, but its network 
stretches across the South West. As such, it demonstrates how Moor Trees has scaled 
the activities of a quintessentially local organisation to achieve regional impact. 
3. The Government Office of the South West reports the South West to be the leading 
region in the UK for its environmental awareness, sustainability objectives and 
conservation targets. As such, the associated actors are numerous and diverse, within 
the region, and provide established environmental partnerships as case studies. 
4. As a woodland charity, Moor Trees' main activity is tree-planting (see Chapter 4 for 
more detailed discussion). The last three years, however, have seen the organisation 
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adapt to a changing working environment caused by the rising profile of the third 
sector (see Appendix A). This adaptation has been made possible through partnership- 
working and provides an example of how environmental actors are diversifying their 
activities in response to market opportunities and new funding streams. Thus, Moor 
Trees provides an example of a voluntary and community sector organisation that has 
adapted itself to, not just become part of, but to actually create its own environmental 
partnership networks. 
5. Moor Trees provided further opportunities for this research due its multi-dimensional 
nature. Established in 1998 to restore native woodland on Dartmoor, diversification 
has led to new, private sector partnerships, with organisations increasingly seeking 
socio-environmental credentials. Further, the rising profile of climate change and 
sustainable development have brought new dimensions to Moor Trees' activities in 
the last 5 years, with new corporate responsibility, carbon offsetting, environmental 
education and training programmes created. This has led to an increasingly diverse 
range of actors joining the MTPN, which provided a broader and more generalisable 
range of data. As a result of this, Moor Trees and its partnership network provide a 
good example of an environmental actor working within a partnership-driven 
environment. 
3.4 Participant Observation and Action Research 
The potential of participatory research projects is highly dependent on the flexibility and 
openness of the research design so that the research subjects' needs and wishes as well as 
their interests and abilities can be taken into account. This study was primarily ethnographic 
and based on an action research approach, where my embeddedness enabled me to learn 
'about society through efforts to change it' and aimed to understand the perspectives of actors 
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and networks under study and observe their activities in everyday life (Hoggart et ol., 
2002: 292). Thus, action research and participant observation brought 'together action and 
reflection, theory and practice, in participation with others' (Reason and Bradbury, 2001: 1). 
This was carried out via my employment as part-time Director of Moor Trees where I observed 
group communication and interaction through my dual role as researcher-practitioner, which 
was played overtly and with the consent of other actors. As Cook (in Flowerclew and Martin, 
2005) noted, this approach provides an understanding of society from the 'inside', with 
Robson (2002) concurring that a key feature of participant observation is that the researcher 
becomes a member of the research group with a specific role. Yin (1994: 87) highlights this 
distinction as: 
'A special mode of observation in which you are not merely a passive observer. 
Instead, you may assume a variety of roles within a case study situation and may 
actually participate in the events being studied. 
Action research is seen by Hoggart et a/. (2002) as the researcher playing an active role. It has 
the purpose of effecting change in the lives of the people studied and to change society or at 
least establish causation by gauging reactions when a 'stimulus' (e. g. aim to change and 
improve Moor Trees' partnership networks) is deliberately introduced into a social situation 
(see Section 3.8.2 regarding attention to my positionality). Silverman (1985: 104) similarly 
defines participant observation as a method that shares 'in people's lives while attempting to 
learn their symbolic world' and will vary from 'complete participation to the complete 
observer'. He further argued that participant observation involves taking the viewpoint of 
those studied and understanding the situated character and associated social processes of the 
interaction to generate formal theories grounded in first-hand data. Participant observation, 
therefore, is characterised by observing social communication and interaction in 'an 
unstructured and natural manner, where the design is developed and modified while 
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observation is carried out, in a face-face relationship, and in an open and flexible way' 
(Sarantakos, 1998: 218). 
According to Gan (1982: 54) there are three different types of roles for the participant 
observer; the total participant who is completely involved in the situation he / she is studying, 
the researcher participant who is only partially involved, and the total researcher who 
observes a situation without significant personal involvement. Eyles and Smith (1982: 9) 
elaborate on this theory by discussing how a researcher should be both 'inside and outside of 
the study group(s), institution or community under investigation and must be immersed but be 
able to remain a critical commentator able to see a complete pattern or process with daily or 
routine interactions or events'. It is also important to consider that the degree of participant 
engagement (from 'no participation to full participation' (Sarantakos, 1998: 208)) may also 
bring unrepresentative results due to personalities and bias. Denzin (1978) also argued that 
the very presence of the observer (researcher) may influence the situation (see also comments 
in Section 3.2.1 regarding staff bias). This study addressed these potential weaknesses via its 
multi-method approach and triangulation of data, an approach favoured by Denzin (1970: 186) 
who argued that participant observation weaknesses can be overcome by using 'a field 
strategy that simultaneously combines document analysis, respondent and informant 
interviewing, direct participation and observation and introspection'. 
Flowerclew and Martin (2005) suggested that participant observation has three stages: (i) 
access to the communities; (ii) role within the communities; and (iii) academic interpretation 
of data. This method enables the researcher to work within a community both to observe and 
participate in activities and dialogue to question and understand events that are occurring. It 
enabled this study to unravel the relationships between actors and their networks. A key 
question regarding this type of research is posed by Moser and Kalton (1971: 249) who ask 
'What is the best role of the observer (researcher) in the community? ' There is no simple 
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answer to this question, but one must take into account the skills of the researcher, the type of 
community and the type of data required. For this study, action research was conducted via 
overt participant observation, where I worked openly within the MTPN as researcher- 
practitioner. This enabled me to understand how the network worked from the inside whilst 
retaining an objective outsider's view (see Section 3.8.3 regarding objectivity). However, 
Moser and Kalton (1971) argued that a bigger and less naturally restricted community means 
that some of the members lose awareness that they are being observed and therefore exhibit 
more 'authentic' behaviour and no 'control effect' that new community members can 
sometimes apply. Whilst this can lead to improved data validity, there are issues regarding 
ethics and anonymity, as it may be seen as synonymous with covert participation (see Section 
3.8.1 regarding ethical standards). Thus, I was presented with the decision whether to make 
myself known to all actors being studied. I addressed this by presenting my researcher- 
practitioner status at the beginning and end of the online survey and interviews, and at the 
scheduling and then 'personal introductions' stage of any MTPN meetings that I was observing 
or working within. This provided actors with the opportunity to withdraw at any time or to 
request data not to be used for my research. None withdrew or requested the restricted use of 
data, but anonymity was requested by some. This was honoured by coding sheets for both 
online survey responses and interviews. 
My presence may have created an unavoidable bias to group proceedings, though I countered 
this through data triangulation and by adapting my qualitative framework during observation 
(Sarantakos, 1998). Thus, participant observation is a highly individual technique that, if not 
done correctly, can; (i) present a biased and unrepresentative picture through case study 
manipulation, and (ii) collect data from actors that have become self-conscious and untypical - 
both issues that need to be actively addressed throughout the data collection process. 
However, the observation process does bring the advantages of; (i) number and diversity of 
informants; (ii) the means to study a whole system (network) with subsequent checking 
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against individual contributions (by interview); (iii) access to data otherwise not made publicly 
available; and (iv) insightfulness into interpersonal behaviour and motives (Moser and Kalton, 
1971; Yin, 1994). 
The next section discusses the use of secondary data as a methodological tool to triangulate 
findings from this study. 
3.5 Secondary Data 
It is the natural inclination of the researcher to gather new data to meet research aims and 
objectives (Hair et al., 2007). Researchers should, however, also see if data are already 
available to answer, or contribute to answering or provide context to, the research question. If 
they exist, secondary data may then provide efficient, valid and sources of both quantitative 
and qualitative information that saves time, effort and expense in spite of the fact that the 
data may not have been originally collected with the research question in mind. 
3.5.1 Types and Sources 
Researchers like to think their idea of a research project is original, assuming that relevant data 
has not yet have been collected by anyone else. Methodologically, therefore, the use of 
secondary data requires critical reading because such 'information has been collected by 
someone else, for another purpose' and 'may already have been manipulated for particular, 
possibly political, purposes' (White, 2003: 68). Similarly, Clark (1997: 58) argued that the 
utilisation of secondary data needs to take into account that it 'is a cultural artefact, produced 
for administrators with priorities and ways of seeing the world' and that it 'reflects the aims 
and attitudes of the people and organisations that collected the data'. But 'old' data can often 
make an important contribution to original research (Babbie, 2007; Montell and Sutton, 2006; 
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Rubin and Babbie, 2001). Indeed, the availability of these secondary data can sometimes 
influence the nature of the research, with the rationale for secondary analysis of existing 
datasets including the economies of time, money and personnel (Hakim, 1982; Kitchin and 
Tate, 2000). Hakim (1982) further argued that secondary analysis includes studies presenting 
any or all of the following: 
0 More condensed reports (such as a social area analysis based on selected social 
indicators); 
0 more detailed reports (offering additional detail on the same topic); 
0 reports which focus on a particular sub-topic or social group; 
0 analyses based on a conceptual framework or theory not applied to the original 
analysis; and 
0 re-analyses which take advantage of more sophisticated analytical techniques. 
Secondary analysis can also be done within a shorter timetable than a new study if results are 
needed quickly i. e. reanalysis of existing census or survey data to complement literature 
reviews. However, the researcher must feel comfortable that the data are reliable and that the 
source is known. Scott (1990, see also Hoggart et aL, 2002) argued that a researcher must 
assess its usefulness against four themes; (1) Authenticity (is the source correctly attributed? ); 
(2) Credibility (did the recorder believe in what was recorded? ); (3) Representativeness (is the 
source representative of opinion at that time and place? ); and (4). Meaning (should the source 
be used in a literal sense? ). The researcher should, therefore, pay careful attention when using 
secondary data sources to identify what is, and is not, relevant (Kitchin and Tate, 2000). Jacob 
(1984: 45) concurred: 
'Whether data are found in libraries or data archives, they should not be viewed 
simply as providing grand opportunities for cheap analyses: they should be seen as 
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problematic. In every case the analyst should ask: Are these data valid? In what ways 
might they have been contaminated so that they are unreliableT 
Secondary analysis can be used as an additional too[ for new research. For example, secondary 
analysis of an organisation's policy documents or reports can be used for the preliminary 
investigation of an issue for further exploration in survey and / or interview work. May (1993) 
argued that secondary data sources can be classified as 
" Primary sources that have been recorded by those who actually witnessed an event, 
thus representing knowledge by acquaintance. 
" Secondary sources that have been recorded after the event by second parties. The 
recorder, therefore, has no personal experience of the event itself. 
" Tertiarysources that enable one to locate other sources i. e. indexes, bibliographies. 
I accessed secondary data via my role as researcher-practitioner. As researcher, I sourced data 
to contribute to the study. As practitioner, I already had access to a large amount of secondary 
data. Interestingly, without exception, all further documentation that I requested from MTPN 
actors (that was not already available online) was also made available. These sources included 
public and some private data. Scott (1990) categorised these sources as closed, restricted, 
open-archival and open-published. This study identified and then collated data from a number 
of sources: 
" Public documents (promotional / technical literature / media) 
" Archival records (organisation records, annual reports) 
" Personal documents (memoranda, blogs) 
" Administrative documents (memoranda, progress reports, agendas, minutes) 
" Formalstudies and reports (relating to the research topic) 
(Sarantakos, 1998) 
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Analysis of MTPN actor documentation included annual reports, state policy documentation, 
press releases, conference proceedings and minutes from various meetings. This secondary 
data played an important role in the preparation of interviews and for situating the primary 
data from the interviews in a broader context (Clark, 1997: 59). Documents were collected in 
electronic format, enabling a fairly simple quantitative analysis to be carried out by searching 
for key words including; 'community', 'stakeholder', 'participation', 'partnership', 
'accountability', 'responsibility', and 'legitimacy'. When words were identified in a document, 
the context was analysed so as to ensure that it related to this study. This analysis helped 
guide the structure of the interview process, where interviewees were questioned regarding 
employer attitudes and beliefs towards partnership-working compared to the realities of its 
application 'in the field'. For example, an organisation's company report stating that it worked 
in partnership could then be compared retrospectively to the responses given at interview 
regarding the realities of policy implementation. 
3.5.2 Strengths and Weaknesses 
The accessibility of secondary data for this research was primarily via the online publications of 
actor reports, policy documents, management plans, minutes and publicity material. The 
retrospective analysis of these secondary data proved to be an important factor when 
comparing individual vs. organisational attitudes and beliefs towards partnership-working. 
These documents, created for non-research purposes, reduced researcher bias and provided a 
low cost source of high quality data to triangulate against the findings from the other research 
methods utilised by this study. This study did, however, identify some of the inherent 
weaknesses with secondary data. The main one was author subjectivity, with much of this data 
generated by actors reporting or communicating on their own activities. For example, private 
sector actor annual reports frequently published data regarding their partnership-working with 
third sector actors as part of their corporate responsibility programmes. Without wider 
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investigation and cross-referencing, these data were occasionally difficult to validate due to 
the lack of third party verification. The representativeness and sampling of secondary data 
were also considered throughout the study, by ensuring that 20 articles and / or documents 
were sourced from each of the four levels of the Policy Implementation Continuum i. e. public, 
QUANGO, third and private sectors. 
There are also ethical issues underlying the use of secondary data. Hair et ol. (2007: 138) 
summarised this as 'inappropriately using these sources when you should not, and 
inappropriately not using them when you should'. Secondary sources should not be used 
surreptitiously as a way of avoiding research effort. This is important when there is a 
misalignment of purpose and the sourced data cannot be expected to address the research 
problem in an unbiased fashion. Confidentiality and exclusivity should be respected at all times 
and researchers should confirm that data gathered and analysed for a particular survey may be 
used as a secondary source for another one. Section 3.8 deals with these ethical issues in 
greater depth. 
3.6 Questionnaires 
'Questionnaires are one of the most widely used primary data collection tools in social 
science, especially human geography' (Sarantakos, 1998: 223). 
it is widely acknowledged that questionnaires are an important tool for collecting qualitative 
and quantitative data on respondent attitudes, opinions and awareness on specific issues 
(Flowerdew and Martin, 1997; May, 1997; Philip, 1998; Sarantakos, 1998). Questionnaires can 
be completed by researcher or respondent and include postal, street or online. 
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Table 3.1 shows the advantages and disadvantages of the qualitative and quantitative 
approaches to social research. It shows how quantitative data provides an economical and 
controlled method for data collection, with analysis often carried out electronically. This 
method struggles to adapt to the needs of collecting data on social phenomenon i. e. 
respondent opinions, attitudes and beliefs. It is this weakness that is strength of the qualitative 
approach, where discourse can unravel complex issues and the researcher is able to adapt the 
questions to the respondent. This does, however, bring implications regarding the complexities 
and greater amount of time required to collate and analyse data. 
Quantitative Qualitative 
Advantages Economical data collection. Facilitates understanding: how/ why 
Clear theoretical focus. Researcher aware of changes during 
Greater control of research process. research process. 
Easily comparable data. Understanding of social processes. 
Disadvantages Lack of flexibility when collection Data collection can be time 
started. consuming. 
Weak at understanding social Data analysis is difficult. 
processes. Clear patterns may not emerge. 
May not discover meanings people Generally perceived as less credible 
attach to social phenomena. by 'non-researchers'. 
Table 3.1: Quantitative and Qualitative approaches to Social Research 
Adapted from Saunders et aL (1997: 74) 
3.6.1 Questionnaire Development and Design 
Surveys are almost a part of everyday life and should be constructed to minimise excessive 
intrusion into a respondent's day, not waste their time and must be treated with sensitivity 
(Flowerclew and Martin, 1997; Sarantakos, 1998). The researcher should also consider the 
following three types of data that need to be collected: 
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1. Respondent Classification 
Classifies respondents, their circumstances and their environment. Also referred to as 
respondent variables, this can include data such as employer, job title and location. 
2. Respondent Behaviour 
These data relate to respondent behavioural trends i. e. how often, how much, how 
long. Whilst the answers to these questions should provide reliable and valid results, 
there is a danger that the behaviour(s) expressed at interview may differ significantly 
from actual behaviour. Smith (2006: 917) sees this as 'social desirability bias or prestige 
bias, whereby respondents may want to answer survey questions based not on their 
true feelings, but on the desire to present themselves in the most favourable manner 
possible i. e. within social. ' 
3. Respondent Attitudes, Opinions and Beliefs 
Parfitt (1997: 77) discussed the challenges of the variability and occasionally subjective 
nature of responses to questionnaires, the potential for 'attitude -fo rci ng' (through 
questionnaire structuring and researcher prompting) and insincerity (by the 
respondent wanting to please or to fit the perceived norm). Robson (1993) and Judd et 
al. (1991) also argue that respondents with strong opinions on the research question - 
particularly negative ones - are more likely to respond. 
Surveys can be 'descriptive' or 'analytic'. The former typically deals with opinion polls, 
population estimates or predominantly numbers-based data, typically on a large scale. 
Analytical surveys focus on explanations and causality, with one of the aims often being to 
establish associations between variables. As such, they are more frequently used by the 
academic community and were used in this study. 
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(i) Initial research idea: refine 0 Development of research aims and objectives 
and develop analytic design * Literature review / secondary data sources 
0 How much is known already? 
(ii) Design of research 0 Hypotheses formation: basic research design 
* Consider dependent, independent, controlled 
variables 
0 Choice of survey methodology: internet, postal, 
telephone, personal interview? 
0 Researcher- or self-administered? 
* Drafting questionnaire 
(iii) Further refinement of 0 Pilot work 
research instrument and * Post-pilot questionnaire revision 
sampling 0 Sampling: sampling frame 
0 Sampling bias assessment 
0 Consider systematic / purposive techniques 
(iv) Main fieldwork 0 Response rate assessment 
(v) Processing/ analysis of data 0 Data processing control, manual edit checks, data 
coding 
0 Questionnaire / PC transcription of data 
0 Machine edit checks 
0 Statistical analysis and tabulation of results 
(vi) Results * Results, hypotheses testing 
1 0 Research report 
Table 3.2: The Six Stages of a Questionnaire Survey 
Adapted from Parfitt (1997: 80) 
Table 3.2 shows the six stages of a questionnaire survey. It outlines the process from; (i) the 
development of the initial research question and identification of the knowledge gap; to (ii) 
the initial development of the research methodology; to (iii) the piloting and refinement of the 
methods to be used i. e. questionnaire type and style, researcher or respondent-administered, 
etc. Step (iv) is the fieldwork stage where the researcher collects data and assesses response 
rates. This is followed by Step (v) when the data are checked, analysed statistically or by using 
a qualitative technique. Finally, Step (vi) finalises results and produces the research report, 
possibly including recommendations for future research. Questionnaires can become too long, 
so attention is needed to format, sequencing and wording. Survey length is also important to 
avoid respondent fatigue (Flowerdew and Martin, 1997). it is important to understand the 
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types of errors that can affect the reliability (can the results be replicated? ) and validity (does 
the survey measure what it is intended to do? ) of results (Flowerdew and Martin, 1997). 
3.6.2 Questionnaire Wording and Format 
After assuring respondents of anonymity and confidentiality, the questionnaire should engage 
the respondent by using meaningful questions; reflect the research question or hypotheses 
under investigation; and produce results that will meet the research aims and objectives. The 
researcher's ability to empathise with the respondents will reduce bias by engaging at a level 
that is accessible, enthusing and relevant to the respondent. Furthermore, language 
complexity and structure needs to be pitched at a level suitable for the target audience and 
the flow of a questionnaire needs to keep the respondent engaged in sub-topics. These points 
can be addressed through a suitable introductory statement that engages the respondent and 
clarifies the questionnaire's purpose. The online survey for this study (see Section 3.6.3) was 
able to address these issues through the researcher's experience as practitioner, especially 
when considering language and accessibility. 
Choosing either open or closed question formats differentiates between quantitative or 
qualitative results and influences survey results and interpretation techniques. Open questions 
tend to inspire spontaneous and more honest responses due to their more engaging nature, 
though analysis will be longer and more complex. Closed questions are easier to ask, take less 
time to complete and are easier to answer and quantify. This study adopted a mainly closed 
approach, using a five point Likert Scale (see Figure 3.2) for many questions, though with room 
for an open response ('additional comments') at the end of each survey sub-section. When 
constructing these scales, I overcame a potential patterning effect by respondents by mixing 
the 'positive' and 'negative' ends of the scale. This approach was more complex but aided the 
subsequent identification of themes for further exploration during the semi-structured 
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interview process. These attitudes and opinions were the most difficult data to collect due to 
fluctuating attitudes and difficulties in creating suitable measurements (Flowerdew and 
Martin, 1997). The survey also presented the challenge of delineating between the subjective 
attitudes and opinions of an individual and the same individual's behaviour when working as 
an employee. This was addressed in the questionnaire by stating that responses should be 
representative of the organisation and not the respondent (see Appendix B). It should be 
accepted, however, that a degree of subjectivity exists in any opinion, attitude or belief. 
Financial Accountability I 
Strongly 
Agree Neutral Disagree 
Strongly 
Agree Disagree 
4.1 Environmental partnerships are usually 12345 
supported by Government grants 
Figure 3.2: Likert Scale format 
Source: Author's Questionnaire 
3.6.3 Online Surveys 
Before the advent of the world-wide web, questionnaire surveys were predominantly carried 
out in person, by post or by telephone. Personal surveys benefit from close contact and 
researcher / respondent interaction, post surveys enable a more remote contact and 
telephone surveys fall in between the two (Alreck and Settle, 1995; Evans and Mathur, 2005; 
Flowerdew and Martin, 1997; Hoggart et o/., 2002). It is important to consider the constraints 
that can be imposed by social science research i. e. bias, budgets, timescales, geographical 
spread and questionnaire design expertise. Since the availability of the web, electronic surveys 
can be conducted through email or, as with this study, posted online with the URL provided to 
respondents who have already been approached or are already known to the researcher to 
save time and money (Duffy et al., 2005; Evans and Mathur, 2005; Griffith et o/., 2003; Ilieva et 
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ah, 2002; Schaefer and Dillman, 1998; Scholl et ol., 2002). Granello and Wheaton (2004: 388) 
surnmarise the benefits of online surveys as 
'... reduced response time, lower cost, ease of data entry, flexibility of and control over 
format, advances in technology, recipient acceptance of the format, and the ability to 
obtain additional response-set information. ' 
Braunsberger et oL (2007: 758) argued that online surveys '... can produce more reliable data 
estimates than telephone surveys and that, web panels are cheaper and less time consuming 
to conduct than telephone surveys'. As early as 1998, Schaefer and Dillman suggested that 
participant responses in electronic surveys can be more detailed and comprehensive than 
paper-and-pencil surveys (though at that time there were still issues regarding limited internet 
access and high CoStS16) . This was further discussed by Taylor (2000, in Duffy and Smith, 2005) 
and Evans and Mathur (2005), who suggested that they offer flexible solutions, appeal to 
consumer and business, tech nologica Ily-in novative feature rich formots (thus, improving 
respondent engagement via a more visual, flexible and interactive design), convenience'7, and 
ease of data entry and analysis. It is also argued that they remove researcher bias, which can 
become a problem in personal surveys and semi-structured interviews (Granello and Wheaton, 
2004; Evans and Mathur, 2005; Duffy et aL, 2005). Surveys can, however, be perceived as junk 
mail and appear impersonal. This was overcome by the personalised email approach. 
3.6.4 Online Survey Design and Wording in the Context of this Study 
A questionnaire needs to be context-related, whilst still operationalising research aims and 
objectives into general themes and questions that produce measurable variables for 
16 9% of UK adult population had home internet access in 1998. This increased to 52% by 2004 and, in February 
2005,59% of UK adults had used the internet (National Statistics Omnibus Survey 2005, in Duffy et aL, 2005: 615). 
17 This argument was supported by the high (77%) response rate for this study's online survey. 
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quantitative and qualitative analysis (DeVellis, 1991). This study's survey assumed that 
respondents were familiar with the concept of partnership-working but less familiar with the 
issues of responsibility, legitimacy and accountability. To allow for this, questions regarding the 
latter provided a little more detail regarding explanation of the topic. In addition to the main 
themes representing the aim and objectives of this research, the survey defined respondent 
classification by collecting data on organisation type, location, staff size and environmental 
sub-sector. Thus, the questionnaire layout was as follows (see Appendix E for list of questions): 
Section 1: Organisationa I Profile (respondent classification) 
Section 2: Partnerships 
Section 3: Responsibility 
Section 4: Legitimacy 
Section 5: Accountability 
Section 6: The Voluntary Carbon Offset Market 
The questionnaire design then required questions that identified basic trends for more 
complex exploration through personal interview (see Section 3.7). This meant a mainly closed 
question approach, which yielded the following advantages: 
(i) Reduced survey completion time to 20 minutes. (Duffy et a/. (2005) argue that 
respondent fatigue starts after approximately 18); 
(ii) Eased statistical analysis of respondent classification, behaviour, attitudes, 
opinions and beliefs (Gill and Johnson, 1991; de Vaus, 1996); and 
(iii) Reduced the opportunity for researcher subjectivity and bias when interpreting 
closed question responses (de Vaus, 1996; Gill and Johnson, 1991). 
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This approach took place primarily by collecting ordinal data"3 using five-point Likert attitudinal 
scales (DeVellis 1991; de Vaus, 1996; Oppenheim, 1992). This provided a format that needed less 
effort from the respondent to complete (Couper et oL, 2001). See Figure 3.2 for example. The 
information provided by Likert scales was sufficient to identify the basic themes for more detailed 
exploration at the semi-structured interview stage. 
3.6.5 Online Survey Sampling 
Having discussed the construction of the survey and survey questions, this section considers 
the sampling and delivery process, including identification of the survey population and the 
subsequent selection of the sample (Babbie, 1989; cle Vaus, 1996; Oppenheim, 1992). The 
target population was the MTPN which consisted of 400 entities collated from my practitioner 
knowledge and networks. One reason for the focus on this network was that this study of 
environmental partnerships required associated actors, as a randomly sampled population 
from within 'the environmental sector' may have led to interviewees being selected that had 
no partnership knowledge or experience. Combined with my own personalised approach at 
survey and interview stages, this reduced the number of non-respondents who could have 
distorted the final results (Williamson 1981, in Barriball and While 1994). 
Sampling Universe Target Sample Responses 
Government 59 29 26(86%) 
QUANGOs 95 48 24(50%) 
Voluntary & Community Sector (VCS) 131 66 60(90%) 
Private sector 11S 57 44 (779/c) 
Total: 400 200 14 (77 
Table 3.3: Stratified Random Sample of Survey Population 
Table 3.3 shows how the population was stratified into four distinctive actor layers, as per the 
Policy Implementation Continuum (see Figure 3.1). This stratification ensured respondent 
is Due to the Likert scales assigning data to ordered categories. 
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groups accurately reflected the composition of the target population (Ebdon, 1985; 
Oppenheim, 1992). Stratified random sampling was then used to identify the final sample of 
200. This was carried out by dividing the total population by the required sample to choose 
every 2 nd entity (Couper, 2000; cle Vaus, 1996). A response rate of 154 (77%) was achieved 
from the sample. 
Having discussed the sampling technique applied to this survey, the next section considers the pilot 
study. 
3.6.6 Online Survey Piloting 
Converse and Presser (1986, in Sarantakos, 1996) argued that a pilot survey should answer 
four questions: 
1. Do the questions fit together? 
2. Do respondents skip non-filter questions? 
I Is the questionnaire too long for respondents to endure? 
4. Do some sections need to be cut or adapted? 
As a small-scale replica and a rehearsal of the main survey, the pilot aimed to 'discover 
possible weaknesses, inadequacies, ambiguities and problems ... so that they can be corrected 
before actual data collection takes place' (Sarantakos, 1998: 293). It improved question 
phrasing, evaluated the respondent interpretation of meanings, and corrected technical 
problems" in delivery and administration (de Vaus, 1996; Granello and Wheaton, 2004; 
19 An additional aim of the pilot study is to have respondents submit the survey from a variety of computers and to 
be able to target respondents with varying degrees of technological expertise, especially novice (Granello and 
Wheaton, 2004). 
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Sarantakos, 1998; Wyatt, 2000). The pilot study also included four questions that were 
excluded from the main survey: 
1. Questionnaire length - asked to select I of 3 options - 'Too short', 'Right length', or 
'Too long', plus text box for comment 
2. Questionnaire structure -text box for comment 
3. The flow of the questions -text box for comment 
4. Language complexity - asked to select 1 of 3 options - 'Too simple', 'About right', 
or'Too complex', plus text box for comment 
The undeclared 20 pilot study was conducted with 20 known individuals who were directed to 
the survey URL 21 via a personalised email (see Appendix Q and / or telephone call. The pilot 
study respondents were a sub-set of the target population, with the data collected also used in 
the final analysis (Granello and Wheaton, 2004). Data submitted from completed surveys were 
then stored in a text file for importing into spreadsheet format22 . There was a 
100% response 
rate from the pilot study, with no firm recommendations for changes to the questionnaire. As 
such, the survey design and structure were retained for the remainder of the sampling frame. 
3.6.7 Online Survey Delivery, Administration and Data Analysis 
On completion of the pilot study, the remaining 180 respondents in the sampling frame were 
contacted by personal email. Whilst this is more time-consuming than a generic mailing, it was 
found that my status as practitioner improved engagement by potential respondents and 
contributed to the high response rate. The survey asked for respondent name, organisation 
20 See Moser and Kalton (1971), De Vaus (1996) and Breakwell (1995) regarding undisclosed pilot studies. 
21 www. ssb. plymouth. ac. uk/surveys/EnvPartnerships/ -developed using Perseus software 
22 The spreadsheet was hosted online by the University of Plymouth at: 
https: //webmail-plymouth. ac. uk/owa/redir. aspx? URL=http%3a%2fý. '2fwww. ssb. plymouth. ac. uk%2f pdc-data%2fEn 
vPartnerships. tsv 
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name and email address, thus enabling the monitoring of responses to contact non- 
respondents. The survey also asked if respondents would be willing to take part in the 
interview stage and those who wanted to receive an executive summary of the thesis. As 
discussed in Section 3.8.1, assurances regarding anonymity outside of the research were made 
in the survey (Couper, 2000; Duffy et oL, 2005; Evans and Mathur, 2005; Granello and 
Wheaton, 2004; Ilieva et oL, 2002; Oppenheim, 1992; Taylor et aL, 2005). Anonymity improves 
credibility by encouraging respondents to be more truthful and may have also contributed to 
the high response rate" (Kellner, 2004; Lefever et aL, 2007). The survey was published on the 
internet and accessible to all, i. e. it had no password-restricted entry. Administration of survey 
results was automated, with data being sent to a pre-arranged online location for storage in a 
Tab Separated Values (TSV) file. The TSV file stored data in a table arranged in columns and 
separated by tabs. This file was then imported into Microsoft Excel for analysis (Archer, 2004; 
Evans and Mathur, 2005; Ilieva et oL, 2002; Lefever et aL, 2007). More complex analysis could 
have been carried out by using SPSS, a more advanced tool to collect, analyse, interpret and 
present data. However, this survey collected data requiring simple analysis to identify themes 
for in-depth exploration at interview stage (discussed in next Section, 3.6). For this study, 
therefore, Perseus was used to identify of clusters, trends and possible correlations. 






Figure 3.3: Online Survey Response Clusters 
Source: Author's Questionnaire 
23 Denzin (1989) argued that a low response rate can lead to an unrepresentative sample. 
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3.7 Semi-structured interviews 
3.7.1 Interviews as a Research Too[ 
'Qualitative interviewing and analysis techniques have increasingly been used within 
published research in recent years to obtain a more detailed and flexible 
understanding of individuals' beliefs, perceptions, and accounts relating to particular 
issues' (Lloyd et aL, 2006: 1386). 
Denzin (1989: 102) argues that interviews are the 'favourite digging tool of the sociologist'. 
Interviews have also been defined by the likes of Berg (2001) and Eyles and Smith (1988) as 
conversation with the purpose of gathering information through social interaction (see also 
Babbie, 1989; cle Santis, 1980). Interviewing is a form of questioning characterised by verbal 
questioning as its principal technique of data collection with constructed format being used to 
give an analytically defined perspective (Silverman, 1973,1998). Thus, this research tool's 
strength lies in its ability to focus on the research question in situ and the subsequent analysis 
of how people do things. Together with questionnaires, interviews are frequently used as part 
of multi-method approaches (Sarantakos, 1998; Valentine in Flowerclew and Martin, 
1997: 112). Breakwell (1995) argued that, as a highly flexible research tool, they can be used at 
any stage in the research process i. e. at an early stage to identify areas for further exploration 
(as per this study), for piloting and validation of other research instruments, as the main 
vehicle for data collection, or at the final stage to check whether interpretations of other data 
make sense of the sample. Whilst interviews are common place in everyday life, they are 
different when used as a social research tool or as a method of data collection. Sarantakos 
(1998: 246) argued that this is: 
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'... due to their preparation, construction and execution, first because it is prepared 
and executed in a systematic way, second because it is controlled by the researcher to 
avoid bias and distortion, and third due to the fact that it is related to a specific 
research question and a specific purpose. ' 
Interviews are generally unstructured or semi-structured, take a flexible and conversational 
form, and may vary according to the interests, experiences and views of the interviewees. This 
flexibility, Willig (2001) argued, gives the opportunity to provide access to meanings, 
perspectives and interpretations, to embrace individual differences, and to be sensitive to 
diverse forms of expression. This enables a dialogue rather than an interrogation, and provides 
a sensitive and people-oriented approach that allows interviewees to build accounts of their 
experiences by describing and explaining them in their own words (Valentine, in Flowerclew 
and Martin, 1997). In addition, the interviewer has the chance to ask the same questions in 
different ways in order to explore selected issues more thoroughly, enabling interviewees to 
explain the complexities and contradictions of their everyday lives (Bryman, 1988). Another 
strength of the interview approach is that it allows respondents to raise issues that the 
interviewer may not have anticipated, thus generating rich, detailed and multi-layered 
material, and producing a 'deeper picture' than a questionnaire survey (Burgess, 1984; 
Silverman, 1985 and 1993: 15). Thus, it is argued that these advantages have led to a 
broadening of the role and significance of interviews in research (Rubin and Rubin, 1995; 
Denzin and Lincoln 2003; Gubrium and Holstein 2002; Silverman 1997), while Kvale (1996) 
adds that the human interaction of the interview itself produces scientific knowledge. 
3.7.2 Interview Types 
Rubin and Rubin (1995) identify three major categories of interviews: 
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" Standardised, also referred to as formal, or structured; 
" Unstanclardised, also referred to as informal, or non-directive; and 
" Semi-standardised, also referred to as semi-structured. 
Stanclardised interviews gather information using formally structured and predetermined 
questions. They offer fewer variables and, therefore, offer easier comparisons (Babbie, 1995). 
Unstandardised interviews do not utilise schedules of questions and work on the basis that the 
interviewer sets out knowing that he / she will adapt / create questions throughout the 
interview. The interviewer also assumes that not all interviewees will find the same meaning in 
the questions posed. Thus, the interviewee needs the 'skill to develop, adapt and generate' 
questions and follow-up probes (Berg 1995: 61). According to Burgess (1982: 101), probing 
uncovers new clues, opens up new dimensions of a problem and secures vivid, accurate, 
inclusive accounts from informants based on personal experiences. This approach enabled me 
to gain additional information regarding phenomena observed during the interview process 
and helped to establish rapport with interviewees, especially when there was an initial lack of 
familiarity. Semi-standardised interviews also allowed me to digress from the predetermined 
set of questions. This gives the opportunity to probe beyond initial interviewee responses and 
offers a potentially richer and more intimate set of data. This resulted from interviewees' 
elaborations following unexpected probes. For example: 
Scheduled Question: Have you ever worked in a partnership programme? 
Respondent answer: 'Yes' 
Scheduled probe: How did you find it? 
This format enabled me to engage further with the interviewee while also reflecting an 
awareness of the interviewee's world. I adopted this approach for two main reasons; (i) the 
survey had identified specific themes to be explored through interview, so a structure had to 
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be implemented to achieve these aims by guiding the interview discussion; and (ii) I needed to 
be able to ask spontaneous questions in response to unexpected points made by the 
respondent. This second point was particularly pertinent as most respondents were known to 
me as practitioner and therefore presented opportunities for a relaxed and flowing dialogue 
borne out of mutual trust. Denzin (1989) argued that this shared background can have a 
positive effect by facilitating the development of a rapport between interviewer and 
interviewee, producing a rich, detailed conversation based on empathy and mutual respect 
and understanding. Thus, familiarity with background and identity encouraged a more relaxed 
and flowing dialogue that yielded improved results and overcame the potential for unwanted 
constraints or controls imposed by the interviewee. 
3.7.3 Interviewee Selection 
'Good interviewees ... appear comfortable and unstrained 
in interactions with the 
researcher; they are generally open and truthful although they may have certain areas 
about which they will not speak or where they will cover up; they provide solid 
answers with good detail; they stay on the topic or related important issues; they are 
thoughtful and willing to reflect on what they say' (Dobbert, 1982, in Barriball and 
While, 1994: 331). 
Having gained data from the online survey I identified a number of themes to explore in 
greater detail through semi-structured interviews. I was aware that the selection of actors to 
interview would need to focus on a small number of motivated individuals to ensure good 
response rates, data validity and reliability (Oppenheim, 1992). 1 decided, therefore, to select 
interviewees from within the MTPN that I knew to be established partnership practitioners and 
knowledgeable of the MTPN context. A small number of these actors were, however, located 
outside of the South West of England due to their roles including a wider, i. e. national, remit. I 
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also decided to choose interviewees from within the questionnaire sample as they were 
familiar with the research context and would perhaps provide contrasting answers in person 
(verbally) compared to their written responses (see also Section 3.7.5). Five were subsequently 
selected from each level of the Policy implementation Continuum leading to a total of 20 
interviewees. They were not selected randomly, but by a combination of particular online 
responses made, known areas of activity and expertise, and availability and accessibility. This 
selection could be argued to be subjective, but the design process ensured that the 
interviewees formed a representative sample of the target population for exploring comments 
and themes highlighted by the online survey. 
The selection of the interview location should not be a purely technical decision, as interview 
surroundings also potentially contribute to the interview structure (Herzog, 2005). For 
example, an open office environment may lead to different interviewee responses compared 
to a private setting. Taking this into account, I ensured that all interviews were conducted in a 
private and comfortable setting (Adler and Adler 2002; Berg 2001: 99). Herzog (2005) and 
Seidman (1991) argued that this sensitivity to location is also guided by the desire for equity in 
the interview. This can be partly achieved through interviewer flexibility whilst at the same 
time taking into account the constraints of logistics. Adler and Adler (2002) also argued that 
the nature of the research question can also be a determining factor regarding interview 
location. Ultimately, however, interview location and time was often constrained by spatial or 
temporal circumstances, i. e. 'where' and 'when'was mutually convenient (Warren, 2002). 
3.7.4 Interview Design 
Unlike other methods, the interviewer is an 'instrument' that can be affected by factors like 
fatigue, personality, knowledge, levels of skill, training, and experience (Guba and Lincoln, 
1981, in Patton, 1987). Patton (1987) pointed out that any face-to-face interview is also an 
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observation, with the skilled interviewer tracking non-verbal messages, interview setting, and 
nuances of the interviewer-interviewee relationship. While these subjective factors are 
sometimes considered threats to validity, they can also be strengths because the skilled 
interviewer can use flexibility and insight to ensure an in-depth, detailed understanding of the 
participant's experience. A faulty interview design would have distorted the final results, so it 
was important to construct an interview that was both exploratory and standardised to 
facilitate comparability between respondents during analysis (Denzin, 1989). This process, 
argued Denzin (1989), included delineating the areas of interest and relevance (themes) that 
should be covered by the interview. These broad areas were subsequently broken down into 





S. Further comments 
Gordon (1975) argued that the wording and sequence of all questions in a standardised 
interview must be exactly the same for each respondent to ensure that any differences in the 
answers are due to differences amongst the respondents rather than in the questions asked. 
Implicit in Gordon's argument is that respondents share a common vocabulary and that every 
word has the same meaning to every respondent (Denzin 1989). However, this argument was 
contested by Treece and Treece (1986, in Barriball and While, 1993: 330), who argued that: 
'Opportunities to change the words but not the meaning of questions provided by a 
semi-structured interview schedule acknowledges that not every word has the same 
meaning to every respondent and not every respondent uses the same vocabulary. ' 
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Both arguments were found to have relevance, in particular regarding the ambiguity for some 
of the language and terminology used by both myself and interviewees. For example, when 
discussing 'responsibility', it was assumed on more than one occasion by interviewees that this 
study was referring to 'who was responsible', as opposed to the actual research theme of the 
state 'devolving' responsibility to non-state actors. Both are linked to the wider discussion, i. e. 
that the former results from the latter, but I decided to clarify this point prior to, or 
immediately after the start of, each discussion. A further and perhaps more crucial point to 
reinforce was the definition of 'governance', with a number of interviewees assuming that it 
referred purely to the act of governing by the state, as opposed to the concept of community- 
based governance approach. 
3.7.5 Implementing the Semi-Structured Interview 
Having identified the interviewee sample, I approached each person by telephone to make an 
appointment. During the call I reminded the interviewee about the nature of the research, 
indicated that it should take no longer than 50 minutes, and commented that the interview 
was one of a number of data collection methods employed. I also presented the opportunity 
for withdrawal, and assuring confidentiality. I received a 100% acceptance rate, with many 
appearing to welcome the opportunity to discuss partnership-working. I concluded that this 
was, for the most part, due to the topicality of the study plus the impact of the subject matter 
on the day-to-day activities of the interviewees. This conclusion was reinforced during the 
interviews, with the average interview time being 72 minutes despite the interview being set 
for 50 (see Appendix D). Of the 20 interviewees, 12 asked during the a ppointment-ma king 
process if they could have an executive summary of the thesis on completion (see also 
Appendix D). 
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Although making the appointment was a relatively straightforward task, I found that 
conducting the interview was more complex, especially regarding the anonymity of the 
interviewee. Indeed, 16 out of 20 interviewees requested that their names not be listed in the 
report (see Appendix D, also the attention to ethics in Section 3.8.1). This number included all 
five of the public sector employees (four of whom stated that from a personal perspective they 
did not support partnership-working, thus contradicting company PoliCY)24 . This feedback also 
influenced my decision to down play this study's institutional sponsorship from Great Western 
Research (GWR) as, much to my surprise, I had previously been quizzed by a number of actors 
regarding the nature of the GWR sponsorship and whether I was effectively 'working for the 
RDA' (Regional Development Agency). I responded to those situations by confirming that 
funding had been secured by GWR from both the RDA and Moor Trees to fund research 
collaborations between Higher Education Institutions and local business to build international 
recognition to promote the growth of the region. When framed as such (as per GWR's stated 
aim), I found that initial reservations were withdrawn. This does, however, provide an 
interesting anecdote about the image and profile of the South West RDA. 
I further addressed the employer / employee conundrum by requesting responses based on 
company policy via the online survey and including the opportunity for the interviewee to 
discuss their personal experiences of partnership-working during the interview. I found that 
this was possible due to the flexibility and responsiveness offered by the interview approach 
and also through my status as a trusted practitioner (cle Santis, 1980). This role also enabled in- 
depth discussions of sub-topics that a researcher new to the sector may have found 
challenging. My action research experiences and findings also contributed to discussions, as 
did my role of observer. This dual role elicited positive responses from the interviewees, with 
me regularly being asked for my own opinion and suggestions regarding partnership-working, 
resulting in a complex dove-tailing of action researcher and interviewer. However, this multi- 
24 As mentioned In the previous ection, this was also a consideration when deciding to select interviewees from the 
questionnaire sample Le. to contrast written vs. Verbal responses. 
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faceted role was not without its own challenges, including the need to remain objective, 
especially when asked for my opinion. I met this challenge by constantly reverting to the 
interview structure so that I could remain focused on meeting the research by exploring the 
themes identified by the online survey. 
On finishing the interview, I ensured we returned from any sector practitioner dialogue (or 
tangents) to our interviewer / interviewee statuses. This ensured that the conditions of 
anonymity, requirements for executive summary, timing the interview, etc, were all met and 
recorded for inclusion in the research analysis and findings. 
3.7.6 Interview Analysis 
I conducted a series of semi-structured interviews to obtain a more detailed understanding of 
particular issues highlighted by the online survey. A total of 20 recorded and then transcribed 
interviews provided detailed, oral accounts of MTPN actor attitudes, behaviours and beliefs 
towards partnership-working. It differed from the survey by offering a non-quantitative 
appraisal of findings. This approach enabled triangulation against survey data, secondary 
sources and personal observations of, and action research from within, the MTPN. 
Triangulation met the validity and reliability criteria used within quantitative research whilst 
remaining sensitive to context (Lloyd et oL, 2006; Yardley, 2000). 
I set a target of creating recording transcripts and conducting initial data analysis within seven 
days of each interview. I started 25 the analysis stage using the NVivo 8 software package, which 
is designed to merge and explore related data. The package is built to import, analyse and 
store large amounts of data, but initial results suggested that it was not as adept as myself at 
extracting the necessary information from the multiple sources of information and that it was 
25 My first analyses included 243 Corporate Social Responsibility reports that I had collected as PDF files. 
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also unable to bring action research and practitioner experiences to bear when analysing the 
data. This may be contentious, but I felt that NVivo was too quantitative for the complex 
analysis that this study required. On that basis, I proceeded with my own 'manual' approach to 
interview data analysis. This included re-reading the transcript whilst reflecting on each 
interviewee's positioning within the Policy Implementation Continuum and their responses to 
the online survey. I also reflected on my pre-interview knowledge and experience of the actor, 
drawing on action research experiences and observations to make additional notes for 
subsequent triangulation to reinforce conclusions drawn from other sources. I then conducted 
keyword counts within each transcript. Keywords included the following: 
" Governance 0 Public 0 Stakeholder 
" Partnership 0 Participation 0 Funding 
" Community 0 Local 0 Responsibility 
" Responsibility 0 Legitimacy 0 Accountability 
In addition to measuring keyword frequency against actor classification i. e. the number of 
times QUANGOs mentioned 'Local', I categorised the data as per the survey i. e. partnership- 
working, responsibility, legitimacy, accountability and the voluntary carbon offset sector, 
which then formed the basis for chapters 5 to 8. The data were then linked to background 
literature and secondary data, to link my empirical findings as researcher with MTPN sources 
as practitioner. During this initial analysis I also deleted irrelevant material (Cook and Craig, 
1995). This presented challenges in understanding the nuances of the interviewee, and 
avoiding researcher bias and personal perspectives influencing my interpretation throughout 
the analysis (objectivity is discussed further in 3.8-3). 1 also found that the 7 day time-scale for 
analysis was important, as time went on (especially with other interviews occurring in 
between) the harder it became to appreciate the subtler and more complex discourse. The 
structure of early interviews was driven by survey findings, with the prompt review and 
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analysis of primary data enabling me to modify subsequent interview structures to account for 
the findings. This reflection also enabled me to conduct more efficient interviews, leading to 
the collection of a decreasing amount of irrelevant material. Further reflection was carried out 
by revisiting interviewees to give summaries of findings. This gave feedback to the interviewee, 
gave the opportunity for further comment (from both parties), provided further assurances 
regarding anonymity and objectivity, and confirmation that my own understanding of their 
arguments was correct. 
3.8 Ethics, Reflexivity and Positionality 
3.8.1 Adopting an Ethical Approach 
Flowerdew and Martin (1997: 75) argued that 
'Ethnographic research brings to the fore the many ethical, practical and personal 
issues which surround the organisation of primary data collection - issues to which 
again there are no clear cut answers'. 
Ethical issues are present in any kind of research. The research process creates tension 
between the aims of research to make generalisations for the good of others, and the rights of 
participants to maintain privacy. Ethics pertain to doing good and avoiding harm. Harm can be 
prevented or reduced through the application of appropriate ethical principles. Thus, the 
protection of human subjects or participants in any research study is imperative. The nature of 
ethical problems in qualitative research studies is subtle and different compared to problems 
in quantitative research. For example, potential ethical conflicts exist with regard to how a 
researcher gains access to a community group and in the effects the researcher may have on 
participants. Indeed, Flowerclew and Martin (1997: 137) argued that: 
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'In terms of gaining access to, and establishing a role in your research community, not 
only must the significance of your position and apparent intentions be considered but 
so too must your responsibilities over how the people researched will be represented 
in any account produced, how this will be circulated, and the impact that this might 
have on their lives in the future'. 
Qualitative researchers focus their research on exploring, examining, and describing people 
and their natural environments. Punch (1994) claimed that one hardly ever hears of ethical 
failures in qualitative research. However, Batchelor and Briggs (1994) claimed that the failure 
of researchers to address ethical issues has resulted in researchers being ill-prepared to cope 
with the unpredictable nature of qualitative research. Embedded in qualitative research are 
the concepts of relationships and power between researchers and participants, and the desire 
to participate in a research study depends upon a participant's willingness to share his or her 
experience. Qualitative studies are frequently conducted in settings involving the participation 
of people in their everyday environments, making researcher awareness of ethical issues an 
important point to address. This includes the appropriateness of the research design, 
methodology and reporting behaviours, as researchers are ultimately responsible for 
protecting participants. In qualitative studies, researchers usually collect data through 
interviews, observations, secondary sources, and audio-visual material. While in the field, 
researchers need to negotiate access to participants to collect these data, so the initial 
approach by the researcher may facilitate or inhibit access to information. Once access has 
been granted and data collection started, researchers may then experience ethical issues that 
may not have been anticipated in the research plan (Field and Morse, 1992). Ramos (1989) 
described three types of problems that may affect qualitative studies: 
the researcher/ participant relationship 
the researcher's subjective interpretations of data 
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0 the design itself 
For example, deception or disclosure of damaging information can occur. When preparing 
research protocols, social science researchers should consider the potential ethical issues that 
can be anticipated in the study, such as informed consent, confidentiality, data generation and 
analysis, researcher / participant relationships, and reporting of final outcomes. 
The purpose of qualitative studies is to describe a phenomenon from the participants' points 
of view through interviews and observations. The intention of the researcher is to listen to 
participants or observe them in their natural environments. The researcher's interpretation of 
these experiences is usually described as an emic perspective (Field and Morse, 1992). The 
acceptance of this statement means that researchers recognise that participants are 
autonomous people who will share information willingly, with a balanced research relationship 
encouraging disclosure, trust, and awareness of potential ethical issues. Kvale (1996) 
considered an interview to be a moral endeavour, claiming that the participant's response is 
affected by the interview, and that the knowledge gained through the interview affects our 
understanding of the human experience. This personal interaction between researchers and 
participants is crucial in data gathering by keeping in mind the research focus and being clear 
about the role of researchers. The researchers' perceptions of field situations are determined 
by personality and the nature of interactions (Punch, 1994). Although qualitative research 
methods make it difficult to predict how data will be collected during interviews or 
observation, researchers have the obligation to anticipate the possible outcomes of an 
interview and to weigh both benefits and potential harm. Ethical dilemmas that may arise from 
an interview are difficult to predict but the researcher needs to be aware of sensitive issues 
and potential conflicts of interest. An interview is usually equated with confidentiality, 
informed consent, and privacy, but also by recurrence of 'old wounds' and sharing of secrets 
(Kvale, 1996). The interview opens new risks to both researchers and participants. Ethical 
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codes and guidelines for research do not have answers to all ethical issues that may arise 
during research. The research protocol should also provide enough information ensuring 
protection of human subjects. Moreover, such protocols must give details of the manner in 
which the study will be conducted, details of access to participants, informed consent, and 
access and storage of data. The difficulties inherent in qualitative research can be alleviated by 
awareness and use of well-established ethical principles, specifically autonomy, beneficence, 
and justice. 
Capron (1989) said that any kind of research should be guided by the principles of respect for 
people, beneficence, and justice. He considered that respect for people is the recognition of 
participants' rights, including the right to be informed about the study, the right to freely 
decide whether to participate in a study, and the right to withdraw at any time without 
penalty. It also means that participants exercise their rights as autonomous persons to accept 
voluntarily or refuse to participate in the study. Consent has been referred to as a negotiation 
of trust, and requires continuous renegotiation (Field and Morse, 1992; Kvale, 1996). A second 
ethical principle closely linked with research is beneficence - doing good for others and 
preventing harm. Beneficence in some situations may become paternalism. A paternalistic 
approach indicates the denial of autonomy and freedom of choice. Research strategies used to 
collect data and selection criteria also have ethical implications. if researchers are maintaining 
the principle of beneficence, overseeing the potential consequences of revealing participants' 
identities is a moral obligation, with the use of pseudonyms recommended. However, this 
strategy may not be sufficient if the study is conducted in a small community where 
participants could be easily recognised. In such cases, circulation of the study may need to be 
restricted. 
Protection of participants' identities also applies to publications. Participants should be told 
how results will be published. Quotations or other data from the participants, even though 
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anonymous, could reveal their identity. Ideally, participants would approve the use of 
quotations used in publications. Confidentiality and anonymity can be breached by legal 
requirements such as when researchers' data are subpoenaed for legal purposes. Despite the 
need for confidentiality, qualitative research requires confirmability, that is, documentation of 
all activities included in a research study. This process may create an ethical dilemma regarding 
confidentiality and anonymity and, in some cases, participants may need to know that other 
researchers may review the process and the data. The principle of justice refers to equal share 
and fairness. One of the crucial and distinctive features of this principle is avoiding exploitation 
and abuse of participants. My understanding and application of this principle of justice was 
demonstrated by recognising vulnerability of the participants and their contributions to the 
study. For example, when, during data analysis, I considered a concept to be based on the 
contribution of a particular participant, then I requested permission to use it or at least discuss 
the issue(s) with the participant. 
Conducting research in an area in which the researcher works or is already known raises 
several issues and ethical considerations. Having these ethical principles in mind, researchers 
who are also professionals in their area of study should reflect on their roles as researchers 
and compare the research with their previous / existing roles as professionals. At times, 
however, researchers have to revert rapidly to their roles as professionals, especially if 
engaged in action research. The researcher may also get better results by knowing the 
situation and having the trust of participants. Indeed, Flowerdew and Martin (1997: 139) asked: 
If you are expecting the people you live and / or work amongst to be frank about their 
opinions and experiences, should you do likewise in order to foster a genuine even- 
handed relationship? Or should you step back, at least for a while, observe, ask 
innocent questions, and be careful what you reveal about yourself? 
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However, the known researcher may get less information as respondents may feel coerced to 
participate and may limit the information they give. They may also feel self-conscious or 
threatened knowing that anything they say may be 'written down and used in evidence' 
(Flowerdew and Martin, 1997). Thus, negotiation and identification of my role as researcher in 
my professional setting was important, as was clarifying the purposes of the study. This meant 
that I was regarded as a researcher and not as someone who was doing something dubious. 
This study presented a number of ethical challenges due to the researcher-practitioner 
approach. Working at Director level for Moor Trees gave me access to data that had been 
acquired for Moor Trees business i. e. address books, mailing lists and some actor personal 
contact details. This presented the dilemma of using these data as a researcher as opposed to 
as a practitioner. I concluded that two main issues needed to be addressed; (i) the use of 
contact data for research purposes; and (ii) anonymity. in addressing point (i) I initially 
consulted a small group of MTPN actors to ask how they would feel if they received an email 
from me requesting them to complete the online survey, possibly take part in a semi- 
structured interview and my playing an observer role in MTPN interactions for the duration of 
my data collection phase. Without exception, all confirmed that they were happy on all counts, 
though many stated that they would prefer anonymity for themselves and occasionally the 
organisations they represented. I drew two conclusions from this; (i) that this feedback was 
representative of the wider MTPN; and (ii) that assurances sought regarding the anonymity of 
findings was both an important technical aspect and one that indicated the potential 
sensitivity of the research. 
Following on from this consultation, I sent a one-off email (see Appendix B) to each member of 
the MTPN requesting their participation in my research as discussed above. included in this 
email were assurances regarding anonymity and the statement that participants could 
withdraw their contribution at any time before, during or after the interview and / or survey 
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processes. This was backed-up via further comment on the online survey, before and during 
the interview process, and prior to meetings, conferences or other occasions where I was 
observing a number of MTPN actors. All were happy with this approach and I have been 
careful to anonymise findings except where specific permissions have been given for company 
names to be quoted where the data presented could be considered to be contentious (see, for 
example, 7.2.3 regarding the Access to Nature fund). 
Although 'ethics' play a major role in conducting high quality research, the position of the 
embedded researcher and the subsequent ability for him / her to reflect on their impact on 
the research subject necessitate arguably equal considerations. 
3.8.2 Reflexivity and Positionality in the Partnership Network 
Flowerclew and Martin (1997) argued that when a researcher is considering who they want to 
interview it is important to reflect on oneself and how one's identity will shape the interviewer 
/ interviewee interaction. Such reflecting upon one's own position as the researcher has been 
conceptualised as positionality and reflexivity, i. e. the researcher needs to recognise his / her 
positionality and be reflexive (England, 1994; Rose, 1996). England (1994: 82) described this 
reflexivity as 
'self-critical sympathetic introspection and the self-conscious analyticol scrutiny of the 
self as the researcher. indeed, reflexivity is critical to the conduct of fieldwork, it 
induces self-discovery and can lead to insights and new hypotheses about the research 
questions. ' 
May (1997: 286) argue that (as an analytical tool) '... reflexivity can mean recognising 
researcher's own social locations and disentangling how they might shape the empirical 
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analysis'. Valentine (1997: 113) further argued that it is 'important to reflect on who you are 
and how your identity will shape the interactions that you have with others'. For conducting 
ethnographic-style fieldwork in geography, in particular, the researcher must also be aware of 
the power relationship with the interviewee. For example, gender, class, race, nationality, 
politics, history and experience can shape research and interpretations of the world. These 
influences cannot be removed, so the researcher must learn to accommodate and adapt 
accordingly (Schoenberger 1992). The sharing of professional backgrounds, however, had a 
positive effect of building a rapport between myself and the interviewees, leading to rich and 
detailed discussions based on empathy and respect around the points in question. Similarly, 
argued Flowerclew and Martin (1997), the researcher may find it easier to build a rapport with 
a research participant if the project is linked to their own interests or the researcher is 
interviewing people who they have something in common with. 
This study focused on actors from the four stratified levels of the Policy Implementation 
Continuum, i. e. government, QUANGO, third sector and private sector, leading to a diverse 
range of actors with a common professional interest (the environmental sector). When 
collecting data from these individuals and organisations it was important to engage with my 
own positionality as professional, practitioner and researcher. Part of this engagement was my 
understanding of self as a multi-faceted individual and how this was to be presented to the 
subjects of my research activities, some of whom who already had different perceptions of my 
identity through university work-based initiatives on which I had already been working. For 
example, I had set up work-based learning, research and student volunteering programmes for 
Moor Trees. To focus both my personal and my research subjects' attention, I presented 
myself primarily as a 'University of Plymouth PhD Researcher, with a secondary professional 
affiliation to Moor Trees as 'charity Director. Thus, as 'researcher' I was conducting semi- 
structured interviews, carrying out surveys and observing MTPN activities. As a 'charity 
Director' (or, 'practitioner), I was conducting Moor Trees business. What quickly became clear, 
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however, was that action research for this study necessitated the combined role of 
'researcher-practitioner'. What this meant, was that my positionality and role when interacting 
with MTPN actors could and often did vary, though it did not adversely affect data collection 
and always provided "an insider's account with an outsider's detachment" (Eyles and Smith, 
1988: 9). 
This 'dual-personality' (as often suggested by a number of MTPN members) also presented the 
challenge of remaining objective and the need to continuously reflect on my potentially 
influential position as MTPN actor. However, it also enabled access to high quality, diverse and 
occasionally exclusive data from the MTPN which would have been very difficult to do 
otherwise. For example, sitting on various partnership committees, company boards and 
numerous stakeholder consultations presented numerous action research and participant 
observation opportunities yielding a rich data-set. My position as PhD researcher and Moor 
Trees Director thus created opportunities that would have otherwise been difficult to access 
with a different background. Throughout the data collection and analysis process it remained 
important for me continuously to assess my positionality. I did this through a number of ways. 
Firstly, MTPN actors were all informed and then regularly reminded of my dual role. This took 
place in interview, action research and observed settings. These are, for the most part, ethical 
issues, with Cook and Crang (1995) further emphasising that ethnographies do not necessarily 
produce concrete results (such as proven or discarded hypotheses) and that the researcher 
should avoid attempting to develop a definitive answer to a research question resulting from 
one's own and one or two respondents' theorisations, i. e. that: 
The process of analysis is not a matter of developing a definitive account, but 
of trying to find a means to understand the interrelations of multiple versions 
of reality - including not least that of the academy - so that it serves to stress 
the inter-connectivities (Cook and Crang, 1995: 91). 
101 
Secondly, I adopted a multi-method approach, where I collated and analysed data collected 
from an online survey, semi-structured interviews, participant observation, secondary sources 
and action research. This cross-referencing of data also removed the potential for researcher 
and respondent bias, plus assisted with my own objectivity. 
3.8.3 Remaining Objective 
Objectivity is considered to be one of the most significant elements of sociological enterprise, 
though also regarded by many as not easy or even possible to actually achieve (Sarantakos 
1998). It is employed to reduce personal prejudice and bias, and to present social reality as it 
really is and not as constructed by the researcher (or respondents(s)). Thus, argued Sarantakos 
(1998: 18), researchers should be neutral technicians and not 'reformers, neutral observers and 
not philosophers or analysts, and that researcher's personal views and value judgements 
should be kept out of research. Some qualitative researchers, however, reject the notion of 
objectivity, arguing that inter-subjective reliabi lity2l is neither desirable nor possible, This 
argument is supported by the assumptions that objectivity is; (i) supported by results that can 
be standardised and is therefore not possible with qualitative research; and (ii) requires the 
researcher to remain distant and neutral to the research object, the respondents, the data 
collection and analysis methodology, and to the findings - none of which are possible with 
qualitative research. Furthermore, the qualitative social science researcher interacts with and 
interprets data from society, of which they are also part. In this sense, the researcher plays a 
personal role and objectivity in qualitative research is, therefore, impossible. 
Research data should, however, be collected as objectively as possible. Both analytical and 
humanistic approaches adopt methodologies where the 'researcher is the expert, an objective 
recorder and observer of the world who neutrally carries out the study' (Kitchin and Tate 
26 So that if a research study is carried out by two or more researchers the same results are achieved (Sarantakos 
1998) 
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2000: 23). However, it can be argued that knowledge is fact-situated whereby it is not 'given', 
but in fact waiting to be 'discovered', i. e. it is constructed through how the researcher 
investigates and examines the world. Thus, it could be argued that it will be subject to 
researcher bias, or, by their enthusiasm and motivation, or the context of the research itself. 
Kitchin and Tate (2000) go on to argue that the researcher will also come to the research with 
a certain amount of 'baggage' that inhibits impartiality. Further, Sample (1996) argued that, 
whilst in theory a research design is chosen to address the situation and questions under 
investigation, in reality, it often suits the interest or speciality of the researcher. As such, 
research is researcher-orientated, based around the desires and agendas of the researcher 
rather than the subject of the research. 
Data validity and reliability are important issues as, through them, the objectivity of the 
research is at stake (Sarantakos 1998, Silverman 1998). My status as researcher-practitioner 
presented the challenge of collecting and analysing data from my own work-place as 
objectively as possible. The answer was to adopt a 'systematic approach to data collection 
which allows you to maximise the chances of maintaining objectivity and achieving valid and 
reliable result' (Breakwell (1995: 230). 1 found that the key point here was that I aimed to 
'maximise the chances of maintaining objectivity' as my research work treated participants as 
people, not objects to be exploited or mined for information (England, 1994). Stanley and Wise 
(1993: 157) supported this view: 
'Whether we like it or not, researchers remain human beings with all the usual 
assembly of feelings, failings and moods. And all of those things influence how we feel 
and understand what is going on. Our consciousness is always the medium through 
which the research occurs; there is no method or technique of doing research other 
than through the medium of the researcher! 
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What I ultimately discovered during this study was that despite my best efforts at avoiding 
personal preconceptions, I often entered into data collection and analysis activities mentally 
predicting outcomes and outputs. This raised initial personal concerns regarding my own 
objectivity as researcher/ practitioner. However, these concerns were addressed when I found 
on a number of occasions that findings from this study had fundamentally changed some of my 
own beliefs and ideas regarding partnership-working in the environmental sector. 
3.9 Conclusion 
The multi-actor nature of networks and partnerships and the importance of the associated 
relationships made this research inherently challenging. Indeed, whilst the MTPN provided a 
finite sample of actors and the Policy Implementation Continuum a distinct stratification of 
actor types, cleconstructing their complex and often informal operational and financial 
interactions would have been difficult if I had not had the in-depth understanding of an 
environmental sector practitioner. Lowndes et oL (2007) concurred that the informality of 
much of the activity meant that telephone conversations and chance meetings (as part of my 
action research approach) were as significant as pre-arranged interviews and discussions. 
Although my practitioner experience benefited this study, my primary role was of researcher. 
This led to a requirement to establish research rigour through this chapter's extensive 
provision of information on the appropriateness of the use of multiple methods and 
information on respondent selection (Baxter and Eyles, 1997). 1 have further highlighted; my 
immersion in the research topic, lengthy and in-depth fieldwork, revisits to and verification by 
respondents, and the ongoing triangulation of results. 
Regarding my role as researcher-practitioner, this presented methodological challenges as a 
result of my 'clua [-persona lity', from actor sensitivities regarding the potential 
commercialisation and / or the dissemination of results, and my own objective analysis and 
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interpretation of data. However, the dove-tailing of my practitioner background with action 
research, observation and interviews yielded a rich set of data which, when triangulated, 
proved to be reliable as well as leading to robust conclusions. Perhaps in further recognition of 
my approach, was the high survey response rate. This electronic format also proved to be a 
highly cost-effective and flexible (format-wise) method that enabled my access to the MTPN 
population (Granello and Wheaton, 2004). Findings from the survey then enabled me to 
develop the structure for the interviews. Semi-structured interviews were selected as the 
means of data collection because of two primary considerations. Firstly, they are well suited 
for the exploration of respondent perceptions, attitudes and beliefs regarding complex and 
sometimes sensitive issues of environmental partnerships through probing for more 
information and clarification of answers. Secondly, the typology of themes identified during 
the questionnaire survey process necessitated the adoption of an exploratory framework, thus 
potentially identifying new discussion points and, therefore, precluding the use of a 
standardised interview schedule (Barriball and While, 1994). Semi-structured interviews were, 
therefore, used to enable a focused but conversational approach to data collection by 
identifying and then exploring topics relating to the research. 
I underpinned the survey and interviews with an action research model carried out within the 
MTPN as Director of Moor Trees. The next chapter analyses Moor Trees and its network of 
partners, discussing the charity's role in EPPP, and how network members from across all four 
levels of the Policy Implementation Continuum interact, thus providing a strong empirical 
focus for partnership-working in the environmental sector. 
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Part IV Data Collection, Analysis and Discussion 
Part 11 of this thesis reviewed environmental partnership and governance literature. Much is 
written on governance, with the likes of Imrie and Raco (1999), Jessop (1998), Mackinnon 
(2002) and Stoker (1997) variously defining it as the redistribution of power to non-state 
actors, the transition from hierarchical to network government, and the 'blurring' of public / 
private sector boundaries to enable 'coordination and collaboration'. This list is by no means 
exhaustive but there is a common thread of state / non-state interaction, or 'partnership- 
working'. Part 11 narrowed the research focus by reviewing the partnership approach in the 
environmental context. It highlighted various authors' arguments regarding partnerships as 
the delivery framework for the 'bottom-up' approach of environmental governance i. e. 
whereby partnerships are formed, often between state and non-state actors, to engage in 
both formulation and delivery of EPPP (Connelly et al., 2006; Imrie and Raco, 1996; 
Mackinnon, 2002; Sampford, 2002). It is this increasingly complex multi-actor partnership- 
working, it is proposed, that raises questions regarding the acceptance of responsibility 
(through state devolution of power), acquisition of legitimacy (the issue of non-elected actors), 
and the provision of accountability (regarding actor autonomy) of these partnerships. 
Thus, I argue that, whilst partnerships are increasingly regarded as a delivery mechanism 
within the conceptual framework of environmental governance, successful application is 
dependent on meeting conditions of responsibility, legitimacy and accountability, with 
effective partnership-working only becoming a reality when all three are engaged i. e. 
0 ACCEPTING Responsibility 





Figure 4.1: The Components of Effective Partnership-working 
Source: Author 
Through the lens of the MTPN, this study addressed the practicalities of implementing 
partnership theory, or, the shift from concept to application. In this section of the thesis, data 
were collected from the MTPN using the methodology outlined in Part III i. e. secondary 
sources, action research, participant observation, 154 online survey responses (collected from 
a sampling frame of 200 taken from a population of 400) and 20 semi-structured interviews. 
Situated within the analytical framework of the MTPN case study, Part IV is split into five 
chapters: 
0 Chapter 4, where the case study of the MTPN is presented as the empirical focus of 
this thesis. 
0 Chapter 5, where it is suggested that the state is devolving responsibility, with 
questions raised over the subsequent resourcing of grassroots actors. 
0 Chapter 6 analyses the legitimacy of partnerships as delivery framework for state EPPP 
0 Chapter 7, where the financial and operational accountability of partnerships are 
discussed against the backdrop of non-state actors and associated autonomy. 
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* Chapter 8 draws on the -findings of chapters 4,5,6 and 7 to assess the opportunities 
and threats of the partnership approach, drawing on lessons learnt from observing and 
working within the case study, and suggesting new approaches to ensure that 
responsibility, legitimacy and accountability can be achieved to enable successful 
partnership-working. 
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Chapter 4: CASE STUDY: Moor Trees and its Partnership Network 
4.1 Introduction 
This thesis considered the partnership approach in environmental governance and the issues 
of responsibility, legitimacy and accountability. Its empirical focus is the case study of Moor 
Trees and its partnership network, collectively termed as the MTPN. This case study was 
chosen due to researcher embeddedness, the diversity of MTPN actorS27, and its 
representation of the complexities of effective partnership-working. 
This study brought additional focus to the Voluntary Carbon Markets (VCM) and the 
relationships between Moor Trees (as offset provider) and organisations from across the Policy 
Implementation Continuum with whom it works that seek to offset their carbon emissions 
through tree-planting as a form of carbon sequestration. I was embedded within the 
environmental sector as the Director of Moor Trees. This privileged position, as well as 
providing co-funding for this study, provided action research and participant observation 
opportunities to provide in-depth assessment of the associated actors and networks (see 
Hoggart et oL, 2002; Sarantakos, 1998; Silverman, 1985). The nature of this research (the study 
of inter- and intra-actor relationships and network dynamics) meant that a diverse range of 
quantitative and qualitative data were made available to me, thus providing a strong empirical 
focus. Access to this group of actors presented the opportunity to ask if the partnerships were: 
Increasingly responsible for government plans, policies and programmes (PPP) delivery 
through the third sector agenda 
0 Legitimately delivering top-down PPP due to their non-democratic nature 
0 Financially and operationally accountable 
27 Spanning the four sectors of public, QUANGO, third and private sectors. 
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Through an action research approach to the VCM, it also presented the opportunity to ask: 
0 Can the largely autonomous nature of the VCM provide a credible contribution 
towards the delivery of EPPP, thus providing a robust example of environmental 
partnership-working? 
Chapter 3 detailed the methodological approach for qualitative and quantitative data 
collection. The use of multiple methods maximised the opportunities presented by researcher 
embeddedness for the collection of in-depth and complex clatasets (Hoggart et aL, 2002; 
Robson 2002; Wadsworth, 1998). This embeddedness further provided often exclusive access 
to partnership networks. My status as Director of Moor Trees also brought partnership- 
practitioner experience, presenting an in-depth knowledge of partnership theory and 
application 'in the real world'. It presented a candid view of a cross-sector, multi-actor 
network constantly working to turn policy into practice. As discussed in the previous chapter 
(Section 3.8), this ethnographic-based approach raised the challenges of researcher 
subjectivity and respondent bias (de Vaus, 1996; Remenyi, 2000). When considering the 
suitability of the target research sample, care was also taken to include a sufficient diversity of 
environmental actors. This meant representation from all four layers of the Policy 
Implementation Continuum (see Figure 3.1), each of which the MTPN is able to populate to 
provide reliable and valid data. 
Out of the conceptual framework of governance, it is the 'operationalisation' of partnership 
theory that this study focused upon (Boonstra, 2006; Connelly et oL, 2006; Imrie and Raco, 
1999; Stoker, 1998). This chapter provides context and background to the actors, partnership 
networks and markets that are the empirical focus of this thesis. Set primarily against the 
geographical backdrop of the South West of England, it centres on a small woodland charity 
(Moor Trees) and its partnership network. I was embedded as both researcher and practitioner 
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as Director of Moor Trees and, therefore, within the MTPN. This network was chosen as the 
over-arching case study for this thesis for the following reasons: 
My embeddedness provided: 
o Action research and participant observation opportunities 
0 Partnership-practitioner experience and expertise 
The population consisted of a range of cross-sector actors (see Table 4.1) 
a 'Real-life' example of partnership responsibility, legitimacy and accountability issues 
This chapter firstly discusses Moor Trees' background, aims and objectives, and provides detail 
on how its charitable activities work alongside two QUANGOS. It then analyses the MTPN, 
discussing how Moor Trees has embraced partnership-working and the ensuing benefits and 
challenges this has posed, including the case study of the Offender Pathway to Employment 
Programme at Her Majesty's Prison (HMP) Dartmoor. The chapter then introduces the VCM 
and how Moor Trees has diversified its activities into this market through its voluntary carbon 
offset programme. It then concludes with an assessment of the quantity and quality of data 
available and the pathway to collection and analysis. 
4.2 Moor Trees Overview 
Established in 1999, Moor Trees was incorporated as a company limited by guarantee (No. 
03716434)on 19th February 1999 and achieved charitable status (No. 1081142) 19th June 2000. 
Based at South Brent (Devon, UK), it operates in and around Dartmoor National Park, the City 
of Plymouth and the South Hams areas. These areas sit within the South West of England (the 
geographical focus of this study) with a wider partnership network that, in part, extends 
nationally (see Section 4.6). 
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Figure 4.3: Moor Trees locations 
(Images reproduced with permission of Ordnance Survey and Ordnance Survey of Northern Ireland) 
Moor Trees' stated aims are as follows: 
0 The preservation and conservation for the public benefit of the environment, and 
in particular Dartmoor's wild natural forests; 
The advancement of education amongst the public concerning natural history, 
conservation and the environment, and in particular the role of the woodland 
restoration in the stabilisation and regeneration of ecosystems. 
(Charity Commission, 2008) 
The 'About Us' section of the Moor Trees website publishes its aims as to: 
0 create new and enable natural regeneration of native woodland 
0 build social cohesion through volunteering 
112 
" work towards a low carbon economy 
" provide high quality education and training 
(Moor Trees, 2008a) 
As Moor Trees' main aim is the restoration of native broad-leaf woodland, it is known within 
the MTPN primarily as a nature conservation actor. its community-based activities, 
conservation volunteering, education and research programmes also represents a diversified, 
cross-sector approach, with significant 'social' outcomes. Moor Trees (2008) summarised its 
activities on its website as: 
'We grow local provenance trees in our community tree nurseries from locally 
collected seed. Volunteering is central to our work, so each year we work with 
hundreds of volunteers of all ages and abilities. We also run research, education and 
training programmes with partner schools, colleges and universities'. 
Moor Trees restores native broad-leaf woodland by working in partnership with a wide range 
of local communities and businesses to collect seed to grow local provenance seed across a 
network of seven community tree nurseries prior to planting in various woodland locations. In 
addition to this environmental aim, social benefits are also very important to Moor Trees, with 
individuals of all ages and abilities welcomed to their nurseries and planting sites. Activities 
include seed gathering, sorting, sowing and nurturing, sapling care, site development and 
improving access for less mobile volunteers. The charity also works in partnership with further 
education colleges (including Duchy College and Bicton College) to offer a wide range of 
practical skills, education and training for individuals and businesses (Moor Trees, 2008). The 
Moor Trees Woodlands Service provides free consultation, planting and maintenance to help 
create and restore native woodlands of all sizes for conservation benefit. The Moor Trees 
Woodlands Manager pointed out that although fragmented remnants of ancient semi-natural 
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woodlands (ASNW) only cover 2.8% of Dartmoor and 1.8% of the South West, they provide 
some of the most important habitats in the region with upland oakwoods being one of the 
closest habitats to the natural climax vegetation of the uplands. The Woodlands Service works 
with landowners to plant new and extend existing woodlands for conservation by improving 
the economic viability of schemes with free trees from their tree nurseries, a volunteer 
workforce and grant application advice. The service includes project design, grant payment 
applications, woodland management plans, free trees, recycled tree stakes, tubes and spirals, 
and volunteer tree planters. This afforestation of agricultural land is becoming an established 
part of rural policy28, recognising that, if correctly managed, forestry has a positive impact on 
the natural landscape and biodiversity. It further recognises the role played in mitigating 
climate change, for which deforestation is one the largest contributing anthropogenic factors. 
The next two sections provide detail on two funding programmes; agri-environment schemes 
(AES) and the English Woodland Grant Scheme (EWGS). These schemes provide examples of 
state-funding programmes that work with non-state partners for delivery, whilst enforcing 
hierarchical accountability through various checks, balances and control mechanisms (Section 
7.3 provides more detailed analyses of these managerial technologies). 
4.3 Agri-Environment Schemes 
The state provides funding for this work through AES run by Natural England, a QUANGO. The 
AES support, amongst other things, forest improvement, with the principal aims to maintain 
the ecological stability of forests and to restore damaged ones. The agri-environmental 
strategy of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) is largely aimed at enhancing the 
sustainability of agro-ecosystems. The measures set out to address the integration of 
environmental concerns into the CAP encompass environmental requirements (cross- 
28 Agenda 2000 reinforced financial incentives to farmers converting agricultural land to woodland and 
forest 
(European Commission, date unknown). 
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compliance) and incentives (e. g. set-aside) integrated into the market and income policy, as 
well as targeted environmental measures that form part of the Rural Development 
Programmes e. g. AES (European Commission, 2008 (no page)). AES are increasingly delivered 
by working through partners such as Moor Trees. Building on the Environmentally Sensitive 
Areas and Countryside Stewardship schemes, it has three elements: 
1. Entry Level Stewardship (ELS). A straightforward approach to supporting the good 
stewardship of the countryside. This is done through simple and effective land 
management that goes beyond the Single Payment Scheme requirement to maintain 
land in good agricultural and environmental condition. It is open to all farmers and 
landowners. 
2. Organic Entry Level Stewardship (OELS). The organic strand of ELS. It is geared to 
organic and organic / conventional mixed farming systems and is open to all farmers 
not receiving Organic Farming Scheme aid. 
3. Higher Level Stewardship (HLS). This involves more complex management, where land 
managers need advice and support. Agreements are tailored to local circumstances. 
HLS applications will be assessed against specific local targets and agreements will be 
offered where they meet these targets and represent good value for money. 
(Natural England, 2008) 
The next section discusses the EWGS, which provides a further example of state funding for 
non-state programmes, and demonstrates how third sector actors such as Moor Trees are 
improving delivery performance. 
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4.4 The English Wood Grant Scheme 
Although the AES predominantly supports landowners in the agricultural context, the EWGS 
funds both agricultural and non-agricultural landowners with regard to woodland 
establishment and conservation. Farmers and / or landowners commit themselves to at least a 
five-year period during which time they adopt environmentally-friendly land farming 
techniques that go beyond usual good farming practice. In return, they receive payment(s) 
that compensate for additional costs and loss of income resulting from altered farming 
practices. For example: 
" Adherence to maximum stocking rates for cattle or sheep 
" Compliance with specific conditions for the cultivation of sloping land 
" Respect of maximum permitted volumes of fertilisers per hectare 
" Compliance with specific rules concerning the use of plant protection products 
The EWGS is administered by the Forestry Commission. It is designed to develop the co- 
ordinated delivery of public benefits from England's woodlands. It is run nationally, with the 
main purpose being the increased public benefit from England's woodlands. It is supported via 
the Rural Development Programme for England (Defra, 2007; Forestry Commission, 2008). 
Woodlands have many different values both to their owners and to society. These include; the 
capacity to provide a habitat for wildlife; to protect water and soils; to produce high-quality 
timber; to enhance the landscape and living and working environments; to act as a financial 
investment, or to embody or protect a heritage aspect. The values that are most desired by 
today's society include; the creation and maintenance of habitats for wildlife, producing 
healthy and pleasing living and working environments for people, protecting biodiversity and 
aspects of our cultural heritage, and providing safe areas for recreation and sport' (Forestry 
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Commission, 2009). Grants are awarded against regional targets, though the over-arching 
objectives are to: 
0 Sustain and increase the public benefits derived from existing woodlands in England 
0 Invest in the creation of new woodlands in England of a size, type and location that 
most effectively deliver public benefits. 
The component grant types of EWGS have their own objectives. Some grants are focused 
regionally to meet the priorities of Regional Forestry Framework action plans, and the 
objectives are specified more closely to suit. EWGS grant applications are considered if they 
deliver key targets, such as: 
a area of woodland under certified sustainable forest management and approved 
0 management schemes and bringing woodland SSSls into favourable condition 
0 expanding the area of woodland with public access 
0 assisting delivery of Priority Habitat and Species Action Plans for woodlands 
0 improving the environment of disadvantaged urban communities 
* woodland creation 
(Forestry Commission, 2009) 
The AES and EWGS provided an empirical focus on state funding programmes partnering with 
'bottom-up' community actors such as Moor Trees to facilitate EPPP delivery. it is not only 
state actors that partner with Moor Trees in the delivery of these programmes. Moor Trees 
has its own network of partners that contribute to this afforestation programme. This 
'community governance' includes a wide range of actors from across the environmental 
sector, many of whom have either traditionally been marginalised or have previously not been 
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directly engaged in environmental programmes (Day, 1998; Goodwin, 1998; Hutchinson, 1994; 
Lowncles and Skelcher, 1998; Raco et a/., 2006; Stoker, 1998). 
4.5 Moor Trees' Partnership Approach 
Moor Trees' schemes include environmental agreements with all the landowners with whom 
they work to ensure that the woodlands they create and restore are protected from future 
unwanted developments. This means that, each year, thousands of trees get planted that 
would otherwise not have done so through a partnership approach between Moor Trees, 
landowners and statutory agencies9. This approach is the main thread of this study. Moor 
Trees, therefore, presents an interesting empirical focus due to the availability and richness of 
data, and the diversity of actors engaged in the partnership. The Moor Trees website mentions 
partnership-working: 
'Our partnership approach has increased resources and impact in the region, with 
more woodlands, nurseries and a growing number of volunteers. Our more recent 
programmes in education, training, research and corporate responsibility are now also 
firmly established as an integral part of the charity' (Moor Trees, 2008). 
Partnership-working is embedded from European Union policy level, where there has been a 
fundamental shift from support for sectoral policies (e. g. agriculture') to supporting more 
spatial (rural) policies. Wilson (2001) conceptualised this as a shift from 'prod uctivism'31 to 
I post-prod UCtiViSMP32 . The latter emphasises the development of rural areas' capacity to 
29 Including; Dartmoor National Park Authority, Forestry Commission, Natural England and Rural Payments Service. 
30 See Wilson and Hart 2001, and Wilson 2003 and 2004 regarding the transition from Intensive to 'post- 
productivist' sustainable agriculture. 
31 Productivist policies' are characterised by the discursive emphasis on food production, commodity production 
maximization and rhetoric focusing on national / regional self-sufficiency (Wilson, 2002: 688). 
32 Post-productivist policies, meanwhile, are generally seen to be associated with a shift in discourse towards 
'environment', 'extensification' and 'multi-functionality' of the countryside, and towards the more holistic concept 
of rural development policy complementing agricultural policy. 
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support themselves through capacity building, community-based initiatives and partnerships 
(Buller, 2000; Ray, 2000; Shortall, 1994). Part of this transition was via the Common 
Agricultural Policy reform of 2003, which put greater emphasis on cross-compliance 33 and has 
since become compulsory. The reform involves clecoupling most direct aid payments from 
production to reduce many of the incentives for intensive production that carry increased 
environmental risks. This has seen an increasing amount of improved grassland turned over to 
the type of woodland planting carried out by Moor Trees due to a shift away from intensive 
agriculture and towards environmental sustainability34 (European Commission 2008b). To 
bring into context, it is worth considering Wilson's (2004: 462) framing of this paradigm shift as 
the new 'post-productivist rural governance'. Wilson discussed this in the agricultural context, 
but parallels exist with the environmental sector, in particular ideas regarding the inclusion of 
formerly politically marginal actors (such as environmental groups or local grassroots 
organisations e. g. Moor Trees and partners) in PPP formulation and delivery. He goes on to 
discuss 'the changing levels and trajectories of a more inclusive model of governance with 
empowerment of local stakeholders and grassroots actors, and, ultimately, the erosion of the 
power of the state as the sole deviser and shaper of policies and decisions affecting rural 
communities' (see also discussions on 'rural partnerships' by Boonstra (2006), Jessop (1998), 
Mackinnon (2000), Raco (2006) and Winter (1996), and the 'hollowing out of the state' by 
Jepson (2005), Jessop (1998) and Yarwood (2002). 
Demand for Moor Trees' work is increasing. A significant part of this demand is due to the 
provision of free trees, volunteer labour and consultancy expertise, with this charitable work 
helped to improve the economic viability of woodland schemes that are only part-funded by 
the AES and EWGS (Natural England 2008). More recently, however, it is the synergies brought 
33 The principle that farmers should observe a minimum level of environmental standards as a condition for the full 
granting of the direct payments (European Commission, 2008a) 
34 Agenda 2000 reinforced financial incentives to farmers converting agricultural land to woodland and forest 
(European Commission, 2008b). 
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by Moor Trees' 'bottom-up' approach of community involvement leading to working with 
thousands of volunteers each year (Connelly et aL, 2006; Sampford, 2002; Sorensen, 2005). 
4.6 The Moor Trees Partnership Network 
Partnerships have long been argued to be part of the new delivery framework for 
environmental sustainability. Their benefits including the gaining of local ownership and 
knowledge, and the increased capacity provided via the community-based platforms like those 
provided by Moor Trees (Kearns, 1992; Murdoch, 1997; Stoker, 1998). This bottom-up 
approach was underlined in the 1992 Rio Earth Summit's Agenda 21 document (furthered in 
2002 by the WSSD Type 2 outcomeS35) which promoted collaborative advantage when seeking 
to solve environmental issues and asserted that partnerships require new levels of co- 
operation between key sectors of society and government (Connelly et aL, 2006; Sorensen, 
2005). At the local level, LA21 furthered this partnership approach by including previously 
marginalised actors and the creation of cross-sector collaborations between public, private 
and voluntary sector stakeholders (Day, 1998; United Nations, 1993; Worthington et aL, 2003). 
Partnership-working in the environmental sector is now considered to be a new norm, with 
newly empowered community stakeholders and an attitudinal shift towards greater 
environmental stewardship (Hutchinson, 1994; Jessop, 1998; Mackinnon, 2000; Winter, 1996). 
Moor Trees has embraced and developed this partnership approach across the region, leading 
to it establishing itself within a largely autonomous partnership network of actors, many of 
whom would otherwise not work in such cross-sector collaborations. One of the main 
outcomes for Moor Trees has been the expansion (and diversification) of activities outside of 
its historic operational boundary of Dartmoor National Park into the South Hams Area of 
Outstanding Natural Beauty (AONB), and the cities of Plymouth and Exeter (see Hutchinson, 
35 Including voluntary partnership initiatives of, or with, the private sector. 
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1994) regarding the crossing of political divides and geographic boundaries). Though the 
geographical spread of operations is limited to mid- and south Devon, Moor Trees works with 
partners from across the region and, occasionally, nationally. This partnership approach has 
increased resources and the charity's impact, with more woodlands, nurseries and volunteers, 
and new programmes in education, training, research, corporate responsibility and voluntary 
carbon offsetting being established. For example, partnerships with BITC, BTCV, Groundwork 
and the universities of Plymouth and Exeter provided support for their national award-winning 
volunteer project, with volunteers receiving two further awards from the Volunteer in 
Plymouth scheme. Moor Trees has increasingly adopted partnership-working into its 
programmes and now considers partnership-working to be an essential component in both the 
development and delivery of its projects. Indeed, the charity now acts as a key partner in 
multi-actor projects including representatives from all four levels of the Policy Implementation 
Continuum (see Section 3.1). Moor Trees is also increasingly recognised in public sector PPP 
documents and reports as a key partner for the delivery of specified objectives - the woodland 
objectives of the Dartmoor National Park Authority's Woodland Strategy (2005-2010) being 
one example (see also Section 3.5 regarding Secondary Sources). This growing association and 
'formal' partnering highlights the key issues identified in this research, namely: 
* Responsibility - have government actors shifted their own responsibility for the 
delivery of certain EPPP Moor trees i. e. Local Biodiversity Action Plan objectives? 
* Legitimacy -as a non-elected actor, can Moor Trees legitimately deliver state PPP? 
9 Accountability -as an autonomous actor, is Moor Trees accountable for delivery? 
Using the MTPN as a case study, therefore, provided a first-hand example of multi-actor, cross- 
sector engagement in the delivery of EPPP and an empirical focus for this study's research 
objectives. Table 4.1 details Moor Trees' core network 36 partners. It stratifies them into the 
36 The core network includes the actors with whom Moor Trees actively works in partnership. 
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four levels of public, QUANGO, third and private sectors (see Figure 3.1 Policy Implementation 
Continuum). This shows the state to non-state paradigm shift of EPPP formulation and delivery 
represented in the continuum (see Jessop, 1998; Mackinnon, 2000; Sampford, 2002; Savan et 
al., 2004; and Winter, 1996 regarding empowered rural communities). Table 4.1 also suggests 
the transferring of power and responsibility (downwards) from state to non-state actors 
through community involvement and partnership-working, key components of environmental 
governance (Raco 2006, Thompson 2005). 
Sector Partner Sector 
Public Exeter City Council Plymouth City Council 
Defra South Hams District Council 
Devon County Council Teignbridge District Council Government 
Government Office of the West Devon Borough Council ('statel 
South West 
QUANGO BBC Forestry Commission 
Big Lottery Fund HMP Dartmoor 
Business in the Community Natural History Museum 
Dartmoor National Park Natural England 
Duchy College South Devon College 
Exeter University University of Plymouth 37 
third BTCV RSA Trees 
CLINKS Sharpham Trust 
Dartington Estate South Hams CVS 
Esm6e Fairbairn Foundation Teignbridge CVS 
Dartmoor Partnership The Bromley Trust 
Exeter CVS Tree Council 
JP Getty Jr. Charitable Trust We are V 
LankellyChase Foundation West Devon CVS 
Plymouth Guild Will Charitable Trust 
private Andrew McCarthy Associates Google AdWords 
Bond Pearce O'Connors Campers 
Carbon Projects Pell Frischmann Consultants 
Co-op Bank South Hams Motor Club 
Cornwall College Spook Media Community 
EDF Energy The Almanac Gallery Mon-state') 
Fourfront Group Toshiba 
Francis Porter Design Xperta 
Table 4.1: Moor Trees Partners 
Source: Author (collated from action research within Moor Trees) 
37 A university is slightly ambiguous regarding sector position, due to mix of public and private funding. 
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This adaptation of the Policy Implementation Continuum is shown in the context of Moor 
Trees' work in the environmental sector, with actors from all four levels and a diverse range of 
state and non-state actors. It is this core network that provides the empirical focus for this 
research, with the wider's network population consisting of 400 actors, 200 of whom formed 
the target sample for the online survey (154 responses, representing 77%, were received). 
The next section highlights the Offender Pathway to Employment Programme (OPEP) as an 
example of a MTPN partnership project that included actors from all four levels of the 
Continuum. I worked within OPEP as a practitioner whilst at the same time observing it as a 
researcher to provide an outsider's view with an insider perspective (Eyles and Smith, 1988). 
4.7 Deconstructing the Offender Pathway to Employment Programme Partnership 
OPEP is a multi-actor partnership based at HMP Dartmoor (Princetown, Devon). Its members 
represent each level of the Policy implementation Continuum. 
Partner Sector Role 
- Primary Moor Trees Third Principal" Pa rtnership 
HMP Dartmoor Public Host 
Bicton College Third Education and training 
Secondary BromleyTrust Third Funder 
Dartmoor National Park 
Authority 
QUANGO Funder 
Forestry Commission QUANGO Offender work experience 
Land-based employers (various) Private Offender work experience 
Tudor LankellyChase Third Funder 
University of Plymouth Third Research 
Table 4.2: OPEP Partners 
Source: Author (collated from action research within Moor Trees) 
39 The wider network includes the actors with whom Moor Trees regularly collaborates. 
39 See Section 7.2.2 for discussion on Partnership Principals 
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OPEP aims to reduce re-offending by improving offender employability through the provision 
of an enhanced land-based education and training programme based around practical 
conservation opportunities. It also helps deliver HMP Dartmoor's sustainability agenda 
through farm conservation work and local community involvement. The project was 
established to address the links between re-offending and unemployment i. e. offenders 
released from prison without a job are twice as likely to re-offend as those released with 
employment already lined up. it acknowledged that unemployment is the most significant 
barrier to successful re-integration into society by making it harder to maintain stable 
accommodation or earn money legitimately. OPEP aims to help overcome this through its 
accredited land-based training programme. The courses are accredited through the National 
Proficiency Tests Council and Lantra and are designed to give successful candidates 
competence in a range of short course i. e. fork lift, chainsaw, and tractor driving. 
The partnership between Moor Trees and HMP Dartmoor started with the establishment of a 
new tree nursery on the farm. This was the first step in a wider practical conservation and 
land-based activity programme across the prison as a whole, starting with the planting of over 
1,000 trees. The prison farm staff are all National Proficiency Training Council / Lantra trainers 
and assessors for various technical certificates and provide good training opportunities to the 
inmates. Moor Trees and HMP Dartmoor then invited Bicton College to join the project as third 
primary partner. The reason for this invitation was two-fold; firstly, Bicton was able to provide 
accredited training, secondly, it was able to access state funding via the Learning and Skills 
Council to pay for the accreditations. The resulting partnership between Moor Trees, HMP 
Dartmoor and Bicton College presented a cross-sector, multi-actor case study of non-state 
actors delivering state PPP. I acknowledge that 'the reduction of reoffencling' does not 
necessarily sit within the remit of 'the environmental sector, so will further clarify the 
relevance of the OPEP case study to this research. 
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As further discussed in Section 5.3, it is widely acknowledged that the environmental sector 
suffers from a resource deficit. This has led to many sector actors diversifying their activities to 
access new funding streams and establish 'trading' activities. In this case, Moor Trees has 
diversified into working with offenders and the provision of accredited training. The former is 
clearly a niche activity, thus making new associated funding streams available. The latter is a 
new income stream, with Bicton College having entered into a commercial arrangement with 
Moor Trees to pay a profit-share on completed short courses. OPEP not only provides an 
empirical focus on multi-actor, cross-sector partnership-working, it also provides an example 
of how the state has devolved responsibility for the training of offenders to non-state actors, 
with legitimisation secured via HMP Dartmoor's (as a state actor) inclusion in the partnership 
(Chapter 6 explores legitimacy in further detail). 
The next section discusses the Moor Trees Voluntary Carbon Offset (VCO) Programme. The 
programme was used as an empirical focus for this study as an example of a market-based 
approach, and as the 'zero accountability' case study in Section 7.6. 
4.8 The Moor Trees Voluntary Carbon offset programme 
The Moor Trees VCO Programme (hereonin referred to as 'the prograrnme') was created in 
2006 in response to increasing demand from local businesses and individuals for tree planting 
to offset their impact on the environment. The programme and associated voluntary carbon 
markets provided further empirical focus for this study as they demonstrated how 'the state 
uses various techniques of partnership, consultation and devolved responsibility in order to 
directly implicate non-state actors in the act of governing' (Thompson, 2005: 326). This section 
is split into two sub-sections, the first (4.5.1) provides background information on VCM, and 
the second (4.5.2) provides information on the programme. 
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4.8.1 Voluntary Carbon Markets 
The Parliamentary Office of Science and Technology (2007) defined carbon offsetting as 
I calculating a person or entity's greenhouse gas emissions and then purchasing 'credits' from 
emission reduction projects that have prevented or removed the emission of an equivalent 
amount of greenhouse gas elsewhere'. 'Offsets' emerged in the Kyoto Protocol, which allows 
inclustrialised (Annex 140) countries to meet a proportion of their greenhouse gas emission 
reduction targets by purchasing emission reductions from projects in the developing world. 
This is known as the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), with projects between Annex I 
economies falling under the Joint Implementation (Bailey and Maresh, 2009; Bailey and 
Wilson, 2009; Bishop et a/., 2008; Bumpus and Liverman, 2008; Hamilton et aL, 2008; Goff, 
2007; SWEI, 2008). This created a parallel market in voluntary carbon offsets for entities that 
have no statutory obligation but want to buy offsets for altruistic or public relations activities. 
As a result of this and a parallel growth in volumes traded in the Kyoto-based compliance 
carbon markets, a wide range of corporate and private non-compliance or voluntary offset 
buyers have developed the Voluntary Carbon Markets (VCMs) into a legitimate commodity. 
The growth in VCMs is primarily based on the use of project-based emission reductions by 
proactive corporations in achieving self-imposed carbon neutrality commitments or in offering 
low-carbon products and services. The offset programs underpinning these carbon neutrality 
commitments are managed by businesses or NGOs, making the VCM very different from the 
Kyoto markets. Moor Trees provides an example of VCM programme provider. 
4.8.2 Programme Methodology 
The aim of the programme was to provide organisations and individuals with a tree planting 
service as a form of carbon sequestration to offset their carbon emissions. This type of 
40 All the countries that were OECD members in 1992, countries with Economies in Transition and Turkey (Marechal 
and Hecq, 2005). 
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sequestration refers to the carbon stored in trees and associated litter. Woodland carbon 
sequestration rates are complex, with the numerous variables making the calculation an 
inexact science, i. e. tree species, planting density, management, varying uptake over time, 
dead wood and leaf litter, soil type, and climate. Moor Trees worked on the basis that the type 
of woodland that it planted - the Upland Oakwood (referred to in the European Union Habitats 
Directive as Atlantic Oakwood 41 , which form part of the Dartmoor Habitat Action Plan for 
Woodland) - sequesters approximately 75 tC per hectare over a 100 year life-cycle. This figure 
was derived through a review of peer-reviewed forestry literature, when it became clear that 
estimates for UK woodland sequestration varied greatly due to the above variables (Benitez et 
ol., 2007; Bishop et a/., 2008; Cannell, 1999; Cannell and Milne, 1995; Gough and Shackley, 
2002). 
Moor Trees' planting methodology was then based on Forestry Commission guidelines for 
broad-leaf woodland plants around 1100 trees per hectare (as stated by the Moor Trees 
Woodland Manager at interview). This equated to 15 trees per tonne of carbon, or 4 trees per 
tonne of carbon dioxide. What this means, for example, is that a consumer emitting 100 tC per 
year would need to plant 1,500 trees per year to offset the 100 tonnes. The programme 
quantified the consumer's carbon liability (tonnes of carbon per annum) via the Moor Trees 
online calculator using National Energy Foundation data to calculate travel (car, rail and air) 
and energy use emissions (Moor Trees, 2006; National Energy Foundation, 2006). It then 
converted the tC into the tree planting requirement for carbon sequestration. The programme 
has now been operational for nearly four years. A wide range of actors have been engaged in 
the programme as consumers, including representatives from all four levels of the Policy 
Implementation Continuum. Thus, it provided an interesting, first-hand study of how a small, 
41 Atlantic Oakwoods are identified as habitat of high importance in the European Union's Habitats Directive. The 
Oakwoods are restricted to the Atlantic coastal fringes of Britain, France, Ireland and Spain. They are described in 
the UK Biodiversity Plan as 'Upland Oakwoods', and are recognised as Britain's temperate rainforest. Atlantic 
Cakwoods are found in areas that have a damp, humid climate with high rainfall and acidic soils that have not been 
altered by human activity, such as cultivation (Forestry Commission, (no date A)). This type of woodland is 
dominated by Oak, with stands of Alder and Ash. 
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bottom-up, community-based project is engaged in cross-sector partnership-working towards 
the delivery of top-down EPPP. 
4.9 Conclusion 
This chapter has discussed Moor Trees and its partnership network as the case study providing 
the empirical focus for this research. It highlighted the AES and EWGS as examples of state- 
funding programmes increasingly working with non-state actors to deliver their operational 
objectives. The chapter also presented OPEP as a typical MTPN partnership that engaged state 
and non-state actors towards the delivery of state PPP, highlighting the themes of 
responsibility, legitimacy and accountability that are analysed in Chapters 5,6 and 7 of this 
study. It then discussed the VCMs, which are further analysed in Section 7.6.2. it should be 
noted at this point that these case studies are not exhaustive, with further partnerships and 
funding programmes introduced in Chapter 7 (regarding accountability structures) and Chapter 
8 (concerning partnership-working). 
Thus, this chapter has highlighted how the MTPN provides provided examples of: 
1. Multi-actor, cross-sector partnerships, that are indicative of the new 
environmental governance (Hutchinson, 1994; Worthington et oL, 2003; 
Goodwin, 1998; Lowncles and Skelcher, 1998; Raco et oL, 2006). 
2. The transferring of power and responsibility (and blurring of boundaries towards) 
to the community level (Raco, 2006; Stoker, 1997; Thompson, 2005). 
3. The entrepreneurial approach of commodifying natural resources to after the 
form and the substance of environmental governance to rely more on market- 
based strategies and non-state actors (Cashore, 2002; Morris, 2008). 
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Having highlighted the empirical focus and defined the methodological approach, Chapter 5 
reports on data collected from the MTPN to consider if and how the state is devolving 
responsibility for EPPP to non-state actors. 
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Chapter 5: The Devolution of Responsibility of EPPP to Non-state Actors 
by the State 
5.1 Introduction 
Using the MTPN as a case study, this chapter analyses the idea that the state is devolving 
responsibility and authority for environmental decision-making and the delivery of EPPP to the 
non-state, or grassroots, actor level through discourses of community responsibility, 
partnership-working and self-governing. It has been argued that this transferring of power to 
the community level brings new community involvement and the sharing of responsibilities 
between the state and non-state actors through partnership-working (Fairbrass, 2003; Raco, 
2006; Thompson, 2005). Seen as the central pillars of sustainable development and key 
components of environmental governance, this 'hollowing out of the state' has also made it 
difficult for citizens to attribute responsibility for programme quality, effectiveness and 
efficiency of delivery to any one actor due to the devolution of power and their (multi-actor) 
complexity and unelected nature (Jepson 2005, Jessop 1998, Yarwood 2002). 
An important component of governance and sustainable development, argued Raco (2006), is 
the inclusion of non-state actors in policy formulation and delivery. In seeking to analyse this 
argument, this chapter draws on action research, an online survey, and semi-structured 
interviews conducted with members of the MTPN. It begins by addressing state-devolved 
responsibility as a central pillar to sustainable development through a series of statements 
against which survey respondents measured their opinion on a five point Likert scale ranging 
from 'strongly agree' to 'strongly disagree'. Themes were then identified and subsequently 
explored through 20 semi-structured interviews, including the concepts of the 'hollowing out 
of the state, 'active citizenship', and local knowledge. The chapter then explores one of the 
key themes of this thesis, the issue of resource deficit, or, the perceived lack of funding for the 
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third sector to deliver state-formulated EPPP, and how the sector is trying to overcome this 
through full cost recovery (see also Chapter 8). Following this, the chapter analyses how MTPN 
private sector actors are increasingly becoming active in EPPP delivery. 
5.2 Devolved Responsibility in Environmental Partnerships 
Action research provided data on the state devolving responsibility for sustainability initiatives, 
with an online survey and interviews bringing additional data to support analysis of identified 
themes. Perhaps unsurprisingly due to the environmental context of the case study, MTPN 
actors were universally found to be engaged with sustainable development, many through 
day-to-day activities, though most through general awareness. The concept of 'devolved 
responsibility', however, was one that I directly explored with numerous actors. Whilst rarely 
quoted in response to my interview probes or during action research communications 'per se', 
it was frequently implied through use of alternative language. The next section explores some 
of the attitudes and behaviours of MTPN actors towards the concept and application of 
devolved responsibility. 
5.2.1 MTPN Actor Attitudes and Behaviours towards Devolved Responsibility 
During the course of this study I created and then managed the OPEP partnership between 
Moor Trees and HMP Dartmoor (see 4.4, plus 5.3.1 for further detail on OPEN. On one 
occasion, I joined members of the management team to discuss how the partnership was 
progressing. Partly in acknowledgement of my researcher-practitioner status, the team 
discussed at some length how they felt the government increasingly expected the third sector 
to deliver objectives of, or add value to, a programme that is, and probably always will be, the 
responsibility of the state i. e. offender sustainability education and training. In the meeting, 
the comment "it is the government's responsibility to provide extra funding for this; we just 
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don't have the budget" was made on more than one occasion by non-state and state actors 
alike. This comment suggested that actor frustration with devolved responsibility for 
sustainability objectives is perhaps partly due to them not being directly engaged with the 
concept by the state. If they had been made more aware that the government is apparently 
adopting this approach, then perhaps it would have improved engagement and, therefore, PPP 
delivery. Feedback from the OPEP meeting was noted and subsequently explored through 
interview with wider, non-OPEP actors. One respondent (Interviewee No. 7, a senior civil 
servant) commented on the lack of funding made available by the state to non-state actors 
facilitate the devolution process: 
"We receive regular top-down directives regarding sustainability but have to date 
received no significant additional budget to help develop the programme with third 
sector partners. Westminster, on the one hand is obsessed by sustainable 
development, but on the other will not resource us, saying that we should work with 
community partners to access new funds. I just don't have the time to do it and 
community partners shouldn't be relied upon in that way". 
Survey Respondent No. 37 (from the third sector) concurred: "The government is devolving 
responsibilities but not the adequate funds or authority for environmental objectives to be 
met. " This frustration was supported by a third sector survey respondent, who wrote: 
"I believe environmental objectives can be achieved at community level but the 
responsibility should remain with government and shared with the community. The 
government should not be absolved of responsibility. " (Survey Respondent No. 15). 
A further (public sector) survey respondent provided feedback suggesting that again, whilst 
conceptually sound, devolved responsibility has a fundamentally flawed delivery mechanism 
132 
due to an inconsistent and at times confused communications strategy. Ultimately, however, 
the respondent concluded that devolved responsibility (for addressing environmental 
objectives) has significant potential: 
"I believe that it should be a shared and not a shifting responsibility between 
government and partnerships / communities. There are certain responsibilities and 
actions that need taking at government level to influence increased actions and 
responsibilities to be taken at partnership / community level, and vice versa. 
Unfortunately there is not a common and consistent approach to the relay of 
environmental objectives and responsibilities, messages, policy, resources and 
approaches across government, let alone between government and partnerships / 
communities. This is a big drawback, but the benefits, if this is addressed adequately, 
could be huge" (Survey Respondent No. 23). 
These responses suggested an awareness of the downward shift by the state in sustainability 
objectives, but also frustration regarding the lack of resources to (see Section 5.3). Interviewee 
No. 1 (public sector) thought that funding and bureaucracy are key: 
"Budgets are being cut and the government is looking at local communities to assist 
with sustainable development. Funding is very competitive and voluntary input is 
becoming a pre-requisite for local groups to firstly establish themselves and then 
remain (financially) sustainable long enough to make a real impact. Regrettably, state- 
offered assistance (referring to expertise, as opposed to funding) is often hard to come 
by and very localised against socio-economic drivers and measurements, such as the 
IMD (Index of Multiple Deprivation). " 
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These comments made me consider if the state's desire for, and promotion of, sustainable 
development was either not matched by their commitment to deliver, or if there was simply 
an implementation gap or failure in the delivery framework that the state was trying to 
address through community involvement. This question was, in part, addressed by a QUANGO 
survey respondent who suggested that the state is often engaged purely in rhetoric: 
"The government runs various community partnerships to deliver environmental and 
sustainability objectives. After a lot of meetings, consultant reports, fancy websites 
and guidelines on good practice, many just fade away without any perceivable impact. 
Until intention is matched by delivery, the third sector will remain cynical that the 
government has a real agenda to engage the community" (Survey Respondent No. 40). 
This is indeed a powerful statement, especially coming from a QUANGO actor, including an 
arguably accusational tone suggesting poor use of funds and a hidden agenda. Another 
(private sector) respondent also included points regarding delivery and communications: 
"While trying to shift delivery to community level, there is little power or resources 
allocated which creates a large disparity between stated objectives and resourcing of 
supposed delivery partners. Decisions are made above community level with poor 
consultation to design realistic delivery programmes. Again, partnerships only work if 
operations management and communications are both of high quality" (Survey 
Respondent No. 16). 
Interviewee No. 16 (third sector) highlighted communications, resourcing, and delivery: 
"While trying to shift delivery to the community level, there is little power and 
insufficient resources allocated to the community. This creates a large disparity 
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between sustainable development objectives and resourcing of supposed delivery 
partners. Decisions are made above community level with poor consultation to design 
realistic delivery programmes. Again, partnerships only work if operations 
management and communications are both of high quality. " 
What is clear, however, is the overwhelming opinion that (conceptually) community 
engagement (or devolved responsibility) is important to meet (sustainable development) 
environmental objectives. Indeed, 70% of survey respondents agreed that the shift of 
responsibility from the government to community level is important to meet environmental 












Figure 5.1: 'rhe shift of responsibility from the government to community level is important 
to meet environmental objectives' 
Source: Author's Questionnaire 
Of the 70% in agreement, the sector stratification was as follows: 
Public QUANGO third Private 
Sample size 26 24 60 44 
Strongly Agree / Agree 18 18 44 28 
% 69 75 73 64 
Table SA: Sector Stratification of Responses 
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Strongly Agree No Opinion Disagree Strongly 
Agree Disagree 
Table 5.1 shows that, in proportion to the sample size, responses were consistent across all 
four levels, thus showing no signs of bias that directly relates to the sector type i. e. public 
sector. Had public sector response made up a significant per centage of the 'Strongly Agree' 
response, for example, then this may well have presented an example of respondent bias. 
Survey responses included further enforcement of this support, including: 
"The bottom up approach is vital to build community ownership and thus sustainability 
into environmental initiatives" (Survey Respondent No. 4, public sector). 
"Local ownership of environmental issues is essential for real and lasting changes to be 
made" (Survey Respondent No. 27, public sector). 
Data collected from the MTPN regarding devolved responsibility for sustainable development 
provided a mixed set of attitudes and beliefs. On the one hand it is widely supported as a 
concept, but on the other hand the delivery framework is considered to be either non-existent 
42 or at best poorly constructed , thus generating doubt and cynicism regarding government 
intentions. However, 'active citizenship' (see also Section 5.2.2), whereby the individual is 
expected to take responsibility by becoming an 'active citizen', is central to the current 
government's agenda. This point was also made by a third sector Survey Respondent No. 74 ( 
third sector) who stated that "I don't experience it as shifting from the hierarchies to the 
networks, more a case of individuals, groups and communities increasingly taking 
responsibility for themselves. " In the absence of far greater resources, argued Pearce and 
Mawson (2003) and efforts to build genuine community capacity, this attempt to transfer 
responsibility to local communities may be illusory. This raises doubts about whether the state 
42 Kofi Annan (2000, in Hemmati 2002: 1) highlighted the need for an effective delivery mechanism when he argued 
that 'Traditional processes of coordination need to be supplemented by a series of practical arrangements which 
providefor more active, cooperative management'. 
136 
is really seeking to engage the citizen or is simply attempting to engage non-state actors in the 
delivery of its own objectives to save time and resources. 
5.2.2 'Hollowing Out the State': Engaging the Citizen, or Shirking Responsibilities? 
This study situates devolved responsibility for sustainable development as the downward 
component of Jessop's (1995) 'hollowing out of the state', where certain state functions, aims 
and objectives are redistributed and / or allocated to non-state actors. Observations and 
secondary sources have provided evidence of the government's discourse on sustainable 
development, both directly and through QUANGOs. The following text was taken from 
DirectGov (2008) - the official website, of the UK Government - as their official statement 
regarding the four key areas of sustainable development. Sustainable development covers a 
very wide range of activities. In the UK, four key areas have been identified: 
0 Sustainable consumption and production - changing the way products and services 
are designed, produced, used and disposed of - in short, achieving more with less 
0 Climate change and energy - reducing global greenhouse gas emissions whilst at the 
same time preparing for the climate change that cannot be avoided 
0 Naturol resources - understanding the limits of the natural resources that sustain life, 
such as water, air and soil 
0 Sustainable communities - looking after the places people live and work, for example, 
by developing green, open spaces and building energy-efficient homes 
However, it appears that outputs have, in reality, been low compared to state PPP objectives. 
Experiences gained through working within the environmental sector have also painted a 
complex picture of rhetoric, action, bureaucracy, collaboration and dysfunction. My 
experiences in this downward shift have been gained, for the most part, through working 
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alongside or observing QUANGOs such as (not exclusively) the South West Regional 
Development Agency, Envirowise, The Carbon Trust, two different ACNBs and Natural 
England. During this time, I witnessed various dialogue regarding the need for 'grassroots 
engagement', 'community action', 'active citizenship', and 'people power'. Comparable levels 
of action, however, have rarely followed, with bureaucracy and dysfunctional collaborations 
(argued by some to be due to complexity) mooted by many actors as the underpinning reason 
for poor delivery. Indeed, as one public sector actor commented: 
"That's the Audit Commission for you. Our funds are so tightly controlled that we are 
unable to run our community engagement programmes successfully, as they need to 
be flexible and dynamic and if we do step out of the box we have to spend hours 
justifying our actions. " 
In its defence, the Audit Commission's (2009) mission statement is: 
The Audit Commission is an independent watchdog, driving economy, efficiency and 
effectiveness in local public services to deliver better outcomes for everyone. Our 
work across local government, health, housing, community safety and fire and rescue 
services means that we have a unique perspective. We promote value for money for 
taxpayers, auditing the f 200 billion spent by 11,000 local public bodies. 
In remaining objective, it is possibly unfair, therefore, to expect the Audit Commission to 
support flexibility and dynamism in the spending of funds due to the very nature of their work 
i. e. safeguarding taxpayer's money. As an organisation it is, however, considered to be 
indicative of a wider government department approach to stifling grassroots action through its 
audit culture (Jepson, 2005). 
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The survey further asked MTPN environmental actors if they considered partnerships to be 
increasingly responsible for the delivery of government environmental objectives, or, EPPP. Of 
the 154 respondents, 78% either agreed or strongly agreed, with 16% having no opinion and 
only 6% disagreeing. Of the 78% in agreement, the sector stratification was as follows: 
Public QUANGO third Private 
Sample size 26 24 60 44 
Strongly Agree / Agree 24 19 45 29 
% 92 79 75 66 






Figure 5.2: 'Partnerships are increasingly responsible for the delivery of government 
environmental objectives' 
Source: Author's Questionnaire 
Initial data followed a similar pattern to the previous section, where the survey data showed a 
large majority 'in agreement' with the principle of devolved responsibility (through 
partnership-working) for the delivery of environmental objectives (or, sustainable 
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Strongly Agree No Opinion Disagree Strongly 
Agree Disagree 
development). When invited to comment further, respondents were more critical. For 
example: 
"Although devolution of responsibility is to be applauded it must be accompanied by 
commensurate responsibility and adequate funding otherwise it simply becomes an 
abdication of responsibility - which is where we currently are" (private sector Survey 
Respondent No. 71). 
"it will only work if the government is consistent in pushing the correct environmental 
agenda which complements delegated work strands" (QUANGO Survey Respondent 
No. 31). 
'rhe government has unrealistic expectations of partnerships" (QUANGO Survey 
Respondent No. 33). 
This presents the continued theme of a breakdown between concept and application i. e. 
devolved responsibility for sustainable development is conceptually embraced, but its 
implementation is flawed. This links with Curry (2001), who argued that state / non-state 
partnerships can empower individuals with a stake in society to help renew a sense of 
responsibility (concept), but only if done successfully (application). An interesting theme that 
was explored in greater depth by interview, which asked the question: 
0 Do you think that the idea of devolving responsibility to non-state, or grassroots, 
actors is one that is practicable in 'real life', i. e. Is it a concept or theory that can really 
be applied? 
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-"Business is the main polluter, so we should be held responsible. What we do need, 
however, is a more distinct system to report our progress firstly to government, and then 
to society" Interviewee No. 2 (public sector). 
"The government funds QUANGOs like us to meet their community targets" Interviewee 
No. 6 (QUANGO). 
"Depends on local politics for the degree to which 'partners' are actually 'partners' and not 
just an adjunct delivery vehicle for other priorities by other organisations" Interview No. 8 
(private sector). 
Rhodes (1996: 653) argued that governance authoritatively allocates resources to, and 
exercises control and coordination of, non-state actors. Jessop (1994,1995,2002) and 
MacLeod and Goodwin (1999), expanded this principle, arguing that the state is being 
'hollowed-out' through the selective displacement of powers upwards to the international 
level, downwards to the regional or local level, and horizontally to inter-regional or trans-local 
organisations. This research is addressing the downward trend, with findings suggesting that it 
is indeed this devolved responsibility (from government to the community) that has become 
linked to EPPP delivery. Gibbs and Jonas (2000: 303) also argued, however, that despite the UK 
Government having explicitly devolved environmental responsibilities downwards, this has not 
necessarily undermined the authoritative resources of the state whilst 'empowering the local'. 
Thus, research suggests an approach of 'top-down devolved responsibility' aiming for a 
heterarchical structure whilst operating within a hierarchical framework. As Yarwood 
(2002: 289) argued, 'rather than a new form of governance, this (partnership) approach implies 
government from a distance implicit in the hollowing out of the state' (see also Mackinnon, 
2000; and Raco and Imrie, 2000). Further, Leat (2004, in Jepson, 2005) argued that this 'roll 
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back of the state' makes it very difficult for citizens to attribute responsibility to any one 
institution or individual for the quality, effectiveness and efficiency of delivery. 
5.2.3 Active Citizenship and Local Knowledge 
Despite the anxieties surrounding funding and responsibility, community involvement is widely 
considered to be essential for sustainable development by bringing local knowledge to bear 
and by developing a greater sense of responsibility for the management of their areas (Pearce 
and Mawson, 2003). The phrase 'active citizenship' increasingly appears in language used by a 
variety of government papers and company Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) reports. An 
analysis of secondary sources shows that as early as 1995 the Rural White Paper's ethos of 
'Action for All' aimed to place responsibility on individuals and what has now become the third 
sector to work together to tackle local issues (DoE and MAFF, 1995, in Yarwood, 2002). 
Further, in the foreword to Tony Blair's 1998 report Bringing Britain together: A national 
strategyfor neighbourhood renewal, he said: 
"Too much has been imposed from above, when experience shows that success 
depends on communities themselves having the power and taking the responsibility to 
make things better' (SEU, 1998, in Pearce and Mawson, 2003)". 
Active citizenship was originally situated within the context of neighbourhood renewal but has 
subsequently become the perceived norm for sustainable development, with Raco et 01. (2006) 
framing it as a 'central pillar' of sustainable development. Interestingly, action research and 
the observation of numerous cross-sector meetings, seminars and conferences, suggested that 
the phrase remains somewhat marginalised. The concept, however, is not, with examples 
drawn from the online survey: 
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"Local ownership of environmental issues is essential for real and lasting changes to be 
made" (Survey Respondent No. 27, public sector). 
"Everyone should take responsibility for the quality of their environment and the 
impact they have on it" (Survey Respondent No. 13, public sector). 
I believe that it should be a shared and not a shifting responsibility between 
government and partnerships / communities. There are certain responsibilities and 
actions that need taking at government level to influence increased actions and 
responsibilities to be taken at partnership / community level, and vice versa. 
Unfortunately there is not a common and consistent approach to the relay of 
environmental objectives and responsibilities, messages, policy, resources and 
approaches across government, let alone between government, partnerships and 
communities" (Survey Respondent No. 32, QUANGO). 
Indeed, Interviewee No. 5 (a QUANGO Education Officer) highlighted 'localness' as a key 
characteristic of sustainable development and emphasised its importance regarding the 
sharing of knowledge and the potential synergies that can be created: 
"Of course devolved responsibility is important, sustainable development can only be 
achieved through a grassroots approach and we are seeing this more and more in 
schools, including where they work with local charities and trusts to diversify 
experiential learning opportunities. " 
One of the core rationales for this grassroots approach is 'local knowledge', a concept now 
enacted at the environmental policy and programme level to adapt to local circumstances 
(Pearce and Mawson, 2003). For example, Defra's HLS scheme allows for adaptation of local 
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knowledge to enable flexibility within its management prescription (see Section 4.3). The HLS 
adopted this approach from its predecessor, the Countryside Stewardship Scheme, which 
farmers believed was too regimented and with local knowledge disregarded (Franks and 
McGloin, 2006). This was confirmed by private sector Survey Respondent (No. 68), who stated 
that, "Projects benefit from local people through their knowledge and experience of the area. " 
Data also suggest that there is an issue regarding state rhetoric compared to grassroots action, 
a point noted by Taylor (2007: 298), who argued that 'community engagement rhetoric (is) far 
outpacing the reality of partnerships (action) on the ground'. These data also suggest that local 
knowledge is conceptually placed as a subset of active citizenship, which itself is argued to be 
the vehicle for social and environmental change. Sampford (2002: 79) argued that 'This 
bottom-up approach reflects an increasing value placed on local knowledge and the idea that 
environmental governance is about involving and implementing human solutions through 
values, institutions and practices'. However, he continues that finding and implementing these 
solutions are some of the main challenges of environmental governance. Active citizenship 
also has a link to responsibility, with citizens required to be active in their own government i. e. 
the citizen as a self-governing individual (Brand, 2007). 
What these agendas also represent, argue Raco and Imrie (2000), is the transformation to a 
self-governing capacity whereby governance is conducted in and through the governed, whilst 
control mechanisms are retained from above. Perhaps therein lays the problem of the 
implementation gap between policy and practice - that the conceptual approach of the active 
citizen mobilising to build a critical mass for change is ultimately constrained by over-arching 
state control mechanisms (see Section 7.3). This may well be the case, but findings also 
suggested that a lack of resources plays a critical role. 
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5.3 The Resource Deficit 
This section draws on data collected from action research, online survey and interviews to 
analyse state (and non-state) resource availability to the environmental sector. in this context, 
resource deficit refers to the lack of funding made available by state and non-state actors 
engaged in the devolved responsibility for sustainable development. 
5.3.1 Environmental Sector Funding 
A QUANGO Interviewee (No. 8), when asked about devolved responsibility, stated it is "not a 
problem if sufficient funds follow the devolution. Currently they don't". This statement was 
under-pinned by 79% of survey respondents who either disagreed or strongly disagreed with 
the survey statement; The government allocates sufficient funding to enable this devolved 
approach. The data showed lack of funding to be widely acknowledged by actors from across 
the four levels of the Policy Implementation Continuum, including the public sector, as a root 
cause of partnership failure. These findings were further compounded through online survey 
responses, including: 
"There is never sufficient government funding" (Survey Respondent No. 1, public 
sector). 
"The key issue here, is government funding" (Survey Respondent No. 51, third sector). 
"Insufficient resources are available to sustain voluntary or community sectors" 









Figure 5.3: 'The government allocates sufficient funding to enable this devolved approach' 
Source: Author's Questionnaire 
Empirical findings from the MTPN strongly suggested a lack of government funding, whilst 
literature contends that partnership-working offers many advantages for development 
including increased funding opportunities (Hodge, 2007; Martin, 1995; Pearce and Mawson, 
2009; Thompson, 2005; Yarwood, 2002). This contention is supported by secondary sources 
promoting New Labour's approach to the funding of partnerships. For example: 
The government's 2005 white paper (HM Government, 2005) 'Securing the future - 
delivering the UKSustoinoble Development Strategy, lists programmes such as the: 
0 Climate Change Communications Initiative with funding of at least E12m for 
2005 to 2008 to 'tackle public attitudes to, and understanding of, climate 
change, and what we can each do to help reduce our personal contribution to 
climate change'; and 
0 'Up to f2 million support for a Resource Efficiency and Waste Knowledge 
Transfer Network. ' 
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Strongly Agree NoOpinionDisagree Strongly 
Agree Disagree 
The same white paper reported on government funding made available through its 
Environmental Action Fund for distribution to the third sector (for sustainable development 
programmes): 
'Thirty-six projects have been offered government funding for the three years 2005- 
2008, totalling E6.75 million, following the latest round of competitive bids for support 
from the Environmental Action Fund. These projects cover the whole of England, and 
involve working with a diverse set of communities on a wide range of issues, which will 
help deliver sustainable consumption and production outcomes. ' 
86% of survey respondents agreed with the statement "They (partnerships) increase the 













Figure 5A 'They increase the financial resources available to individual partners' 
Source: Author's Questionnaire 
This presented a conflict in opinion, with, on the one hand, concerns regarding the ovailobility 
of government funding, but, on the other, arguments being made regarding the theory that 
partnerships increase funding opportunities. The next section explores this further through an 
analysis of environmental sector funding. 
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Strongly Agree NoOpinion Disagree Strongly 
Agree Disagree 
As a charity director, it became apparent that a disproportionate amount of time is spent by 
third sector employees on fund-raising and donor managemen t4 3. It was noted through liaison 
with a number of grant-funded third sector actors that this is commonplace, often to the 
detriment of other core activities including, for example, human resources, statutory 
compliance, marketing, and business and partnership development. First-hand experience and 
ongoing engagement with actors in similar third sector roles led to the conclusion that, of the 
44 funding streams secured, a comparatively small percentage was from government source s 
This was qualified through an assessment of the Moor Trees fund-raising programme, which 
includes continuous engagement with a wide variety of funders, including trusts, NGOs, the 
National Lottery, UK government and the European Union. Grant funding received by Moor 










Figure 5.5: Breakdown of Moor Trees Grant Income 
Source: Author's Questionnaire 
When compared to Moor Trees outputs attributable to government targets, there is a lack of 
reciprocal funding. For example, during the (woodland) planting season of 07 / 08, Moor Trees 
43 Liaising with and reporting to actors who have donated funds. 
44 However, 76% of survey respondents highlighted government funding as the main source of income for 
partnerships they were involved in, suggesting that government funding is available to partnerships. This contrasts 
with the apparent low percentage of government funding income secured by individual actors, though this research 
now suggests that formal partnerships are required to secure such funding through a joint application process, 
perhaps for the reasons of formalised accountability structures (see 7.2.1) and / or associated control mechanisms 
(see 7.3.2). 
148 
Trusts NGOs Lottery UKGovt EU 
was the largest contributor to the woodland component of the Dartmoor Local Biodiversity 
Action Plan (of which Moor Trees is an informal partner). For that financial year, however, no 
government funding was received toward this aim, yet Moor Trees' outputs were used by the 
state towards its own targets. 
A further example is the Moor Trees volunteering programme. Each year Moor Trees works 
with hundreds of volunteers from schools, special needs groups, refugees and asylum seekers, 
unemployed, and retired. Many of these beneficiary types are targeted by government 
programmes, one being the government's Sustainable Communities Plan, which highlights the 
provision of volunteering opportunities for people with mental health problems. The Dartmoor 
National Park Authority Woodland Strategy (200S - 2010), also highlights the benefits of Moor 
Trees' volunteers in the delivery of its woodland targets: 
'Community-based tree projects, such as the Woodland Trust and Moor Trees, are 
helping to achieve woodland creation targets. Their projects are of a very high 
environmental quality and can involve large numbers of volunteers. The work of Moor 
Trees, for instance, has helped landowners to establish 4.5 hectares of native 
woodland through their free advisory service and provision of trees and volunteers. ' 
The Devon Local Area Agreement (2008 - 2018) highlights volunteering for young people: 
Priority Theme Three - Community Vibrancy 
The Sustainable Community Strategy seeks to improve physical and electronic access 
to key services and advice for all groups in society, particularly in isolated areas. It aims 
to ensure that communities develop in such a way that people are proud of where 
they live and want to help others by supporting opportunities for increasing 
community activity and volunteering, particularly amongst young people. 
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The above shows government PPP devolving responsibility for sustainable development 
objectives, a point in-part addressed in the online survey question which asked for comment 
on the statement "Partnerships have become an important tool for the delivery of 









Figure 5.6: 'Partnerships have become an important tool for the delivery of environmental 
programmes' 
Source: Author's Questionnaire 
The House of Commons Environmental Audit Committee (2008) also stated that "Biodiversity 
conservation is a devolved responsibility in the UK". My observations of, and work within, the 
conservation sector led me to conclude that biodiversity partnerships are rarely supported by 
state funding. Further evidence to support this was collected from the survey: 
"Government passing responsibility for achieving objectives to the local level could 
work effectively as it allows for local responses that are relevant to the locality. 
However, at the current time there are insufficient resources to allow this to be done 
as effectively as it should be" (Survey Respondent No. 23, public sector). 
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"Local partnerships are better placed to deliver-but adequate resources must be 
made available from central government. With Natural England / Defra needing to 
drastically trim budgets, this is not going to happen" (Survey Respondent No. 8, a 
QUANGO). 
My conclusion was further confirmed by a comment by a member of the House of Commons 
Environment Audit Committee in 2008: 
"The statutory agencies with responsibility for achieving biodiversity targets in national 
environment strategies have been severely hampered by resource cuts making them 
unfit for purpose. " 
Further issues are raised with the state utilising non-state derived outputs towards their own 
targets. For example, and as mentioned above, the Dartmoor National Park Local Biodiversity 
Action Plan included Moor Trees outputs in their own reporting to stakeholders, but with no 
reciprocal support and little, if any, acknowledgement of work done. Interestingly, the UK 
Government's Environment Audit Committee also reported that because the UKBAP was never 
a fully-funded implementation programme, it relies heavily on contributions from the 
voluntary sector. Perhaps Survey Respondent No. 14 (a third sector actor) provided an 
explanation for this apparent lack of support, when commenting: 
"High level of complexity of multiple agencies greatly adds to tasks at community 
volunteer level and dilutes actual funds available. " 
Lack of acknowledgement is a more complex political issue, with findings suggesting that the 
state is uneasy with acknowledging non-state contributions for fear of new calls for increased 
funding to the third sector. As a result of this, Moor Trees has withdrawn from the Local 
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Biodiversity Action Plan partnership but continues to generate the same level of outputs for 
the most part independent of, and without any collaboration with, Local Biodiversity Action 
Plan partners. Alongside the lack of funding, a secondary theme was that third sector actors 
are changing their core aims and objectives to fit government funding streams. As Taylor 
(2007: 306), argues, 'even the promise of increased powers through devolution is taking place 
against a background of centrally defined targets and continued constraints on mainstream 
local government funding. Experiences from Moor Trees and some associated partners 
support this, with new 'added value' or 'complementary' programmes regularly developed in 
response to specific, niche or simply more accessible funding opportunities. This was framed 
by Survey Respondent No. 40 (a third sector actor): 
"Organisations can lose their own focus and march to the government drum. It is 
important that organisations stay independent of government but work with it to 
achieve common goals" (Survey Respondent No. 44, third sector). 
"Despite partnerships being more involved and able to deliver what communities want 
to change, the funding (often provided by government bodies) very much shapes the 
work that will be carried out and thus projects will generally follow government policy" 
(Survey Respondent No. 40, QUANGO). 
OPEP is an example of this diversification. The project originally aimed to offer offenders 
voluntary work on conservation projects but it soon became apparent that working with this 
group attracted significant new funding opportunities, attracting over Bok of funding in its 
first 6 months. OPEP expanded its operations further through a partnership with Duchy College 
to provide accredited short courses. This led to a E40k investment of Learning and Skills 
Council funds. In total, therefore, this diversification by Moor Trees had secured E70k of new 
funding (as of October, 2009) to the environmental sector which would have otherwise not 
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been made available. A member of HMP Dartmoor's management committee (who wished to 
remain anonymous, but was happy to contribute to this study) commented that this was "A 
very positive outcome". She then went on to discuss how HMP Dartmoor would have struggled 
to meet its land-based education and training and biodiversity objectives had OPEP not 
introduced the funding. This showed how OPEP, as a non-state partnership, had become 
essential for the delivery of state objectives. 78% of survey respondents also agreed when 
asked to comment on the statement "Partnerships are increasingly responsible for the delivery 
of our own objectives". It was interesting to observe how actors such as Moor Trees were 
diversifying in this way, especially how it developed the project's medium- to long-term 
financial sustainability4" through its education framework. This also overcame the potential 
dependency on short-term public funding and ensured that the voluntary effort that pre-dated 
the scheme was not for nothing (Curry 2001; Scott, 2004). However, Greer (2001) and Skelcher 
et & (1997), contended that this dependence on external funding (especially the Learning and 
Skills Council funding which originated from central government) restricted the autonomy of 
the partnership and limited its capacity to develop strategically, especially where output 
targets that addressed national objectives left little room for response to local needs and 
requirements. A third sector Interviewee (No. 12) concurred 
"This is great and we are undoubtedly producing some great outputs, but we feel 
more like a government instrument than an engaged community group. " 
5.3.2 Full Cost Recovery 
The third sector has traditionally been supported through government grant-funding and 
volunteer time. Taylor (2002) argued that government funding focuses on projects rather than 
more comprehensive approaches to community development, or broader, non-specific 
45 Many funders now assess actor's wider financial sustainability when evaluating specific applications. As such, 
unrelated projects that have the potential to generate surplus or 'core' income are welcomed. 
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support, i. e. through investing in third sector support programmes aimed at building actor 
sustainability and raising the public profile of the sector as a whole. This study found that 
sustainability projects typically have a finite term, so when this source of funding runs out 
(typically at the end of the project term), the potential for a financially sustainable structure 
becomes a major challenge (Peck and Tickell, 1995, in Greer 2001). With increasing state 
devolution of responsibility for sustainability objectives to grassroots actors, findings suggest 
that volunteering is on the increase but funding is becoming increasingly competitive due to 
the increasing number of third sector actors applying for state funds. In response to this, the 
government launched the Full Cost Recovery framework in 2002. At the same time, the Labour 
government also launched a new 'blueprint, 46 to enable it and the third sector to work 
together. Developed by Paul Boateng47 (the then Chief Secretary to the Treasury) and David 
Blunkett (the then Home Secretary), a Treasury-led cross-cutting review (HM Treasury, 2002) 
aimed to overcome barrierS48 faced by third sector actors in delivering high-quality public 
services and to facilitate successful, long-term partnerships with the government. The key aims 
of this blueprint were to: 
1. Ensure that the cost of contracts for services reflect the full cost of delivery, including 
any relevant part of the overhead cost; 
2. Move to a more stable funding relationship and ensure that the sector is equipped to 
work effectively in partnership with government; 
3. Involve the third sector in the planning as well as delivery of services; 
4. Develop capacity in the sector to achieve equality within partnerships. 
(HM Treasury, 2002). 
46 This followed the Rural White Paper of 2000, which stated the government was committed to 'People living in 
rural areas beingfully involved in developing their community, safeguarding its valuedfeatures and shaping the 
decisions that affect them.... A healthy voluntary and community sector is essential to the effective functioning of 
society - urban and rural' (Defra, 2003). 47 , We want a partnership of equals. A two-way relationship where government gives appropriate support to the 
sector, and the sector Uses its experience and expert knowledge to deliver responsive, flexible services to their 
communities' (Paul Boateng, in HM Treasury, 2002). 
48 Primarily the lack of funding. 
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This document placed funding and partnership-working together, though the emphasis was on 
funding, i. e. points (1), (2) and (4) of the above. The National Audit Office paper of 2002 
further highlighted the concern amongst third sector actors that the government was reluctant 
to pay for core overhead costs and that third sector charitable funds were increasingly used to 
subsidise public service delivery: 
'Failure to pay for full costs, where this is appropriate, can threaten value for money in 
the short and longer term: short term risks to the quality and effectiveness of a service 
if it is underfunded and reliant on charitable subsidy; in the longer term, possible 
erosion of third sector reserves, threatening continuity of service and even the 
supplier, and loss of competitiveness and choice if organisations collapse or withdraw 
from public service delivery' (National Audit office, 2007). 
The ensuing Full Cost Recovery model sought to meet government commitments regarding its 
contracts with the third sector. It is now, however, increasingly adopted by third sector actors 
as a model to strengthen office 'core' funds, as opposed to relying on a succession of 'project- 
based' initiatives that often work in parallel with, as opposed to central to, actors' key aims 
and objectives (i. e. the Moor Trees OPEP programme). This model includes; (i) technical 
adjustments to funding bids requesting increased 'contribution to office overheadS'4', and, 
perhaps more importantly, (ii) the development of a services or trading arm to create income 
against work delivered. 
Taking Moor Trees as an example, such work increasingly involves activities such as corporate 
volunteering, and environmental education and training. These services have historically been 
offered to the public and private sectors at no cost, though Moor Trees now considers these 
arrangements to be a partly formalised partnership whereby it charges the 'client' full cost 
49 Action research showed that funders; now allow, on average, 20% of requested funding to go to office overheads. 
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recovery i. e. f 500 for a for a corporate volunteering day, to include 1 day planning and 1 day 
delivery. This f 500 is broken down as follows: 
Project Officer (2 days) f 180 Ind. 1 day planning and 1 day delivery_ 
Operations Manager (1 day) f 120 
Consumables f 100 Refreshments, gloves 
Office overheads (25% of above) f 100 Telephone, stationary, travel 
Tota 1: f 500 
Table 5.3: Moor Trees Full Cost Recovery Budget Example 
Source: Author 
Thus, this research suggests that the cross-sector partnership-working (where one actor is 
third sector) resulting from devolved responsibility is evolving beyond the traditional benefits 
of resource synergies and knowledge-sharing50 into one where new income is generated. 
Indeed, 78% of survey respondents agreed that partnerships '-provide new market 








Figure 5.7: 'They provide new market opportunities for your organisation' 
Source: Author's Questionnaire 
so,, Voluntary and community groups have specialist skills and a fresh independent and flexible approach that works. 
We want to support them and help them improve their delivery of services and make them responsive to the needs 
of communities' (Home Office Minister Lord Filkin, in HM Treasury, 2002). 
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Income generation through partnership-led full cost recovery and 'services' is not exclusive to 
the third sector. Many QUANGOs are adopting a similar approach, one example is the Forestry 
Commission (2004: 8), who are developing income streams through woodland amenity value: 
'The Forestry Commission's forests have a great capacity to absorb people while still 
enabling a feeling of escape from crowds. We can manage woods to provide access for 
leisure, sustainable tourism and active recreation such as cycling, environmental 
education and other outdoor pursuits. A great deal could be achieved without 
environmental damage but much will depend on the building of local partnerships to 
fund the work. ' 
Burt (2007) argued that this generation of new infrastructural capacity and capability, plus 
reduced dependence on government funding through sustainable income generation, is 
central to government's ambitions in this area and that these initiatives mark out a shift in 
responsibilities within the state / non-state governance framework. Burt (2007) further argued 
that financial independence (from government) and new autonomies for the third sector could 
bring these actors new opportunities and confidence as political actors, so strengthening their 
position in the Policy Implementation Continuum. Stakeholder participation aims to bring 
tailored local solutions and increased support for policy-making, but Boonstra (2006) argued 
that this political shift from the state to the markets transfers responsibility for public issues 
from the state to individuals and companies. To explore the market-based approach, a number 
of MTPN actors were asked the following question at interview: 
Q. Do you feel that third sector organisations should try to create new income streams 
through commodifying and then charging for their work when the opportunity arises? 
Responses were varied, but for the most part in agreement: 
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"Yes, this could then lead to project sustainability as project funding usually has a finite 
term" (Survey Respondent No. 4, public sector). 
"It is a difficult transition to make for third sector organisations to start charging for 
their work, so it needs to be a fine balance between charitable work and full cost 
recovery. Where they are working in partnership with the private sector though, they 
should definitely charge" (Survey Respondent No. 6, QUANGO). 
"This type of income would usually be classed as unallocated, so the organisation 
would be able to spend it as it wishes, unlike government funding which would 
obviously have to be spent on the associated programme" (Survey Respondent No. 15, 
third sector). 
"if third sector organisations adopted a more traditional business model then it would 
make them more stable, but they would have to be careful when it comes to 
competitive advantage through govern ment-su bsidised activities" (Survey Respondent 
No. 17, private sector). 
In this context, Morris (2008: 1218) argued that 'As a set of ideologies, discourses, and policy 
strategies, neoliberalism promotes commodifying natural resources and altering the form and 
the substance of environmental governance to rely more on market-based strategies and non- 
state actors. ' For this market to evolve, however, it is fundamental that individual property 
rights exist for the environmental resources to be 'traded'. These rights are either designed, or 
'their spontaneous creation is not blocked by a regulation' (Slavikova et aL, 2010: 2). If the 
goods that this market creates are then demanded by consumers, then a value is created and 
it is in the interest to retain the high environmental quality of the resources. Thus: 
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'rhe mechanism of supply and demand can work in favour of environmental 
protection in the same way as it works for conventional goods and services. This 
implicates that if individuals in the society do not demand high quality of the 
environment, it is not (and it should not be) provided' (Slavikova et a/., 2010: 2). 
The above arguments support the findings from this study that a market-based approach can 
be successfully adopted to meet sustainability objectives. In the MTPN context, this study has 
seen actors such as Moor Trees develop environmental products and services that can be 
I sold' through enterprise models (Ferguson, 2010). This approach, when successful, generates 
new income streams and removes the pressures of constantly competing for grants. Referred 
to by Liverman (2004) as the 'commodification of nature', it has also seen Moor Trees diversify 
into the world of corporate responsibility, where it increasingly works with private sector 
actors striving to increase their environmental and social credentials. 
5.4 Connecting Environmental and Corporate Responsibility 
S-4.1 The Corporate Sector and the Environment 
Corporate Responsibilitys' is a concept born out of organisations' need and desire to work 
beyond government regulations and minimum environmental standards to reduce negative 
environmental and other externalities. This is partly due to stakeholder pressure for them to 
improve their environmental, as well as social, performance. Corporate Responsibility has 
resulted in annual company reporting on social and environmental behaviour. They engage in 
voluntary environmental (and social) initiatives for a variety of reasons, including 
management's values, reputation management, and cost reduction (Waddock, 2004). 
51 Findings suggest that Corporate Responsibility evolved from the original 'corporate social responsibility' due to 
the rise in profile of environmental sustainability which provides an additional focus to social considerations. 
Blodiversity, in particular, has not traditionally been a central focus of Corporate Responsibility, but this is changing 
due to increasing public and business awareness of the issue, notably since the publication of the Millennium 
Ecosystem Assessment in 2005. 
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Participants also strive to embed the concept in the organisation and its staff's day-to-day 
activities. It is frequently operationalised through environmental management systems, 
volunteering, philanthropy (usually through financial donations to charities or trusts) or in-kind 
contributions (MITIE p1c, for example, donated a minibus to Moor Trees). Waddock (2004: 9) 
explained this as involving 'the strategies and operating practices a company develops in 
operationalising its relationships with and impacts on stakeholders and the natural 
environment'. More recently, corporate responsibility has become synonymous with 
sustainable development, with sustainability objectives often embedded in companies' annual 
reports under a Corporate Responsibility section (many companies are now publishing 
separate Corporate Responsibility reports). 
I played both researcher and practitioner roles whilst researching this concept. As a 
researcher, I collected 248 company annual reports over a2 year period. I found that 94% of 
them included sections on their Corporate Responsibility activities, of which 78% contained 
details on meeting sustainability objectives. During this period, I also wrote Corporate 
Responsibility reports for four different organisations. The UK government's (2005) Securing 
the Future - delivering UK Sustainable Development Strategy includes companies in their 
devolved responsibility for sustainable development approach: 
'To see UK businesses taking account of their economic, social and environmental 
impacts, and acting to address the key sustainable development challenges based on 
their core competences wherever they operate - locally, regionally and internationally' 
(HM Government, 2005). 
Thus, Corporate Responsibility can be argued to based on Capriotti and Moreno's (2007: 85) 
assertion that it is an 'organisation's commitments to fulfilling economic, social, and 
environmental duties. it also includes information transparency, ethical behaviour, company 
160 
management, product development, and the evaluation and control of the fulfilment of these 
commitments. ' Corporate Responsibility reporting needs to show tangible (and quantifiable) 
evidence of an active approach to the creation of social and environmental (as well as 
economic) capital, and operational transparency. The Business in the Community (BiTC - see 
www. bitc. org. uk) website stated that, in recognition of this shift towards socio-environmental 
reporting, 88% of FTSE100 companies published non-financial information in 2008. A popular 
way for this approach to be delivered is increasingly through partnership-working with third 
sector actors such as Moor Trees, whereby participants can invest directly or make an in-kind 
contribution to its third sector partner's work. 
This has led to the diversification of the MTPN to include a growing number of corporate 
actors. Examples of this cross-sector partnership-working include: 
Company Contribution Value Cash / IKC 
1. Almanac Gallery Woodland sponsorship f9k Cash 
2. Fourfront Group Woodland sponsorship f4k Cash 
3. MITIE pic Minibus f l8k IKC 
4. Toshiba pic Website sponsorship f4k Cash 
5. Spook Media Website Software fl. 8k p. a. IKC 
6. Xperta Website hosting fO. 5k p. a. IKC 
Table SA: Corporate Members S2 of the MTPN 
Source: Author (collated via Moor Trees Action Research) 
These partnerships are complex, with funding and in-kind contributions generated for Moor 
Trees whilst the company can benefit from 'Green PR', market differentiation and brand 
association. An example of such a partnership is the one between Moor Trees and EDF 
Energy's 'Supporting Communities' programme 'Helping Hands' initiative. I observed the 
partnership over a two year period, during which time Moor Trees hosted EDF staff volunteers 
who visited once per month with a group size averaging 22. This was quantified by Moor Trees 
52 All data published in Moor Trees Annual Reports and is, therefore, in the public domain. 
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as equating to 1,056 volunteer hours, a statistic used by both partners in reporting. In addition, 
EDF staff benefits included development and training and 'green PR'. However, EDF's Head of 
Corporate Responsibility suggested a more altruistic approach: 
"Through our volunteering programme, Helping Hands, we give every EDF Energy 
employee two paid days, twice the UK government recommended entitlement, to get 
involved in community-based activities. Some work with local charities or social 
groups; others donate their energy and expertise to good causes. " 
The Moor Trees / EDF partnership provides a good example of a collaborative approach by 
private and third sector actors in the delivery of an environmental programme, in this case 
tree growing and planting for woodland conservation. To re-contextualise, it is worth 
considering how the outputs of the project meet state-formulated sustainable development 
aims and objectives i. e. the Dartmoor Local Biodiversity Action Plan. it could be argued that 
EDF is seeking green PR and that Moor Trees is seeking additional resources, but the numbers 
of trees planted also contribute to the Local Biodiversity Action Plan objectives, i. e. to create 
75 hectares of new native woodland over 10 years. Thus, the EDF case study provides an 
example of the bottom-up approach of devolved responsibility delivered through cross-sector 
partnership-working. Had this partnership not been formed then the outputs would not have 
been produced. However, these types of environmental partnerships need to be managed 
carefully to reduce greenwash whilst maximising return on investment for the corporation to 
help build a lasting and rewarding relationship for both partners. 
S. 4.2 Greenwash and Altruism 
Findings suggested that there is an increasing responsibility for environmental awareness and 
sustainable business practice placed on the private sector by the public and third sectors. 
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However, third / private sector partnerships including MTPN actors such as EDF, MITIE and 
Toshiba often provoke cynical comments from some observers also suggesting that these 
environmental partnerships are based more on 'greenwash' than a genuinely altruistic 
approach to the environment. A mixture of greenwash and altruism was indeed observed 
within the MTPN. This ranged from, on the one hand, public relations companies contacting 
Moor Trees seeking 'quick win' news stories for their clients, to corporate actors genuinely 
seeking investment opportunities, occasionally on condition of anonymity. One ( third sector) 
interviewee suggested that: 
"The corporate sector offers a great opportunity for funding sustainability projects but 
you need to be careful that your members and other environmental partners don't 
think you're getting involved in greenwash. However, managed correctly, it can build 
financial sustainability and scale (increase) operation" (Interviewee No. 11). 
Interviewee No. 10 (QUANGO) commented: 
"Charities and companies working together is great, but it is important that the 
partnership also inspires meaningful and lasting change from within (the donor) as 
opposed to being just a short-term, PR-driven fix". 
The difficulty of avoiding or 'managing' greenwash was further discussed by a Moor Trees 
member of staff: 
I think it's really difficult to work with corporate partners and avoid accusations of 
greenwash from existing partners, even if it isn't really happening. We need to really 
weigh-up the benefits against the potential threats of disenfranchised members" 
(interview No. 12). 
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Further, another private sector interviewee (working in public relations), commented: 
"Charity work is rising in profile, especially environmental work. One of the challenges 
of this arrangement, however, is to ensure that the corporate partner communication 
strategy accurately reflects the investment made. For example, 'XYZ pic' plants a 
woodland', could mean aI hectare or a 10 hectare site. So Moor Trees would need to 
stipulate quantification of woodland planting i. e. 'XYZ pic plants a2 hectare 
woodland"' (Interview No. 16). 
Engaging the private sector in effective (environmental) partnership-working is, therefore, 
considered a challenge, though one that can also yield significant benefit. Non-state actors 
engaged in sustainability initiatives are not exclusively third sector, but increasingly a third / 
private sector mix. However, whilst the challenge of encouraging behavioural and attitudinal 
change in the private sector partner is often led by the third sector partner, it is still 
strategically driven by the top-down, state approach of environmental policy objectives. Take 
for example, the Waste Electronic and Electrical Equipment directive, the UK Biodiversity 
Action Plan, and the UK Low Carbon Transition Plan. These are all state-formulated policies 
that are being delivered by non-state actors, often in partnership with the private sector. 
Without doubt, the lower levels of the Policy Implementation Continuum includes the actors 
engaged in the bottom-up approach, but this study suggests that the state is becoming over- 
dependent on the market-based approach of third / private sector partnerships to leverage 
new (non-state) funding and resources to help operationalise EPPP. Indeed, findings suggest 
that these new collaborations are becoming increasingly important for EPPP delivery. Janker 
and Nijhof (2006) also argue that a mutual understanding of expectations between partners 
(i. e. brand association by the private sector actor vs. environmental benefit of the partnership) 
is required to bring success. Castree and Sparke (2000, in Liverman, 2004), however, are more 
sceptical, contending that corporate involvement is co-optation, with no serious commitment 
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to the environment (see also Logan and Wekerle, 2008). A private sector Survey Respondent 
(No. 17) also commented that the cost of 'real' environmentalism can lead to reduced (as 
opposed to increased) competitiveness: 
"it is difficult to explain rising costs to clients who purchased a service at a price some 
time ago. In order to continue to provide an environmentally-sound service, we must 
increase our costs which can then put us out of the market as we are undercut by 
those less strict/ less environmentally/ corporate responsibility aware companies. " 
Costs are indeed an issue, especially regarding the independent validation and reporting that 
Bishop et oL (2008) noted are increasingly required of companies to measure their 
environmental performance, even when operating over and above statutory requirements. 
This validation and reporting has evolved in recent years, with a range of social and 
environmental standards, guidelines, assessment tools and / or reporting systems being 
developed for various industries. Examples include: 
0 ISO 14001, an environmental management standard developed by the International 
Organisation for Standardisation. 
0 Equator Principles, which set a benchmark for the financial industry to manage social 
and environmental risk in project financing. 
0 Global Reporting Initiative, which provides a framework for organisational reports on 
economic, environmental and social performance. 
* Performance Standard 6 on Biodiversity Conservation and Sustainable Natural 
Resource Management developed by the International Finance Corporation for all 
projects it finances 
0 ISO 26000 voluntary guidelines for social responsibility 
(Bishop et al., 2008: 114) 
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As well as providing a more robust monitoring and review framework, these standards can 
introduce cost-saving measures such as energy efficiency in to businesses. They can also 
produce less tangible benefits such as employee morale, which Moor Trees linked with 
environmental volunteering programmes such as its EDF partnership, thus providing 
quantifiable outputs, such as hours volunteered and trees planted. None of these standards 
are state-driven, though many work in parallel with state policies and are managed by third 
sector actors. This demonstrates how the markets are adopting new accountability regimes to 
meet sustainable development objectives and, in turn, deliver state-formulated EPPP. 
5.5 Conclusion 
Analysis has revealed the consistent theme of the challenge of putting state-formulated 
sustainable development policies into practice through the non-state delivery framework of 
effective partnership-working. Although the state conceptually and strategically embraces 
devolved responsibility through engaging levels 3 and 4 of the Policy Implementation 
Continuum as a delivery mechanism for sustainable development initiatives, non-state actors 
regularly argue for increased resources to be made available. It was also suggested that state 
sustainability objectives will for the most part stay as rhetoric unless they are backed-up by 
additional resources to enable grassroots actors to accept responsibility for delivery. Data 
suggested that the success of devolved responsibility for sustainable development lies in the 
willingness of the state to increase funding to community-based actors. it also raised the 
question of the implied heterarchical approach of devolved responsibility, whereby each actor 
within the MTPN shares a horizontal position of power and authority, thus theoretically 
playing an equal role in the delivery of sustainable development. This is a sound concept, but 
MTPN actor feedback suggested that the state retained control through a (hierarchical) 
managerial framework (this is explored in Section 7.3). The audit culture of government 
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funding that is made available certainly suggests this, though it is acknowledged that the use 
of tax-payers money will, by nature, restrict programme flexibility and dynamism. 
Is it possible, therefore, for the government to make available the additional resources 
requested by the third sector? This is a question in part answered by the rise of third / private 
sector partnerships as sustainable development delivery vehicles due to their less accountable 
and more dynamic nature. The devolution of responsibility is interpreted by some as the 
government's attempts to withdraw support from the environmental sector by devolving 
responsibility for environmental governance to the local level whilst still seeking to govern 
from a distance. Analysis has shown that the state appears to be devolving responsibility for 
the environmental sustainability to non-state actors by increasingly seeking to 'govern through 
communities' through 'community, diversity and locality' (Murdoch, 1997: 109). The 
environmental governance concept includes the state replacing direct intervention with 
discourses of community responsibility and self-governing through partnership-working 
(Thompson, 2005: 326). The integration and occasionally exclusive use of non-state actors in 
the formulation and delivery of EPPP is conceptually sound, but raises issues about their lack of 
democratic legitimacy leading to reduced uptake by wider stakeholders (Boonstra, 2006; 
Bulkeley, 2005; Connelly et oL, 2006; Dryzek, 2001; Mackinnon, 2000). In seeking to further 
analyse the partnership approach to environmental governance, the following chapter 
examines if and how such partnerships can obtain democratic legitimacy when delivered by 
non-state, unelected actors. 
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Chapter 6: The Legitimacy of Cross-sector Partnerships as a Formulation 
and Delivery Framework for Environmental Plans, Policies and 
Programmes 
6.1 Introduction 
The shift from government to governance has led to a shift from state domination of policy 
development and delivery to collaborations with non-state actors in flexible and often less- 
formalised structures (Papaclopoulus, 2003; Stoker, 1997 in Connelly et OL, 2006). These 
collaborations are considered key for democratic legitimacy by Dryzek (2001: 651), who argued 
that (as an absolute ideal) legitimacy is gained 'through reflective assent through participation 
in authentic deliberation by all those subject to the decision in question'. Whilst democratic 
legitimacy is considered an important component of a governance approach (Wallington et al., 
2008), this research asked the question: do EPPP lose legitimacy through the inclusion of non- 
state actors that have not been empowered through a process of representative democracy? 
This chapter seeks to answer this question by addressing the concept of the legitimacy of 
cross-sector partnerships as a formulation and delivery framework for predominantly state- 
derived EPPP. To do this, the chapter drew on action research and observations, online survey 
responses, and in-depth interviews with state and non-state actors. 
The chapter firstly analyses the MTPN to identify the informal partnerships that have 
developed in response to state-formulated EPPP. It addresses the issue of the selective 
representation of environmental partnerships, using the case study of a QUANGO funding 
programme. it then analyses how state partnerships seek legitimacy through public 
participation in EPPP formulation and community involvement in delivery. The chapter 
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concludes by discussing if a formal framework is necessary and if so, how it may be adopted to 
ensure EPPP legitimacy. 
6.2 Deconstructing the MTPN: an Analysis of Environmental Partnerships' Legitimacy when 
Co-ordinated and Managed by Non-State Actors 
The MTPN consisted of a wide range of state and non-state actors covering all four levels of 
the Policy Implementation Continuum i. e. public, QUANGO, third and private sectors. Initial 
findings gained through environmental sector observation and participation suggested that, 
for the most part, the non-state partners (which form 73% of the MTPN) primarily operated in 
the area of programme delivery, as opposed to PPP formulation. As such, this research 
explored if this is due to (i) 'delivery' being intrinsically more resource-intensive 53 than 
'formulation', or (ii) because formulation can involve a smaller, often exclusive set of (primarily 
state) actors, which tend to exclude many of those directly engaged in the subsequent 
delivery. 
Findings suggested the latter, and thus raised questions regarding the democratic legitimacy of 
environmental partnerships due to a lack of stakeholder representation, i. e. Dryzek's 
engagement of 'all those subject to the decision in question'. Further, Bulkeley et aL's 
(2005: 879) conceptualised 'redistribution of state functions' could also suggest that the state's 
deliberative democracy (based on stakeholder consultation) compromise (between direct and 
representative democracy) of non-state actor participation is itself flawed for the same reason. 
To answer these questions, MTPN actors were categorised and stratified in an attempt to 
quantify the democratic legitimacy of associated EPPP. The data was collated through the 
researcher's participation in and observation of the MTPN. 
53 Programme delivery often involves more time, money and people. 
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6.2.1 The MTPN and the Policy Implementation Continuum 
For the sake of this study, the MTPN was quantified as 272 actors", of which 73 (27%) were 
classed as 'state' and 199 (73%) as 'non-state'. 
state, 
73,27% Non- 
Figure 6.1: MTPN State / Non-State Classification 
Source: Author 
State 
1. Government 2. QUANGO 
Non-state 
3. third 4. Private 
38(14%) 35(13%) 110(40%) 89(33%) 
EPPP Formulation 38(100%) 35(100%) 38(35%) 33(37%) 
EPPP Delivery 38(100%) 35(100%) 98(91%) 89(100%) 
Table 6.1: MTPN EPPP Formulation and Delivery Cluster 
Source: Author 
Analysis of the above table shows 100% of state actors are involved in EPPP formulation - this 
means directly involved in the consultation process i. e. member of a Local Biodiversity Action 
Plan stakeholder group. 100% are also involved in delivery i. e. habitat management and 
creation, biodiversity audits, or education provision. However, whereas 93.5% of non-state 
actors were active in delivery, only 35.5% were involved in formulation, a significant bias 
towards state actors in EPPP formulation. This statistic suggests, therefore, that EPPP lack 
54 The larger survey sampling frame of 400 included a number of actors who worked for the same organisations, 
though at different levels and departments. 
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democratic- legitimacy due to limited stakeholder engagement. Further survey responses and 
interview data also suggested that partnerships can suffer from selective representation. 
Goodwin (1998: 11) concurred: 
'Political talk and writing now stress notions of inclusion and empowerment, but given 
the paternalistic and 'non-political'traditions dominant in many rural areas, there may 
be a tendency to involve only key actors in the new structures of governance and 
marginalise the wider community. 
Survey Respondent No. 16 (from the private sector), supported this assertion: 
"Partnerships must have active consultative methodologies with all local stakeholders 
in place to be sure to meet local / regional need. 'Listening to the people' has a key 
role. Public scepticism about government strategies is borne out of poor consultation 
and the same faces cropping up time and again when it comes to making decisions". 
6.2.2 Of Selective Representation: Membership Selection and inclusion / Exclusion Criteria 
My experiences of working on the various funding committees to which I had been invited and 
wider observations at stakeholder forums suggested that many environmental partnerships 
were frequently 'self-selecting' or subject to selective representation. This suggested that 
environmental partnership founders invited specific actors to join the partnership, thus 
reducing representativeness and possibly resulting in bias regarding the disbursement of 
funding. When asked to comment on the statement Environmental Partnerships tend to self- 
select their members, 69% of respondents agreed and 25% had no opinion. Only 6% disagreed, 
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Figure 6.2: 'Environmental Partnerships tend to self-select their members' 
Source: Author's Questionnaire 
Further evidence of self-selection was noted from private sector Survey Respondent No. 71, 
who commented that "There is an inherent danger that environmental partnership 
membership becomes self-perpetuating". The respondent also commented on how certain 
actors always appear to be members of partnerships. I explored this point with co- 
practitioners and at interview. It was generally agreed that national partnerships need some 
actors included that have national coverage, i. e. BTCV, Groundwork, RSPB, National Trust, 
Woodland Trust, etc. However, the need for local representation (i. e. Moor Trees) was also 
important for local context, and not necessarily from 'local offices' of national organisations as 
they would still be guided by 'head office' aims and objectives. It was also suggested that 
national actors involved in 'local projects' would inevitably divert some funding to their head 
office to cover 'core costs'. I also explored this point with a number of organisations, and 
found that it was their policy to budget for between 10% and 25% of project funding to go to 
head office. 
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Figure 6.3: 'They can be dominated by one or a few organisations' 
Source: Author's Questionnaire 
Survey Respondent No. 28 (from the public sector) also suggested that "Proper community 
engagement is difficult and the partnerships set up often involve only those who have an 
interest and are not truly representative of the wider community". Both actors, therefore, 
supported the notion that partnerships can be unrepresentative. The idea of self-perpetuation 
of membership was reinforced, with 78% of survey respondents agreeing that partnerships can 
be dominated by one or a few organisations (see Figure 6.3). Of the 16% that disagreed, 90% 
were state actors, suggesting a degree of respondent subjectivity. On exploring this point 
further, it was pointed out by third sector Interviewee (No. 14) that "The main barrier to wider 
involvement is a perception that partnerships are closed shops when most partnerships would 
welcome wider involvement". This perhaps suggests an attitudinal barrier as opposed to an 
organisational one. One (public sector) survey respondent (No. 2) commented that "Self 
selection may seem to happen, but I believe that this is not the case. Many people are 
apathetic to joining partnerships and I believe that it is often the same interested parties that 
contribute the lion's share". In contrast, Survey Respondent No. 74 (from the third sector) 
stated that "As long as there is widespread consultation, and the consultation indicates a fairly 
strong consensus, then self-selection ("who do we need") works". Responses, therefore, 
showed differing opinions about self-selection. 
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In addition to survey responses and interviews, a programme within the MTPN provided an 
interesting indication of selective inclusivity. The programme in question was Natural 
England'sss 'Access to Nature' Programme (A2N), which was promoted as a partnership to 
enable peoplefrom all backgrounds to understand, access and enjoy our natural environment. 
Evidence collected, however, suggested that the immediate beneficiaries consisted of 
partnership members -16 and / or public sector 57 actors. The programme was a Big Lottery Fund 
grant programme that was managed by Natural England (a QUANGO). It targeted 
environmental volunteering and was theoretically open to all environmental sector actors 
active in that area. As Director of Moor Trees, I applied to the fund in 2008. As part of the 
funding application process, I researched the background to the programme, including 
management structure. I discovered that membership of the management committee and 
funding panel was by invitation only and that no sector-wide consultation had been carried out 
prior to its launch to request expressions of interest in joining the committee. The Moor Trees 
application was rejected, and I subsequently explored the intricacies of the programme 
further. I discovered that the majority of the funding (65%) had been awarded to committee 
members (42.5%) and public sector actors (22.5%). Further interviews suggested that this 
example is not isolated, with some suggesting that it is prevalent in the environmental sector. 
One third sector actor commented: 
"In my experience of over 30 years of community and environmental projects, 
partnerships are usually led by a dominant organisation that commands most of the 
budget and influence over the project. Larger NGOs ... can act almost as QUANGOs 
working closely with government departments. I have experience where ... panel 
member 'partners' were able to command most of the funds". 
5S Written permission for inclusion in this study was received. 
56 British Waterways, BTCV, Environment Agency, Forestry Commission, GreenSpace, Groundwork UK, Land 
Restoration Trust, The National Trust, Natural England, RSPB, The Wildlife Trusts, The Woodland Trust (this data is in 
the public domain). 
57 The awarding of significant grants to public sector applicants i. e. City Councils and National Parks, contrasts with 
Jessop's concept of the 'hollowing out of the state' and Tony Blair's 'active citizenship' discourse. 
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Another (public sector) commented during interview that this was "typical of Y (government) 
organisation, they always work with the same Voluntary Community sector partners". 
Findings suggest, therefore, that whilst state-driven environmental partnerships are 'inclusive 
and representative' in theory, they can be 'self-selecting' in practice. However, the key 
element in raising legitimacy is the inclusion of all groups and individuals affected by EPPPs, 
both in terms of who is present and how they are involved (Connelly et aL, 2006). Despite 
state actors such as Defra (2003) mentioning inclusivity in their rural community capacity 
building programme, the issue remains as to whether EPPPs can ever be fully inclusive, or 
whether stakeholder groups are merely selected by the state to include those actors with 
whom an existing 'smooth' relationship" exists, at the expense of other stakeholders. Castree 
(2009) and Evans (2004), amongst others, argued that this path dependency may result from 
pre-existing arrangements and power relations that may also restrict the transformative ability 
of environmental partnerships. Various MTPN actors agreed, particularly with the point about 
I pre-existing arrangements' and 'local knowledge', or as Evans (2004: 278) conceptualised it, 
'local embeddedness'. Connelly et oL (2006), in their study of 'new rural governance' argued 
that legitimacy is grounded in stakeholder deliberation. it could be argued that this is also 
consistent with the environmental sector and that it is indeed problematic that the criteria of 
legitimacy appropriate to representative democratic government is not obviously applicable 
due to it being situated, or, specifically contextualised or localised. This means that 
stakeholder representation from the locality of each project should be sought. 
Despite Dryzek's (2001) argument regarding reflective assent, it would be unreasonable to 
suggest that a// stakeholders could ever be truly engaged due to inevitable logistical and 
economic constraints and challenges. There does, however, appear to be failings in the levels 
of representativeness that arguably can be achieved. As Stoker (2006: 53) pointed out '-what 
58 Referred to by Connelly et al. (2006: 274) as enabling creative exploration of new positions free from scrutiny or 
political 'interference'. 
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is required is the construction of a dialogue that allows space for the involvement of the 
disorganised many as well as the organised few. ' So, perhaps it is an improved 
communications and feedback framework that is required to close the gap between the 
rhetoric and practice of 'local' environmental governance (Evans, 2004). Indeed, if this was to 
be implemented then the voice(s) of the 'disorganised' would then perhaps also be heard. 
6.3 Seeking the Legitimisation of Environmental Partnerships in the Absence of the 
Legitimacy Mechanisms of Representative Democracy 
The selective inclusivity and lack of representativeness appearing to impact on the legitimacy 
of environmental partnerships suggests that an alternative legitimacy mechanism should be 
considered to enable EPPPs to receive Dryzek's reflective assent. With an improved 
communication and feedback framework as an alternative to representative democracy 
highlighted by existing literature and MTPN actors alike, the concept was explored further. 
6.3.1 Representation in PPP formulation: 'Giving Everyone a Say' - Securing Legitimacy 
through Representative Public Participation? 
Many standards of good governance originate from traditional principles of democracy. 
Although many aspects of environmental governance take place outside parliament, and 
hence remote from the institutional core of democracy, governance discourse still includes; 
the involvement of all people or groups concerned; the equality of influence; the 
responsiveness of governance institutions to citizen needs and concerns; and the 
accountability of decision-makers and administrative bodies (Steffek, 2009). Findings revealed, 
however, a number of cases within the MTPN (and the wider environmental sector) whereby 
the governance approach of stakeholder engagement had evolved towards state-originated 
'managerialist' arrangements by an increasingly exclusive group of actors. Described by 
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Skelcher (2000) as a 'closed decision-making core', this approach was also acknowledged by a 
number of actors during the survey and interviews. One third sector Survey Respondent (No. 
14) commented that "decisions are often made with only token consultation", whilst another 
(public sector) actor's comment59 also raised the issue of funding: 
"It is always the same large organisations that seem to be running these projects these 
days. They allude to working with everybody to get the funding but then when it is 
awarded nobody benefits but themselves and the outputs are never as high as they 
would be if they did actually work with smaller community groups". 
Such comments above reinforce the notion of environmental partnerships' exclusivity and lack 
of representativeness. However, Survey Respondent No. 33 (a QUANGO), argued that "There 
always has to be one leading body, normally that with the highest percentage of funding 
resources, so although suggestions can be made, the final say has to lie with one body". My 
observations concluded that this comment is atypical of QUANGO representativeness due to 
their traditional position of power as funder and within the Policy Implementation Continuum. 
Although it is this hierarchical approach that the governance concept seeks to replace through 
partnership-working with non-state actors (an essential component of sustainability discourse, 
argued Evans et & (2006)), the challenge appears to lie in the legitimisation of non- 
representative state-formulated EPPP for the delivery of projects at the local level (Gibbs and 
Jonas, 2000). 
Representation is argued to be the key for the legitimacy of environmental partnerships. But it 
is unclear if this can occur through direct engagement in the formulation and delivery of EPPP. 
Theoretically, but operationalising this is problematic and complex, with the number and 
diversity of stakeholders required to play a role if environmental partnerships are to claim 
S9 This was not a formal interview, but authority was granted to use the comment in this study. 
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legitimacy through representation. Findings suggest a compromise between membership and 
active communications and feedback is required i. e. 'giving everyone a say'. 'Public 
participation' lies within Principle 10 of the 1992 Rio Declaration, with 'The right to participate 
in decision making processes - the right to be consulted and participate in proposals, plans or 
activities'. it is also one of the three pillars of the 1998 Arhus Convention. In 1998, the 
government also argued that enhanced public participation can contribute to the development 
of 'a new brand of involved and responsible local citizenship' (DETR, 1998, in Lowncles and 
Sullivan, 2004). Whilst public participation clearly underpins a democratic process, it also gives 
stakeholders the opportunity to influence the design, or formulation of EPPP. 88% of MTPN 
actors agreed with the survey statement that environmental partnerships increase the 













Figure 6A 'They increase the influence of your organisation' 
Source: Author's Questionnaire 
Public participation is considered to be one of the benefits of partnership-working, but it is 
argued by Yarwood (2002) and Lowndes and Sullivan (2004) that it can also be problematic. 
Survey Respondent No. 30 (a QUANGO) commented that: 
"... it can be difficult to engage public, private and voluntary and community sector 
groups tend to have one or two sectors, but not all. It can also be very difficult for 
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campaigning NGOs to leave their core issues at the door and engage in true 
partnerships where there is compromise / meet in the middle" 
Survey Respondent No. 5 (from the public sector) also pointed out that "Meetings often 
trundle on wasting officers' time", whilst Survey Respondent No. 29 (private sector) 
commented that "... as sometimes a lead individual can 'overrule' the views of partners, 
pursuing a course of action that not everybody agrees with"60, thus suggesting that a 
democratic outcome was not always the case. Both are interesting points and show mixed 
feedback from online survey respondents when asked to comment on the statement 'All 








Figure 6.5: 'All partners receive a fair opportunity to contribute to decision -making' 
Source: Author's Questionnaire 
Democratic debate is a fundamental aspect of sustainable development, but the above data 
suggests that the concept of effective partnership-working can be difficult to put into practice. 
Ferretti (2006) suggested that broadening participation enhances democratic legitimacy as an 
expression of self-governance and makes people more motivated to accept outcomes. 
Lowndes and Sullivan (2004: 51), however, contended that environmental partnerships do not 
60 Kellett (2007) argued that (in the context of renewables) a strong lead agency is a prime requirement, a second 
key component needs to be a high degree of community involvement, thus suggesting that compromise is key. 
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in themselves deliver enhanced public participation and that they may be particularly difficult 
to secure citizen involvement in a partnership context, and that public participation needs to be 
'designed-in', not 'assumed-in'. On exploring community representation in PPP formulation at 
interview, third sector Interviewee (No. 8) stated that "This can be an area of weakness in 
partnerships. It is often talked about but seldom delivered fully". 
Findings suggested that there is a challenge in achieving public participation in the formulation 
of EPPP. Action research experiences and MTPN actor feedback suggested two main limiting 
factors. One was the inability of some third sector organisations to afford the time to attend 
EPPP meetings. Survey Respondent No. 60 (from the third sector) supported this assertion 
"We do not have the time to work with fully paid government organisations". The other is the 
lack of (and, therefore, need for) an effective communication and feedback mechanism to 
enable contribution without attendance. To overcome this, Lowndes and Sullivan (2004: 63) 
argued that innovative strategies are required to involve the 'external' public in policy 
consultation and deliberation, including a clear link between participation initiatives and 
decision-making processes, and 'a capacity for evaluation and for feedback to citizens 
regarding the outcome of participation exercises. I suggest that such a mechanism is possible 
thanks to the speed and costs-effectiveness of the digital age # 61 (95% of MTPN actors used the 
internet for communication on a daily basis), which offers the opportunity for a digital 
communications framework to provide 'stakeholder participation and empowerment of the 
otherwise powerless but indispensable participants' (Mushove and Vogel, 2004: 186). The 
internet is argued by Warren (2007: 374) to benefit its users in a number of ways, including 
basic acquisition of information, the online purchase of goods and services, and, in this 
context, as a tool to interact with others 'in the wider processes of governance' through the 
removal of former barriers (particularly that of distance) to such interaction. Further, the 
61 The role that information may and will play in environmental management and governance Is changing 
dramatically, largely because of technology innovations that are transforming political relationships, scientific 
capabilities, patterns of governance, and policy strategies (Fiorino, 2009). 
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internet provides a 'clear and common identity that is recognisable to sceptical, or 
uninterested, local citizens' (Lowndes and Sullivan, 2004: 63). An example of such a mechanism 
is this study's online survey, which received a 77% response rate having been hosted online. 
Knowing how busy and geographically dispersed many of the respondents were, the high 
response rate was partly due to the ease of online access instead of my needing to conduct a 
visit in person. 
The opportunity is theoretically there to improve participation in formulation through, for 
example, the use of the internet. However, despite public participation in EPPP formulation 
preceding community involvement in EPPP delivery, researcher experiences suggest that the 
latter is more prevalent in environmental partnerships i. e. that the state is more actively 
engaged in working with non-state actors in the delivery of environmental programmes, as 
opposed to their formulation. Thus, findings suggest that the governance approach could be 
state-derived sustainability rhetoric, as opposed to a genuine attempt to engage the citizen for 
the sake of improved uptake 62 of EPPP. The next section explores this suggestion. 
6.3.2 Community Involvement - Rhetoric or Reality? An Analysis of Theory vs. Practice 
The UK Government started to promote EPPP community involvement via the Countryside 
Commission's Community Action Experimental Programme of the 1980s, when it placed 
greater emphasis on empowering 'local people to determine the sorts of environmental 
activities which took place in their communities' (Martin, 1995: 150). More recently, the HM 
Treasury (2002) White Paper ('The Role of the Voluntary and Community sector in Service 
Delivery') highlighted the need for community involvement to build community capacity for 
the design, delivery and monitoring of services. Similarly, the government's 2005 Sustainable 
62 One of the most insistent claims of supporters of deliberative democracy (or at least of some accounts of it) is 
that public participation leads to better policy outcomes not because it improves the substance of decision-making, 
but rather because it makes people more motivated to accept those outcomes, or at least to attenuate dissent 
(Ferretti, 2006). 
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Development Strategy and Community Action 2020 'Together We Can' programmes included 
'Community involvement' as a key component of its integrated approach for creating 
sustainable communities and a fairer world (HM Government, 2005), Although the state has 
promoted this inclusive approach as a component of sustainable development, this study 
explored both rhetoric and reality by analysing if community involvement did inspire active 
citizenship, or if this stakeholder engagement was merely for the creation of political capital 












Figure 6.6: 'Environmental partnerships usually include Public Sector partners' 
Source: Author's Questionnaire 
The survey showed that 83% of respondents expected there to be a public sector partner in an 
environmental partnership, suggesting that the partnerships are rarely exclusively made up of 
non-state actors. However, only 36% of respondents agreed that partnerships should include 
local community partners. These data begin to suggest that, in practice, the partnerships are 
primarily state-driven. On exploring this further, it became evident that all but one respondent 
was a public sector actor. 
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Figure 6.7: 'Environmental partnerships should include local community partners' 
Source: Author's Questionnaire 
Researcher experiences through action research also led to the conclusion that most 
environmental partnerships included (and were often driven by) state actors (see also 6.2-2). 
This raised questions regarding the devolution of responsibility to the non-state level. It also 
suggested that partnership legitimacy is actually implied via the inclusion of state actors as 
opposed to that of non-state actors. However, it was not clear whether this framework was 
for legitimacy purposes, or if it was more due to the operational challenges of effective 
partnership-working. Indeed, some survey respondents doubted the practicalities of non-state 
/ local community partner inclusion: 
"Many environmental partnerships work hard to include local community partners, 
but few of them are able to consistently empower community partners to stay 
involved in an environmental partnership over the long-term and to regularly 
contribute to decisions" (Survey Respondent No. 37, QUANGO). 
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"I cannot think of an environmental partnership that demonstrates good practice by 
genuinely involving a range of community partners in all aspects of policy or project 
delivery" (Survey Respondent No. 39 ( third sector). 
"Sometimes difficult to actively involve partners in the project delivery, quite happy to 
attend meetings but leave the delivery to a few" (Survey Respondent No. 28, public 
sector). 
Interview feedback from, and action research within, the MTPN suggests that non-state actors 
find effective partnership-working a challenge unless they are directly funded to do so (which 
is rarely the case). Thus, this study suggests that, although community involvement is 
theoretically a pre-requisite of effective partnership-working, in practice, it is a challenge to 
deliver and also necessitates the inclusion of state actors to build EPPP legitimacy. Raco and 
Imrie (2000: 2196) conceptualised this rescaling of policy production and implementation as 
'active citizenship', where 'self-governing capacities are mobilised so that governance is 
conducted in and through the governed'. However, findings suggested that the degree to 
which non-state environmental partnerships 'self-govern' is unclear due to frequent state 
inclusion. 
6.4 Conclusion 
This chapter has considered the inclusivity, representativeness and democratic legitimacy of 
effective partnership-working through the empirical focus of the MTPN- It concluded that 
environmental partnerships theoretically dovetail with a deliberative (or 'discursive') 
democracy approach through their community involvement. it also highlighted environmental 
partnerships as expressions of self-governance through the greater involvement of citizens and 
participation in different areas of life within the community (Ferretti, 2006). Environmental 
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partnerships are, therefore, seen to potentially contribute to the democratic legitimacy of 
EPPP, but only if increased levels of engagement are secured i. e. stakeholders are awarded the 
opportunity to participate in decisions that affect them. Boonstra (2006) and Connelly et ol. 
(2006) concurred that it is the conceptual underpinning of environmental governance that 
EPPPs are shaped through these collaborative stakeholder processes to secure this legitimacy 
through community access to previously remote decision making processes. According to the 
UNDP (1997), it is this active participation by all stakeholders at all stages of the decision- 
making process that constitutes the core characteristic of 'good governance. 
Lowndes and Sullivan (2004: 56) also argued that enhanced public participation is seen as 
contributing to 'greater democratic legitimacy' for the public sector. However, although it is 
argued that effective partnership-working can secure greater legitimacy by widening 
community involvement, the process of engagement appears to be lacking. This study found 
numerous actor concerns regarding the lack of community involvement in EPPP formulation 
compared to delivery. it also concluded that non-state participation in EPPP formulation is not 
necessarily representative of wider stakeholder beliefs and requirements due to selective 
representation. I argue that this is a critical issue, with non-elected actors such as the larger 
NGOs and, increasingly, private sector actors, often assuming the role(s) of community 
representation or 'de facto government' (Ferguson, 2010: 168). Welch (2002) supported this 
finding with his distinction between the legitimacy of the governance system as a whole and 
the need for individual parts of it to be legitimate. This suggested that whilst legitimacy is a 
component of environmental governance, the effectiveness of any part of the system must 
also rest on its having sufficient legitimacy in itself, or, as Dryzek (2001: 662) argued: 
'Deliberative democracy requires that for a collective decision to be legitimate, it must 
be subject to the reflective acceptance of those subject to it, who should be able to 
participate in deliberation concerning the production of the decision. '
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The challenge continues to be the implementation of the governance process. In this case, it is 
the legitimisation of EPPP through the dilution of an otherwise state-centric approach to EPPP 
formulation, compared to the more 'bottom-up' approach of delivery. On the one hand, we 
live in a democratic state which (theoretically) legitimises EPPP decisions. On the other, it is 
argued that reflective assent is required by stakeholders to improve uptake and motivation. In 
the case of 'the environment', this is indeed a challenge, due to the complexity of 
environmental issues. Further challenges have been highlighted regarding the logistical 
challenges, including time and resource availabilities, of community-wide participation. These 
are not unique in a democracy, though do attract a sharper focus in the governance context. 
More recently, the improved availability of broadband in rural areas, coupled with the wider 
growth of the internet and associated communications and media applications, have provided 
a new and widely accessible tool for improved accessibility and wider public participation. 
Whilst the average citizen would clearly like to be heard, many respondents suggested that the 
ability to contribute remotely to the EPPP formulation process would be welcomed. 
To further contextualise research, environmental partnership legitimacy can be gained through 
targeting appropriate levels of representation from the stakeholder clusters situated within 
the four levels of the Policy Implementation Continuum, i. e. whereby sufficient representation 
is required from each level through improved communication and feedback mechanisms 
(increased use of the internet seemed a popular idea). Thus, it has been suggested that the 
legitimisation of EPPP (through public participation) should be 'designed-in' and not 'assumed- 
in' (Lowndes and Sullivan, 2004). Partnerships are mechanisms for facilitating relationships 
between different stakeholders, but the question of democratic legitimacy of partnerships 
remains a fundamental one, especially with the move to give more power to unelected (and 
often autonomous or semi-autonomous) actors. Thus, power relations are changing, with the 
traditionally more powerful state actors engaging with non-state actors leading to tensions 
between and within different political and societal levels. The increasing complexity associated 
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with multi-actor state / non-state partnerships also inherently risks unclear decision structures 
and diminishes accountability. The transparency of internal management practices, therefore, 
becomes critical to maintain the support of the stakeholders as well as advancing legitimacy 
claims (Nijhof & Bruijn, 2008). 
The next chapter explores the existing debate over accountability and the growth of non- 
elected actors, especially with the recent increased focus on the third sector, social 
enterprises, and the hollowing out of the state. Accountability is multi-faceted, with 
'operational' and 'financial' accountability both becoming essential components of effective 
partnership-working. Questions are often raised, however, regarding the efficacy and 
enforcement of the reporting structures put in place to monitor and review the expenditure of 
state funds, often by non-state actors. As such, the empirical focus of the MTPN provides a 
range of often exclusive data against which existing knowledge and theories can be compared. 
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Chapter 7: The Accountability of Environmental Partnerships 
7.1 Introduction 
Hemmati (2002: 63) argued that in the context of multi-stakeholder partnerships, 
accountability means to employ 'transparent, democratic mechanisms of engagement, 
position-finding, decision-ma king, implementation, monitoring and evaluation'. She also 
asserted that the accountability of all members of the partnership towards each other is one 
primary goal of designing and conducting partnerships. This study has also conceptually placed 
the provision of accountability as the final step towards effective partnership-working (see 
Figure 4.1). By provision, I refer to actors adopting operational and financial accountability 
mechanisms to enable the monitoring and review of their activities by stakeholders, as well as 
statutory channels such as trustees and members. 
This accountability framework means that actors are held accountable for (i) the meeting of 
operational alms and objectives and (ii) appropriate management of funds. These are the 
subjects of accountability, whilst the second dimension of accountability is the mechanisms by 
which the subjects of accountability are achieved (Goodin, 2003). These mechanisms or 
'regimes' are argued by Mackinnon (2000) as the tools of 'state managerialism', or state 
initiatives to retain control over non-state actors. Jepson (2005), however, contends that such 
accountability streams are an essential component of environmental governance if public trust 
and partnership legitimacy are to be gained. Accountability has gained new relevance in the 
environmental sector due to the sub-contracting of programme delivery to non-elected, multi- 
actor partnerships. These partnerships have varying degrees of autonomy and accountability, 
from which stakeholders can find it difficult to gain operational and financial information. 
Whilst this is essential to effective environmental governance, compromises must still be 
sought between ensuring the accountability of non-elected actors and the merits of the 
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bottom-up framework of some modern day environmental programmes (Imrie and Raco 1999, 
Mackinnon 2000,2002). 
This chapter explores the accountability framework(s) of the MTPN. It analyses how 
accountability regimes are on occasion used as control mechanisms by the state, whilst also 
often lacking in objectivity due to lack of external verification. The following case studies are 
used to demonstrate how some of these regimes (in particular, state-driven ones) can lead to 
bureaucratic drag and an audit culture (Jepson, 2005). They also highlight how non-state 
funders can adopt a more qualitative approach, thus often leading to increased outputs and 
more sustainable outcomes. The case study of the VCM then provides a wider example of an 
entrepreneurial approach, with its (this research argues) lack of both operational and financial 
accountability. 
7.2 Rights of Authority, Power Structures, and Transparency 
7.2.1 Accountability in the Environmental Context 
Accountability is defined by Mulgan (2000: 255) as a 'process of being called to account to 
some authority for one's actions', or a process of 'giving an account. Mulgan argued that 
accountability is characterised by 'externality, social interaction and exchange and rights of 
authority', and that these rights of authority imply rights to demand answers and impose 
sanctions (see also Erkkila, 2007). With accountability traditionally taking a financial format, 
this study found the environmental sector to be no exception, with quarterly and annual 
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reporting on grant expenditure the norm . When asked if 
'partners are unaccountable 
63 Such reporting typically takes the format of detailing the achievement (or not) of milestones, aims and objectives 
set out in the funding agreement, plus breakdown of expenditure to ensure agreed use of funds. 
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regarding grant funding expenditure', 71% of survey respondents disagreed, suggesting that 













Figure 7.1: 'Many partners in our partnerships are unaccountable regarding grant funding 
expenditure' 
Source: Author's Questionnaire 
It is no great revelation that grant recipients must account for their outputs and expenditure, 
but the potential for partnership hierarchies between donors and recipients was highlighted by 
a number of MTPN actors, thus casting doubts on whether environmental partnerships can 
ever truly work on the basis of equality and balance (Balloch and Taylor, 2001). This doubt was 
underlined by the comment by a survey respondent that "A partnership needs to establish a 
constitution and ensure that the elected representatives in the partnership report back to 
parent organisations to maintain credible mandate" (Survey Respondent No. 28, public sector). 
The mention of 'parent organisations' implies authority and, therefore, a hierarchical approach 
of top-down control. Ultimately, argued Balloch and Taylor (2001: 39), 'The most powerful 
partners are in a position to determine the time frames and set the agendas, too often failing 
to provide communities with the resources to challenge them'. 
64 13% had 'No opinion', though analysis showed the nature of their role precluding them from financial activities. 
Further analysis showed all but one of their organisations was involved in financial reporting to grant giving bodies. 
190 
Strongly Agree No Opinion Disagree Strongly 
All ree Disagree 
Although partnerships are designed to reduce excessive 'producer' power by sharing or giving 
power to communities, findings suggested that it can be hard to achieve due to accountability 
frameworks also being used as control mechanisms by the state, instead of purely reporting 
structures. It was suggested by some (and reinforced through action research with Moor 
Trees) that transparency can also become an issue, with actors occasionally withholding 
operational and financial data to maintain a more flexible approach to address often complex 
environmental issues. indeed, it was found in a number of cases within the MTPN that funds 
were not always utilised as per the funding agreement. However, accountability and 
transparency are considered to be the two main constituent components of legitimacy, so 
need to be addressed accordingly (Davidson and Lockwood, 2008). Thus, it could be argued 
that accountability conveys an image of transparency and trustworthiness (77% of survey 
respondents agreed that their partnership work was transparent in the management and 











Figure 7.2: 'Our partnership work is transparent in the management and reporting of 
finances' 
Source: Author's Questionnaire 
It was, however, suggested by some interviewees that this was often not the case. "We often 
report to funders what they want to hear, as long as it fits more or less within the funding 
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'agreement. We tend to stay away from government and the Lottery" (Interviewee No. 28, 
third sector). Another interviewee (No. 20, third sector) argued that: 
"Some funclers are more 'picky' than others when it comes to our accounting for grant 
expenditure. The best ones are the ones that are more interested in overall outcomes 
as opposed to the government and European funding bodies that want us to account 
for every penny through receipts and even bank statements. We do get around this 
though! " 
Interviewee No. 8 (QUANGO) further suggested that: 
"We find that we are often able to use project funding for more core activities than 
originally planned, though this is not necessarily communicated to funders. This then 
saves time. As long as we don't lie and outcomes are more or less as predicted, they 
are happy. 
These comments echoed other opinions from within the sector, with my experiences and 
observations also noting significant bias towards funders with less draconian reporting 
measures (this point is explored further in Section 7.4). It could also be argued that a more 
qualitative approach to reporting assists partnership-working. This argument is supported by 
the above interviewee comments. In this context, I also refer to my own experiences and 
observations of the MTPN where actors have deliberately diluted the detail in reports due to 
their actual outputs differing from those planned. It was suggested by a number of actors that 
this concurs with discussions regarding the benefits of non-state partnership-working, i. e. that 
they are able to adopt a more flexible and dynamic approach due to their semi-autonomous 
nature, and that a more outcome-oriented reporting systems would be more appropriate. 
Nijhof & Bruijn (2008: 163), however, contend that with the 'increasing complexity of multi- 
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level and multi-actor partnerships, the transparency of internal management practices 
becomes critical to maintain the support of the stakeholders as well as advancing legitimacy 
claims'. Transparency is not enough to constitute accountability in the context of this study 
because it does not necessarily involve scrutiny by a public forum (Bovens, 2007). It is scrutiny 
'by a specific forum' that leads to further discussion regarding the new power structures that 
can be created by such forums, or funding bodies, and how they can play a role in the MTPN- 
7.2.2 'Partnership Principals': power structures within the MTPN 
Woodhill et aL (1992, in Wilson, 2004: 472) argued that the 'change from a top-down to a 
bottom-up regime of policy-making can be threatening to existing institutions and power 
structures, and that there is a risk that those with the power and resources attempt to use 
community participation for their own ends and organisational goals and hence are not 
genuine about empowerment. Evidence suggests that within the environmental partnership 
context and in contrast to the proposed heterarchy of a governance system, donors can 
assume rights of authority over grantees through a top-down approach. This can then lead to 
the reforming of the 'top-down' power structures within partnerships that the governance 
approach is meant to address, with the balance of power between partners shifting towards 
the funding partner. Despite this potential shift towards new, top-down inter-actor power 
structures, however, 77% of survey respondents considered the partners with whom they 









Figure 7.3: 'Many partners in our partnerships are financially self-governing' 
Source: Author's Questionnaire 
On further examination through interviews it became clear that whilst most organisations 
managed their own budgets6', this 'self-governing' was for the most part referring to internal 
processes, with an external management role then often assumed by grant funders. I have 
termed this external role as the 'Partnership Principal'. Further examination suggested that 
most partnerships have their own internal power structure even when they are remaining 
independent of state control. Where this becomes more complex, however, is where the state 
is involved in the partnership as funder, i. e. the state becomes the partnership principal by 
once again assuming control through grant accountability control mechanisms (see Section 
7.3). 
Survey analysis showed that 48% of partnerships were supported by government grants (with 
78% of the 38% that disagreed being state actors who are govern me nt-f u ncled, though not in 
grant format). This suggests that a high percentage of environmental partnerships retain an 
element of state control, despite the apparent part-devolution of power to the non-state level, 
resulting in a complex state / non-state, power/ competency sharing agreement . 
65 Those that did not were either fully managed branches, or linked associations of other actors. 
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Figure 7A 'The partnerships our organisation has been involved in are usually supported by 
Government grants' 
Source: Author's Questionnaire 
More detailed analysis of state involvement in environmental partnerships also revealed 
interesting issues about the accountability of state-driven partnerships. As one interviewee (a 
third sector employee who wished to remain anonymous) stated "All this monitoring and 
review is all well and good, but partnerships run by the likes of Natural England and AONBs 
don't seem to have to answer to anyone but themselves as they are, effectively, the 
government. " This point related to the researcher's action research experiences from within 
the MTPN. Having been involved in a number of state-led environmental partnerships, it 
seemed that these partnerships often lacked external accountability. Further, attempts to gain 
information on financial and operational data were met with varying degrees of bureaucratic 
drag and a lack of transparency. One example is the Access to Nature case study highlighted in 
the next section. 
7.2.3 The Case for External Accountability: Natural England's 'Access to Nature' Programme 
The A2N programme was an open grants programme run by Natural England with f25m 
funding from the Big Lottery Fund's Changing Spaces initiative. It was found that Natural 
England (or one of its board members) assumed the role of partnership principal in each 
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project that it funded. The board consisted of a range of third sector and QUANGO actors. In 
addition to the issues of selective inclusivity (see also Section 6.3.1) and subsequent biased 
awarding of grants to board or state actors (see table 7.2.2), doubts were raised by a number 
of MTPN actors regarding its accountability. The primary concern regarding lack of 
accountability was the fact that 65% of the funding was awarded to either board member or 
state actors. This raised questions concerning the accountability of grant recipients to Natural 
England (as programme manager) as it was (i) state-driven and (ii) included a board populated 
by representatives of their own organisations. "I don't understand how an organisation that 
includes board members of many of the organisations that it should be monitoring can work 
effectively and without bias", said one MTPN actor. Another MTPN actor stated, "This is typical 
of this group of organisations, these types of programmes are always dominated by them. It 
seems to be an increasingly exclusive club". These points were raised by the researcher with 
both the Big Lottery Fund (BLF) Changing Spaces programme (funder) and Natural England. 
A reply was received from the BLIF programme manager (Mike Houghton 66), which included the 
comments: 
"The Access to Nature programme is managed by Natural England under terms set out 
in a delegated agreement. BIG Lottery Fund monitors performance against the terms 
and conditions of the agreement. The delegated agreement also includes a process for 
investigating and responding to complaints that relate to the Access to Nature 
programme. I have reviewed your letter and note the seriousness of the allegations 
but at this stage you must follow the Natural England complaints process before we 
can consider any form of intervention. " 
The Natural England Executive Director (Jim Smylie 67) subsequently replied: 
66 Letter of consent regarding publication of name and letter was received. 
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"The Access to Nature Consortium does contain organisations eligible to apply for 
grant. The Consortium Steering Group guides the development of the programme, but 
has no part in assessing or deciding on individual applications. In order to guard 
against unintentional bias we will continue to monitor the overall picture of 
applications and awards to ensure that we remain focused on the scheme priorities 
and distribute grants fairly. " 
This states that board members apparently play no direct role in the decision-making process, 
but then confirms that the programme is self-regulating. The closing statement of the Natural 
England letter included: "If you feel that I have not adequately addressed your concerns in this 
letter you may ask your Member of Parliament to refer the matter to the Parliamentary 
Ombudsman. " This lays out a clear pathway for advancing complaints to the highest level, but 
working with a local MP and then the Parliamentary Ombudsman can involve complex 
bureaucracy and a long drawn-out process that the average individual or organisation is 
unlikely to be able to resource. More importantly, Natural England refers to the Ombudsman 
as the accounting body, when the delegated agreement is in fact between Natural England and 
the Big Lottery Fund, thus suggesting a confused accountability regime where the complaint 
should have been referred back to the Big Lottery Fund, as opposed to the Member of 
Parliament and / or Ombudsman route. 
The A2N case study gives an example of a high profile environmental partnership lacking an 
independent accountability regime or transparenCY68 . Thus, it provides a case 
for more robust 
and openly accessible 'checks and balances' that ensure unbiased, legitimate and fair use of 
public funds. 
67 Letter of consent regarding publication of name and letter was received. 
68 Board membership and accountability structure details were unpublished and hard to secure. 
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7.3 Managerial Technologies 
7.3.1 'Checks and Balances': a Management of Expectations, or Formal Channels of Control? 
Checks and balances aim to ensure no single actor becomes too powerful by distributing key 
powers across different organisations, i. e. different actors are empowered to prevent actions 
by partners. Goodin (2003: 381) argued that 'Different branches of government representing 
different interests, each with substantial (if not quite veto) power over the other, might well 
produce outcomes that are in the general interest'. Checks and balances in the environmental 
sector are generally implemented via monitoring and review procedures. These were widely 
supported by sector actors, with 85% of survey respondents agreeing that they are important 
for effective partnership-working. Survey Respondent No. 32 (a QUANGO) commented that "if 
systems are put in place properly and early on for monitoring and review it should not become 
an administrative burden to be accountable, and should be intrinsic to good partnership- 
working and practice". The presence of partnership monitoring and review systems in their 
own organisations was confirmed by 72% of survey respondents. 
Figure 7.5: 'in our organisation, monitoring and review is an important process to assess 
partnership success' 
Source: Author's Questionnaire 
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Figure 7.6: 'Partnership-working in our organisation usually includes a clear monitoring and 
review process' 
Source: Author's Questionnaire 
To implement further checks and balances, the environmental sector has adapted the 
'legislative, executive and judicial' governmental framework to 'aims and objectives, board and 
ombudsman'. Taking A2N as an example, this resulted in the Natural England monitoring aims 
and objectives, board members holding executive powers, and the Parliamentary Ombudsman 
holding judicial powers. Moor Trees worked through its constitution, trustees and the Charities 
Commission, respectively. 
Checks and Balances 
Government Environmental Sector A2N Moor Trees 
Legislative Aims and Objectives Natural England Constitution 
Executive Board Board Members Trustees 
Judicial Ombudsman Parliamentary Ombudsman 
Charities 
Commission 
Table 7.1: Checks and Balances adapted to the Environmental Sector 
Source: Author 
Survey Respondent No. 69 (private sector) stated that "Monitoring and evaluation are often 
overlooked, but a vital part of any partnership process", whilst Interviewee No. 13 ( third 
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sector) commented that "We ensure that all reporting and management for every project are 
carried out thoroughly". Further acknowledgement of the importance of this process was 
made by Survey Respondent No. 48 ( third sector) who stated that "Monitoring and review are 
important to ensure financial targets are met and spend is as planned". Survey Respondent 
No. 449 (third sector) also commented that "It is important that we have full audit processes 
in place to be able to deliver in today's market place, programmes can be large, in excess of 
f 10m. You don't get money these days if you can't show what you did for it and where it 
went". This financial accountability also aims to improve legitimacy and democratic credibility 
through stakeholder engagement in the reporting process. Findings from various MTPN 
partnerships observed suggested, however, that selectively inclusive networks and inter- 
partner bias does exist, thus concurring with Stoker (1998: 23) that 'all networks are, to a 
certain extent, exclusive and tend to promote the interests of those involved'. 
PPP formulation comes before delivery, with openness and transparency sought during the 
associated decision-making process (Klijn and Skelcher, 2007). A2N provided a further example 
of poor application during the programme formulation process (see Section 6.2.2 re: lack of 
sector consultation). Paavola (2007: 100) argued that these complex governance solutions 
I create a system of checks and balances which disperses power, creates transparency and 
accountability, and fosters democracy in environmental matters. Mackinnon (2002), however, 
contended that tensions exist between the community that is supposed to be 'empowered' 
and the existence of regulatory mechanisms such as targeting and audit. This argument was 
explored in the survey and interviews. Survey Respondent No. 72 (private sector) made an 
interesting point regarding how the continuation of state control is bringing new overheads to 
non-state actors, which use some of the budgets originally allocated for specific projects: 
69 Project Director of a E11.75m BILF-funded biodiversity project (letter of consent received). 
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"The government sees partnerships as a way of reducing central spending on 
environmental issues. However, the government's paranoid need to monitor and 
control partnerships leads to red tape and admin costs absorbing some of the 
increased fund allocation. " 
When asked about the effectiveness of accountability structures in reporting operational and 
financial data, however, 81% of survey respondents agreed that a clear structure was in place 
in the partnership within which they worked. This does not necessarily support the idea of 










Figure 7.7: 'Our partnerships provide a clear structure detailing who is accountable for the 
delivery of a project's aims and objectives' 
Source: Author's Questionnaire 
The retention of state control was further highlighted'o by various interviewees, with my own 
observations also confirming the existence of 'managerial technologies' (Logan and Wekerle, 
2008; Lockie, 2009; Mackinnon, 2000). Further investigation was carried out to assess if these 
accountability regimes were consistent across the environment sector by focusing on the 
different categories of funder, which, findings suggest, often became 'partnership principal'. 
These findings are discussed in the following section. 
70 Additional points were made suggesting resource-intensive administration regimes impacting on environmental 
partnerships' abilities to focus on core aims and objectives (see Section 7.4.1). 
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7.3.2 Managerial Technologies and the MTPN 
Mackinnon (2000: 2903) defines 'managerial technologies' as budgetary management, audit 
and targeting. He argued that they provide the state with the capacity to shape local 
institutional practice and that they also ensure compliance with certain norms and 
expectations. Findings suggest that these technologies exist in the environmental sector 
primarily as a result of funding awarded by the state to non-state actors. 
MTPN funders; are classified into five categories (see Table 7.2), with members often receiving 
funds from more than one category. This is prevalent where government or European funds 
are involved as they rarely fund 100% of the project costs and usually require a degree of 
matched funding (up to 75%) through either additional cash or in-kind contributions. This 
diversity of funding sources has led to varying accountability mechanisms, with some bodies 
requesting more data (often both qualitative and quantitative) than others. Interviewee No. 8 
(a QUANGO) stated "It massively varies depending on the project and the funders". Another 
third sector Interviewee (No. 15) commented that "Our projects usually receive money from a 
variety of funds. They all ask for feedback, but the amount of information they want varies 
greatly. The government, of course, always wants the most "- 
Source Example Funding level 
1 European Union European Social Fund UptO50% 
2 Government Community Boost Fund UptO50% 
3 Govern me nt-fu nded Programme Landfill Tax Credit Scheme Upt090% 
141 National Lottery I Big Lottery Fund UptO100% 
151 Charitable Trusts/ Foundations I Esm6e Fairbairn Foundation UptO100% 
Table 7.2: Environmental Partnership Funding Categories 
Source: Author 
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This diversity of funders means that there is no standardised feedback or accountability 
mechanism to monitor and review the performance of environmental partnerships. This is not 
necessarily desirable, but there is, however, a common aim amongst funders to ensure that 
grant recipients use funds as directed by the aims and objectives laid out by the grant 
agreement. This is then usually communicated to their stakeholder groups, i. e. trustees, 
members, primary donors or regulatory body / ombudsman. The data requested by funders 
varies greatly, including quantitative operational outputs, qualitative project outcomes, proofs 
of expenditure (receipts, bank statements) and, occasionally, beneficiary statements. 
Frequency of reporting can also vary from quarterly, annually, to the 'end of funding term'. 
This highlights different approaches by different funders. 
State-originated funds (European Union, government, government-funded programmes) 
typically demand more complex and diverse data, perhaps due to their own reporting regimes 
with the Audit Commission and / or the government department from whom the funds were 
sourced. Funds from the National Lottery demand slightly less reporting. Unlike state funders 
which do not vary reporting requirements with grant amounts, the National Lottery (in the 
case of the environmental sector, almost exclusively the Big Lottery Fund programmes) do vary 
with the size of grant. The Awards for All programme, for example, funds up to FlOk and only 
requires an 'end of grant' period report summarising actual against projected expenditure, 
plus proof of expenditure via receipts and, occasionally, bank statements for larger capital 
items (Awards for All, 2009). This kind of report is typically written by the Project Manager or 
individual with responsibility for the project for which the grant was awarded. Larger Lottery 
grants such as the Reaching Communities programme (up to E500k) require more detailed 
reporting, usually on a quarterly basis (Big Lottery Fund, 2009). The Lottery can, however, 
account for the extra time and resources required by the grant recipient in meeting these 
requirements by providing extra funding. The least demanding on monitoring and review are 
the charitable trusts. Many expect only an end of grant term report, often written in an 
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informal structure offering a *mainly qualitative assessment of the work done. Others will ask 
for additional figures to measure success of the project against projected outputs. These are, 
however, often not followed up. Some funders in this category will not stipulate any review, 
nor do they monitor activities. One funder said: "We are too small to follow up all the grants 
that we give, so we just ask that organisations let us know how the work is going when they 
can" - in contrast to the state and some of the Lottery programmes. 
85% of the partnerships within the MTPN included an element of state funding. it was also 
observed that state funders demand the strictest accountability. Mackinnon (2000) argued 
that these regimes provide the state with the reach and capability to monitor the activities of 
local agencies and communities. What remains unclear, however, is at what point 'monitoring' 
becomes 'control'. I suggest that this occurs where the state moves from a reactive to a 
proactive position within a partnership. For example, a partnership that has received state 
funding will provide operational and financial data so that the state can monitor (reactively) 
progress. If / when the state takes a proactive role, i. e. by including itself in programme 
delivery, then this becomes a control situation, where the state has assumed the role of 
partnership principal. With the state apparently still in a position of power in many 
partnerships, the reality of the shift from local government to local governance also remains 
open to question. Mackinnon (2000) suggested that these technologies are utilised by the 
state to counter local power, whilst Ward and McNicholas (1998) also suggested that these 
managerial technologies enable state agencies to render local communities visible and 
calculable as 'objects' of government. 
I suggest that the audit culture intrinsic to state-funded partnerships has been legitimated 
through the rhetoric of accountability, and that non-state actors are often engaged in the 
delivering of national EPPP objectives as opposed to local initiatives, i. e. local environmental 
governance continues to be underpinned by state structures, thus weakening the power and 
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influence of non-state actorS71 (Jessop, 1997; MacLeod and Goodwin, 1999). These suggestions 
were explored further through the empirical foci of a number of case studies. 
This chapter now explores different accountability frameworks through the case studies of the 
South West Regional Development Agency's Community Boost Fund (CBF), the Will Charitable 
Trust and the Voluntary Carbon Offset (VCM) sector. These case studies present examples of 
state, non-state and market-based initiatives, respectively. The VCM sector, in particular, 
presents a case of environmental governance in which the management of an environmental 
problem is partly devolved to the market and to the individual but in which the state 
eventually establishes the rules under which markets operate. 
7.4 Hierarchical Accountability and the Community Boost Fund 
Jepson (2005: 517) argued that 'bureaucratic drag' is where environmental actors 'come under 
pressure from regulators and donors to expand performance metrics and reporting, which will 
lead to a raft of new and costly bureaucracy that will divert scarce resources from the cause 
and do little to enhance efficiency and impact. This section presents the case study of the CBF 
as an example of such a donor. The CBF was run by Devon Renaissance, a not-for-profit 
partnership of private sector, local authorities and community-based organisations. Funded 
primarily by the South West Regional Development Agency, its role was to help create 
prosperity and jobs and improve access to services in rural areas. It was a small scale capital 
funding scheme (total fund size : E225,000) offered by Devon Renaissance, aimed at creating 
and supporting sustainable communities across rural Devon". it did this by supporting the 
delivery of services to hard-to-reach rural communitieS73, working with groups that were 
aiming to increase their own social, economic and / or environmental sustainability. The fund 
71 Jepson (2005) also argued that inappropriate accountability methodologies might dilute the independent change- 
agent grassroots roles offered to previously marginalised actor networks by the governance approach. 72 Based and delivering within East, Mid and North Devon, the South Hams, Teignbridge, Torridge and West Devon. 73 Defined by the South West Regional Development Agency as settlements offewer than 10,000 people. 
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was open to applications from 'not for profit' (third sector) organisations. It was also able to 
accept applications from public sector organisations working "as part of a wider partnership'. 
This presented a similar case to A2N, which enabled funds intended for non-state benefit to 
be, on occasion, awarded to state actors. CBF grants were available from E5,000 to E15,000, 
with the fund contributing a maximum of 50% of the total project costs. Applicants had to 
source the remaining match funding from non-state sources, leading to multiple funding 
streams (as discussed in Section 7.3.1). Stipulations were made by the fund that only 10% of 
match funding could be supplied by in-kind contributions, with the balance to be met by cash 
contributions (grants from charitable trusts were acceptable). The CBF stipulated that projects 
had to address local needs, fit with local plans and strategies and demonstrate long term 
financial sustainability (see Appendix F). 
Supported by 
devon renaissance 
working for rural prosperity 
South West of England 
Regional Development Agency 
Figure 7.8: Devon Renaissance and South West Regional Development Agency Logos 
Source: Author 
Partners also had to prove community consultation during development. This suggests the 
fund sought to legitimise its funded projects through popular assent. A CBF member of staff 
concurred that "If a grant applicant can prove community need then we feel happier that, if 
we give it money, then it will become more of a success and become more sustainable in the 
long term". Action research74 and MTPN actor experiences7s howed that the community 
consultation requirements per project were high compared to the relatively low level of grant 
offered. Thus, despite the CBF Applicant Guidance document stating that the 'application 
74 As Director of Moor Trees, I successfully applied to the Community Boost Fund for a E15,000 grant to part-fund 
the development of a Moor Trees tree nursery site. The community consultation Included a focus group, 
questionnaire, and letters of support. During the consultation process it was found that many community members 
also expected to benefit directly by becoming part of the project as opposed to merely a contributing party. 
75 1 consufted with a number of MTPN actors who had received CFB grants. 
206 
process reflects the scale of the scheme and has been designed to be as straightforward as 
possible' and that 'The need for applications to be turned around quickly has been reflected in 
the scheme's assessment process', the scale of community consultation required proved to be 
problematic and time consuming due to the amount of detail required by the CBF. 
On further examination, it became clear that this detail was required by Devon Renaissance for 
reporting to the South West Regional Development Agency, to which it was accountable. On 
the one hand, project legitimacy was sought through community consultation; on the other, 
the evidence collection regime set by the fund was considered to be excessive by MTPN actors 
who had worked with Devon Renaissance. "We were only going to apply for f: 6,500, but in the 
end decided not to because of the amount of data they wanted about community 
consultation", stated one QUANGO actor. Another, a third sector employee, said: "We also 
decided against it because of the amount of evidence they wanted, plus their monitoring and 
review process is also notoriously time consuming. " A public sector employee (Interviewee No. 
4) also argued that "There is now too much accountability which has replaced trust in project 
management. Partnerships cannot take the risks they need to be truly successful. " It became 
apparent, therefore, that state managerial technologies were already in place before the grant 
had even been awarded (through the requirement for community consultation), and that 
funds designed to support localised sustainability initiatives had also become guided by state 
aims and objectives. The CBF 'audit culture' continued when monitoring the projects they had 
awarded grants to, with requirements for the projects to track outcomes in a way that some 
MTPN actors argued resulted in high administration costs and reduced time spent by project 
officers on front-line delivery (see also Jepson, 2005). Survey feedback indicated that this was 
indicative of the wider funding environment, with 81% of survey respondents agreeing that 
funder performance metrics increased administration costs due to the time spent on 










Figure 7.9: Tunder-imposed performance metrics are increasing administration costs due to 
the time spent on monitoring and review' 
Source: Author's Questionnaire 
However, with CBF funding originating from state sources, i. e. UK tax-payer and the European 
Union, it is realistic to expect a robust financial accountability framework. Indeed, findings 
confirmed that CBF's tracking of projected project outputs was strictly enforced as a tool to 
I assess project success'. To do this, guidance was issued against which formal reporting was 
requested on a quarterly basis. This included outcomes such as beneficiary session and 
attendance monitoring, and community feedback including questionnaires, consultation, 
observations and interviews. A data collection methodology to enable this also had to be 
approved during the application process and was a major consideration when assessing grant 
applications. 
Most MTPN actors argued that this placed unnecessary pressures on already strained capacity, 
though some contended that such regimes are beneficial. Third sector Interviewee No. 20 
stated that "Sometimes funcler-imposed performance metrics encourage good practice that 
might otherwise be too easy to slip out of in business of day to day work", and QUANGO 
Interviewee (No. 8) agreed that "it is a necessary evil that we all have to do to keep getting the 
funding we need. It does also help to keep some of the larger projects on track spending- 
208 
Strongly Agree No Opinion Disagree Strongly 
Agree Disagree 
wise". Interviewee No. 1 (public sector) also made the arguably profound comment that 
"People have to realise that all money coming from the government has to be accounted for at 
the end of the day. The general public demand accountability and transparency, so the 
appropriate frameworks need to be in place to ensure such". This last comment highlights the 
obvious requirement for money to be accounted for, and the conundrum of accountability vs. 
flexibility. 
The CBF case study provides an example of a state funding programme with a financial 
accountability regime that many considered to be burdensome and draconian. Authors 
including Greer (2001), Jepson (2005), Jessop (1997) and MacLeod and Goodwin (1999) argued 
that such regimes suppress local innovation and autonomy, and undermine the inclusive 
governance approach. Accountability and transparency are, however, essential components of 
partnership-working, so a compromise needs to be sought whereby innovation and dynamism 
are encouraged through semi-autonomous partnerships that enable localised approaches to 
national or even international objectives. To explore this concept further, I examined how 
alternative funding sources provide such a solution whilst also building new, community-based 
power structures that suffer from less state intervention through 'holistic accountability'. 
7.5 Holistic Accountability and the Will Charitable Trust 
Within the environmental sector there is a clear divide between state and non-state funds. The 
associated accountability regimes are different, with state funding typically adopting a 
hierarchical, quantitative format that promotes accountability to state donors (Edwards and 
Hulme, 2002; Najam, 1996). Conversely, non-state funders of environmental partnerships 
(such as charitable trusts) typically adopt an holistic approach 76 to accounting by requesting a 
more qualitative outcome-driven approach as opposed to a quantitative output regime. In the 
76 Holistic accountability is also seen as broadening accountability, including actual and potential impacts on a range 
of less powerful stakeholder groups (O'Dwyer and Unerman, 2008). 
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context of this research the term holistic refers to the reporting to the sector as a whole, or, to 
all stakeholders as opposed to individuol ports. Reporting is also carried out via more 
qualitative as opposed to quantitative methods. This conceptualisation is further explored in 
Chapter 8. Taking the Will Charitable Trust (WCT) as a case study", this holistic approach was 
analysed to understand how different monitoring and review regimes are applied whilst 
seeking accountability within an environmental governance framework. WCT was established 
by private philanthropy to make grants to other charities working in the: 
Care of and services for blind people, and the prevention and cure of blindness; 
Care of people with learning disabilities in a way that provides lifelong commitment, a 
family environment and the maximum choice of activities and lifestyle; 
" Care of and services for people suffering from cancer, and their families; 
" Conservation of the countryside. 
(Will Charitable Trust, 2009a). 
WCT carries out one round of funding per year, with a submission deadline of 31't August and 
decisions made by the end of November. Moor Trees has received three grants over four 
years; E5,000, E15,000 and f15,000. Each grant was towards the salary of the Woodlands 
Officer, so fell under the WCT 'conservation of the countryside' programme. Of particular 
interest to this study was the difference in WCT`s monitoring and review requirements 
compared to CBF. WCT stipulate only a short update on the project funded to be submitted by 
the application deadline the following year i. e. 31" August. No further updates are required 
unless specifically requested, and none were requested in any of the three grants awarded to 
MT. WCT does, however, assume that project reporting is disseminated amongst recipient 
stakeholders, including direct and indirect beneficiaries. 
77 It should be noted that OPEP funders Bromley Trust and the Tudorl. ankellyChase Foundation are further 
examples of this type of accountability, though state-funded Dartmoor Sustainable Development Fund adopts a 
more hierarchical approach (see Section 4.4). 
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I discussed the varying approaches of funders with the Moor Trees' board of trustees. One 
commented, "Will is great to work with. Their application process is quite tough, but this is 
partly due to the highly competitive funding sector and their wanting to ensure that the 
organisations to whom they grant money will spend it wisely and as per the grant agreement 
as they do not monitor projects nearly as closely as government funders". Third sector 
Interviewee No. 15 concurred "We have worked with them for a number of years now and 
rarely (if ever) hear from them apart from acknowledgement of our end of year report". This 
point was confirmed by a WCT representative during a visit to Moor Trees who said "We try to 
visit all our new applicants. That way we try to get a feel for how they are going to work and if 
they really are going to use the money as agreed". 
CBF and WCT were both considered to be representative of their classifications, as CBF funds 
originated from the state's South West Regional Development Agency, and WCT funds 
originated from a (deceased) philanthropic donor. The funds offered similar levels of funding 
of approximately E15,000. However, a clear divide was identified between their accountability 
regimes, with their associated monitoring and review processes (CBF being hierarchical and 
WCT being holistic) requiring significantly different levels of resource allocation by the grant 
recipient. Whilst the hierarchical approach typically demanded a more complex set of data, the 
holistic approach required wider dissemination of a less complex dataset. My experiences 
gained through working with both funds concluded that this wider dissemination of grant 
expenditure and project outcomes, whilst initially considered to increase workload, was 
typically run in parallel with other activities such as annual reports, AGMs, conferences and 
marketing initiatives, thus significantly reducing workload. 
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Funder Source of Funds 
Access to Nature National Lottery 
Big Lottery Fund National Lottery 
Bromley Trust Philanthropy 
Dartmoor Sustainable Development Fund Central Government 
Esm6e Fairbairn Foundation Philanthropy 
JP Getty Charitable Trust Philanthropy 
South West Foundation European Union 
Teignbridge Leader Plus European Union 
Woodland Trust Charity 
Table 7.3: MTPN Funders 
Source: author 
Through continuously triangulating my research findings, I compared the CBF and WCT case 
studies with other funders with whom I had worked as practitioner and observed as 
researcher. Table 7.3 provides a non-exhaustive and non-representative sample of the wider 
funder population. It also shows that funds originated from private (listed as philanthropic), 
public sector, European Union and National Lottery sources. On analysing the MTPN funder 
population I found that the differing CBF and WCT accountability regimes were representative 
of state and non-state originated funds respectively. The holistic accountability required by 
non-state funders provided greater legitimacy and transparency due to its engagement with a 
wider group of stakeholderS78. In contrast, the typically state-driven hierarchical accountability 
requirements to a single (usually central government or European Union) entity or small 
number of stakeholders resulted in reduced transparency due to the lower number of report 
recipients (O'Dwyer and Unerman, 2008). 
7.6 Zero Accountability and the Moor Trees Voluntary Carbon Offset Programme 
In addition to the analyses and discussions regarding hierarchical and holistic accountability 
frameworks, this study has conceptualised a further 'zero accountability' approach that has 
79 These stakeholders include groups, individuals and / or communities directly and indirectly impacted by 
partnership activities (Ebrahim, 2003; Najam, 1996). 
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resulted from a new wave of market-based approaches (Bakker, 2009; Bumpus and Liverman 
2008; Castree 2006,2009; Liverman 2004; Morris, 2008). This approach can be conceptualised 
as actors that are not formally accountable to any external body. Typically a private sector 
scenario, this study found that third sector actors are working with an increasing degree of 
autonomy in such frameworks as a result of new income streams generated from Full Cost 
Recovery 79 and trading initiatives. Moor Trees is an example of one of these third sector actors 
as a result of its diversification into accredited education and training, research, corporate 
responsibility, and more recently, the provision of a carbon offset programme to the VCM (as 
detailed in Section 4.8). 
This section analyses the accountability of the programme and is split into two sections. The 
first section (7.6.1) analyses the UK government's Quality Assurance Scheme that has been 
developed as a voluntary initiative for subscription by VCM programme providers, outlining 
the challenges and complexities facing this relatively unregulated (and non-standardised) 
market-based approach to environmental sustainability. The second section (7.6.2) then 
discusses how the VCMs are increasingly adopting partnership discourse and delivery 
frameworks, with a specific focus on the action research case study of the Moor Trees 
Voluntary Carbon Offset Programme. 
7.6.1 The UK Government Quality Assurance Scheme for Carbon Offsetting 
I observed numerous arguments by MTPN actors that, as the VCM mechanism is originated in 
the Kyoto Protocol, it is sound in principle8o and, therefore, of value to the natural 
environment (Liverman, 2004; Taiyab, 2005). However, findings suggest that the delivery 
framework for carbon offsetting could be argued to be flawed, with the complexity of 
79 Full Cost Recovery is a third sector framework for covering of the total cost of a service project by charging for the 
direct costs associated with the project or service plus a proportion of the organisation's overheads. 
so Through the CDM's linking of carbon markets with sustainable development objectives in developing countries. 
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programmes, high levels of bureaucracy and 'business as usual' approach stimulating 
acrimonious discussion at many levels. A further criticism of the VCM (when driwing 
comparisons to the CDM) was the lack of agreed standards and protocols. Lack of VCM 
accountability was considered by 70% of survey respondents to have an adverse impact on the 











Figure 7.10: 'The existing lack of regulation makes VCM less credible and therefore reduces 
the amount of people and businesses offsetting their carbon' 
Source: Author's Questionnaire 
Analysis of the VCM through action research found that this criticism, in part, resulted from 
frustrations over 'lost opportunities', where it was argued that more individuals and 
organisations would offset their emissions if they felt that the market was more regulated (see 
Figure 7.10). Examples of potential regulation include a stanclardised carbon emissions 
calculation methodology, independent verification of woodland sequestration, and allocation 
of offset funds. Conversely, some environmental sector and VCM actors argued that higher 
levels of programme provider accountability and regulations (as imposed by the CDM) would 
result in similar problems for the VCIVI, adversely affecting market dynamism. One example of 
this dynamism is the ability for programme providers to quickly create and / or adjust the 
types of offsets available. Moor Trees, for example, was able to offer offsets from a new 
woodland almost instantly, unlike the CDM approach where months of verification, validation 
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and certification would need to take place. There was also concern amongst private sector 
programme providers that profit margins would be difficult to maintain (under new regulation) 
with increased administration, monitoring and review costs, thus reducing the diversity of 
programmes on offer. This point was raised at the House of Commons' Environmental Audit 
Committee VCM Stakeholder Consultation (held 19.03.07). The response from the panel 
suggested that a middle ground must be sought to develop a less bureaucratic code"' (than the 
CDM) with a quality assurance kitemark to ensure consumer confidence in an emerging market 
and to ensure continued growth (see Table 7.4 for comparison of governance structures). The 
same Environmental Audit Committee panel member also stated that private sector 
involvement is needed to ensure an innovative and stimulated marketplace. This was met by a 
counter-argument from stakeholders at the meeting, one of whom (who wished to remain 
anonymous) argued that "Making money out of climate change is immoral and profits should 
be reinvested to scale impact and not distributed to shareholders". 
Figure 7.11: Quality Assurance Scheme Kitemark 
Image source: ActonC02 (2008) 
Further consultations defined the aims of the Quality Assurance Scheme as firstly to educate 
consumers about offsetting and its role in addressing climate change; secondly to increase 
consumer confidence in the integrity and value for money of offset products; thirdly to provide 
signals to the UK offset sector on required quality and verification standards to develop the 
UK's position as a global market leader in the field; and finally to encourage provision of credits 
81 This led to the UK Government's Quality Assurance Scheme for carbon offsetting. 
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consistent with the government's policies on meeting Kyoto obligations and strategy for 
supporting the development of a robust and liquid global market for carbon trading. 
Clean Development Mechanism Voluntary Carbon Markets 
Governance Kyoto Protocol requires registered No formal or general structure. 
structure methodologies, 3 rd party verifiers Offset governance decided by 
and projects. Credits tracked. associated actors implementing the 
project. 
Standards Mandated and approved by No mandated standard. 
UNFCCC. 
Legal structure Project Design Documents (PDDs) Private contracts link project 
documentation describe methodologies for developers and credit buyers. 
emission reductions and calculate Contracts vary due to the smaller 
actual emissions reductions. PDDs or more informal nature of VCMs. 
and methodologies are public on No requirement to transparently 
the UNFCCC web site. document methodologies, 
accounting procedures or project 
design. 
Retiring of CERs submitted under rules Monitored by offset companies or 
credits (not to be governing the Kyoto Protocol and through optional registries. 
resold) the ELI ETS. 
Additionality and Detailed in PDD using guidance May or may not be explicitly 
baselines from the CDM Executive Board. described in project 
documentation. 
Project Mostly large multinational Projects implemented by local 
implementation companies actors in developing countries in 
and actors partnership with developed world 
actors. 
Transaction costs Higher: complex paperwork and Lower: no formal registration 
validation and verification of requirement, no need to use 
projects to attain CDM registration. officially accredited third party 
verifiers. 
Sellers of credits Project developers and brokers Voluntary offset retailers 
Buyers of credits Governments, large private sector Companies not covered under 
actors with commitments to Kyoto Kyoto or EU ETS regulation, those 
and / or EU ETS, brokers and going beyond formal obligations, 
traders. I individuals 
Table 7.4: Comparison of CDM and VCM Markets Standards and Protocols 
Source: Adapted from Bumpus and Liverman, 2008 
What was sought, therefore, was a continued market-based approach regulated through a 
voluntary accreditation. On speaking with a member of the Environmental Audit Committee 
panel, she stated that the scheme would (i) address the problems of 'clodgy operators' with 
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poor project delivery standards resulting from the absence of standards and regulations; (ii) 
improve financial and operational transparency and accountability; (iii) create a more robust 
scientific rationale, including carbon output and sequestration calculations; (iv) enforce post- 
implementation monitoring, support and review of offset projects; and (v) ensure permanence 
of offset projects. She also commented that, whilst a new accountability framework was to be 
implemented, it should at the same time be more accessible, easier to understand and be less 
bureaucratic than CDM, and leave scope for project innovation and investment in small-scale, 
local projects. As a result of this and two further consultations the voluntary code was 
launched, with offset providers able to choose whether to seek accreditation for all, or some, 
of their offsetting products. The creation of the code meant that the VCMs were moving 
towards a more regulated approach. 
Before the standard's implementation, I presented a number of questions regarding voluntary 
carbon offsetting to the MTPN via the online survey. The aim of the questions was to collect 
empirical data from a wider set of actors to the more narrow focus of the Environmental Audit 
Committee stakeholder consultation which almost exclusively included only those with a direct 
interest in the VCM. The survey provided the following responses: 
0 75%82 of survey respondents agreed that accredited third party verification of 
emissions reduction should be required. 
* 85% supported operational transparency. 
0 82% supported the provision of the scientific rationales and supporting data behind 
offset programmes. 
0 80% agreed that financial transparency is required. 
82 None of the 23% who had 'No opinion' had in-depth knowledge of the market. 
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These responses demonstrated the strong demand for accountability via third party 








Figure 7.12: 'The kitemark should require operational transparency of its members, whereby 
their methodologies and delivery frameworks are made publicly available' 












Figure 7.13: 'The kitemark should require scientific transparency of its members, 
Whereby rationales and appropriate literature are made publicly available' 
Source: Author's Questionnaire 
The scheme's kitemark can now be used for offsets that meet specifications, requirements and 
procedures and have been assessed by the approval body (AEA Group p1c). Interestingly, 
uptake of the kitemark has been low, with a non-state controlled association of offsetters 
called the International Carbon Reduction and Offset Alliance (ICROA) attracting a wider 
membership, apparently to ovoid state interference and be less bureaucratic (as commented 
by an ICROA member at an industry conference). 
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Figure 7.14: 'The kitemark should require financial transparency of its members, whereby 
project income and expenditure is made publicly available' 
Source: Author's Questionnaire 
I concluded that the VCM required increased operational and financial accountability. This 
conclusion was, however, tempered by promoting the values of actor autonomy, reduced 
bureaucracy and administration, and the benefits of a dynamic, market-driven approach. The 
key here was to identify if these arguments could be grouped by actor type. Analysis showed 
this to be the case, with those presenting the first argument predominantly those with no 
vested interest in the voluntary carbon offset market, though all were stakeholders in the 
climate change mitigation debate. Those arguing for less accountability were predominantly 
programme providers or those seeking to potentially benefit from a less constrained 
marketplace. They included, for example, those selling offsets, and those offering projects 
seeking investment, i. e. woodland regeneration partnerships including private and third sector 
actors. These partnerships are analysed in the following section. 
7.6.2 The Voluntary Carbon Market Partnership Approach 
This study included working within and observing a range of the above mentioned VCM 
partnerships. I found that the term 'partnership' was increasingly used by VCM programme 
providers and their participants when communicating with stakeholders, i. e. 'XYZ plc (the 
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participant) is working in partnership with ABC organisation (the programme provider) to 
become carbon neutral'. This terminology appeared to have been adopted to suggest a more 
'hands-on' approach by the participant when addressing carbon emissions. This cross-sector 
partnership-working was new to many, especially those from the private sector. Counter to 
this, there is an ongoing debate regarding this adoption of 'green policies' to meet business 
objectives, with 'greenwash' (see Section 5.4.2) frequently mentioned by some MTPN actors. 
Some MTPN actors argued that private (and some public) sector actors were only building 
their green credentials (by working with environmental actors such as Moor Trees) in response 
to the market opportunities created through brand association with sustainability initiatives. 
Rightly or wrongly, this new form of partnership-working has led to a surge in the value of the 
VCM, with 66% of survey respondents also agreeing that the VCMs have demonstrated how 
private and third sector actors can work in partnership. 
The VCM now represents a growing share of the carbon market as a whole. Some VCM 
projects aim to deliver co-benefits, including the conservation of biodiversity, human 
development and poverty reduction, and low-carbon sector technology development (Bumpus 
and Liverman, 2008; Cosbey et aL, 2005; Mackerron et oL, 2009; Taiyab, 2005 and 2006). 
Indeed, Gough et oL (2002), argued that the optimum offset policies will be those which 
provide these win-win solutions, meeting multiple needs, such as soil conservation, 
biodiversity enhancement and water conservation on the same land area. Bishop et ol. 
(2008: 75) reported that: 
'Some companies have made public commitments to implement biodiversity offsets 
linked to their 'footprint; while several mainstream investors are looking at 
biodiversity offsets as a new business opportunity, as well as an indicator of good 
corporate governance. ' 
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The projects that provide such co-benefits tend to comprise smaller-scale, community-based 
projects. Project monitoring is less robust, partly due to the semi-autonomous nature of the 
sector, and partly due to the relatively high resource implications of developing and 
implementing monitoring systems. This makes these projects unattractive to purchasers in the 
compliance market, who tend to favour low-cost, high-volume projects such as renewable 
energy initiatives (Hepburn, 2007; Taiyab, 2006). However, unlike the compliance market, the 
co-benefits of the VCM tend to stimulate increased participation by private individuals and the 
private sector. A large number of providers offer VCMs that are subject to differing levels of 
verification, generated from a variety of project types, and associated with a diverse range of 
co-benefits. In this fragmented and non-standardised market, prices have been determined by 
'project costs, transaction costs and, ultimately, what the market will bear' (Bumpus and 
Liverman, 2008: 137). As such, the VCM remains subject to considerable uncertainty and 
controversy, due to its lack of standardisation and accountability. Tree planting, in particular, 
has been subject to criticisms regarding carbon leakage, lack of additionality, impermanence, 
double-counting, and timing (Monbiot, 2006; Gillenwater et aL, 2007). 
Questions should also be raised regarding the legitimacy of VCM providers in climate change 
mitigation and their ability to self-regulate, in particular due to the varying 'carbon calculators' 
and certification standards that exist (Carbon Trust, 2006; Trexler and Kosloff 2006). In 2004, 
claims were made against the UK-based Carbon Neutral CompanY83 and Climate Care 84 for 
false advertising, due to their lack of acknowledgement of the scientific uncertainty 
surrounding their tree-planting and other offset projects. However, in spite of these criticisms, 
MTPN actors have suggested that well-managed VCM projects provide not only reductions in 
atmospheric GHG levels and co-benefits, but add value through media coverage and 
83 The complaint against the CarbonNeutral Company was dismissed on a technicality. 
84 The Advertising Standards Authority ultimately sided with Climate Care, concluding that "because Climate Care 
had shown that, so far as it was possible to measure C02 offsets, they were on course to achieve the offsets bought 
by the Phone Co-op, they had justified the claim 'for every E10 you spend on calls we will offset 100kg of COV 
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associated offset marketing campaigns raising public awareness of climate change. Rousse 
(2008: 388) concurred: 
'Due to the increasing number of information campaigns about the causes, current 
impacts and future risks of climate change, the percentage of natural and artificial 
persons with a real energy and environmental awareness has strongly increased over 
the last few years'. 
This 'bottom-up' environmental governance approach has subsequently seen the growth of 
the VCM demonstrate to government the public's support and willingness to pay for 
environmental protection (Imrie and Raco, 1999; Hutchinson, 1994; Sampford, 2002). Perhaps 
as a result of this market-based approach, the government has set a target for its office estate 
to be 'carbon neutral' by 2012 (HM Government, 2005 and 2006). As part of this commitment 
it has set an aspirational target to reduce carbon emissions from central government buildings 
by 30% by 2020, and has introduced carbon offsetting for official air travel (BERR, date 
unknown). 'Carbon Neutral' accreditation is sought by an increasing number of companies and 
organisations of all shapes and sizes. Whilst questions must be asked of the accreditation, in 
particular, its actual efficacy in dealing with climate change, it has introduced many new and / 
or formerly marginal actors to 'environmentalism'. This partnership model of climate change 
governance sees partnerships formed between private and public sector actors, and 
established environmental actors. 
This section has analysed the zero accountability of the VCM, including the UK Government's 
voluntary Quality Assurance Scheme. This presented the case where a solution to a complex 
environmental problem was developed by commodifying natural resources (Liverman, 2004). 
The resulting market was originally unregulated with zero accountability. More recently, 
however, the need for a voluntary accountability mechanism in the form of the state- 
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controlled quality assurance kitemark was highlighted due to the unexpected growth of the 
market. As Goodin (2003: 363) argued, 'accountability regimes are subject to the precise 
instruments giving them effect; the duties to which they give rise; the rights, powers and 
remedies that they afford'. He further argued that the non-profit sector relies relatively 'more 
heavily upon mutual monitoring and reputational sanctioning within a cooperative network of 
like-minded others as its characteristic mechanism for achieving accountability' (Goodin, 
2003: 367). Although the kitemark is voluntary, ICROA provides an example of Goodin's mutual 
or collaborative monitoring regime that avoids the hierarchical approach of the state (see also 
Christensen, 2003). What remains largely in doubt, however, is the efficacy of either standard. 
7.7 Conclusion 
This chapter has used the term 'accountability' as a combination of (i) 'operational' (the 
meeting of operational aims and objectives) and (ii) 'financial' (the appropriate management 
of funds) reporting. It placed the provision of accountability from partnership actor(s) to 
stakeholder(s) as the final step towards effective partnership-working, and analysed the 
complexities of accountability mechanisms. It found that this challenge is often made greater 
through cross-sector partnerships, with each sector requiring different monitoring and review 
procedures to ensure legitimacy of activities, transparency and the possible continuation of 
grant funding. This often complex framework was considered by many MTPN actors to be a 
significant strain on resources. However, these accountability regimes appear to be 
increasingly legitimised through the inclusion of third sector actors, with joint responsibility 
and ownership of programmes leading to improved support and actor commitment. Indeed, 
Savan et al. (2004: 617) argued that environmental programmes 'must acknowledge 
interdependence, expand transparency, and emphasise the accountability of all parties'. 
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I introduced the 'Partnership Principal' concept to assert that donors can assume rights of 
authority over grantees through a top-down approach, as opposed to the proposed heterarchy 
of a governance system. This potential for 'external management' is a key finding in this study, 
as it has important implications regarding the reality of state intentions regarding the move 
towards bottom-up environmental governance in favour of top-down governing. Analyses of 
environmental partnership accountability requirements were carried out through an empirical 
focus on the Moor Trees Partnership Network. It focused on two funders of Moor Trees work - 
the Community Boost Fund and the Will Charitable Trust - as examples of state and non-state 
funders. Analyses of these case studies firstly showed how Mackinnon's (2000) state-driven 
managerial technologies of hierarchical accountability can lead to resource implications 
through increased levels of bureaucracy and administration, checks and balances, and 
monitoring and review. It was within this hierarchical approach that I placed the Partnership 
Principal concept. The chapter then conceptualised the alternative environmental partnership 
governance structure of holistic accountability which, although apparently more complex in 
nature, has eroded the traditional hierarchical mechanisms leading to environmental 
partnerships presenting a wider, more transparent and legitimacy-building form of 
accountability to its stakeholders. 
Chapter 8 now draws on the key findings of Chapters 5,6 and 7 to consider how more effective 
partnership-working can be achieved. It reviews MTPN attitudes and behaviours towards 
partnership-working and analyses if and how structures and mechanisms can be adapted or 
developed to enable environmental partnerships to become an accepted tool for the 
successful implementation and management of environmental governance. 
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Chapter 8: Partnerships as a Delivery Mechanism for Environmental 
Plans, Policies and Programmes 
8.1 Introduction 
This chapter draws on the findings of Chapters 5,6 and 7 to consider how effective 
partnership-working can be achieved. Chapter 5 concluded that, despite the state seeking to 
partly devolve responsibility for the delivery of EPPP to the third sector, these grassroots 
actors are widely considered to be under-resourced to meet this requirement, with findings 
suggesting that high levels of bureaucracy and an audit culture present further challenges. 
Chapter 6 analysed the legitimacy of non-state actors delivering state-formulated EPPP. It 
concluded that although environmental partnerships theoretically enhance democratic 
legitimacy, in practice they can be self-selecting and unrepresentative of the wider 
stakeholders from whom reflective assent should be gained to legitimise EPPP. The chapter 
further concluded that the state still dominates EPPP formulation, whilst apparently seeking a 
non-state delivery framework through a governance approach. Chapter 7 explored the 
hierarchical and holistic accountability of environmental partnerships. it concluded that 
resource-intensive hierarchical regimes can impact on environmental partnership resources, 
with holistic regimes (although enabling wider stakeholder reporting and, therefore, increase 
legitimacy) tending to be self-selecting. The chapter also examined the Voluntary Carbon 
Markets as an example of a zero accountability regime, which, whilst enabling dynamic and 
responsive market-based approaches, can present challenges regarding quality assurance. 
Chapters 5,6 and 7 examined the case for responsibility, legitimacy and accountability as 
essential components for effective partnership-working, which this chapter now explores 
further. Firstly, environmental partnerships are conceptualised through the Policy 
Implementation Continuum and environmental partnership-working models. It then analyses 
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how environmental partnerships are typically cross-sector and multi-actor, with local 
knowledge, partnership synergies and joint funding bids acknowledged as three principal 
benefits of partnership-working in the environmental sector. The continued inclusion by the 
state in environmental partnerships is then discussed, with further analysis given to the 
assertions made by some survey respondents and interviewees that environmental 
partnerships are often dominated by one or a few organisations. Power structures are 
considered to be an important issue for effective partnership-working, plus the increased 
influence that previously marginalised actors can bring to EPPP. The chapter then reviews 
MTPN attitudes and behaviours towards partnership-working via the OPAL case study, where it 
analyses if and how the network's structures and delivery mechanisms can be adapted or 
developed to create a more general model for environmental partnership-working in the 
implementation and management of environmental governance or EPPP. 
8.2 The Partnership Approach to Environmental Governance 
Findings from within the MTPN concluded that environmental partnerships are becoming 
increasingly apparent within the environmental sector. These partnerships consist of both 
state and non-state actors and exist to deliver EPPP that are, for the most part, formulated by 
predominantly state actors. Data collected from the survey suggests that partnership-working 
has become an important tool in environmental governance, with 97% of survey respondents 
supporting this assertion (65% agreed strongly). The rationale underpinning this partnership 
approach, however, appears to vary between state and non-state actors. On the one hand, the 
state is appearing to devolve responsibility through public and QUANGO sector actors, whilst 
on the other, non-state actors are subsequently assuming responsibility through new 
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Figure 8.1: 'Partnerships have become an important tool for the delivery of 
Environmental Governance' 
Source: Author's Questionnaire 
These collaborations are through both formal partnership-working and informal network 
approaches. It is the former construct that is the focus of this study. The reasons for this 
collaborative approach by non-state actors are numerous, including; accessing new funding 
streams, stakeholder engagement, brand association, local knowledge, and enhanced / 
diversified skill sets. Observations of the MTPN have shown numerous third sector actors 
joining and / or forming partnerships for, in particular, funding and resource-sharing. State 
actors, however, sought partnerships predominantly to meet the stakeholder engagement and 
community involvement criteria set by central government plus, increasingly, to gain access to 
local knowledge, i. e. 'The top-down approach that attempts to generate bottom-up actions for 
sustainable communities' (Davies, 2002: 201). It was argued, undoubtedly with a degree of 
cynicism, by some actors, however, that the state was merely seeking political gain, plus, as 
one private sector actor commented, 'trying to get something for nothing'. 
This complex multi-actor partnership-working raises questions regarding environmental 
partnerships accepting responsibility, acquiring legitimacy (by addressing the democratic 
deficit of non-elected actors delivering state PPP), and providing occountobility (the issue of 
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non-state actor autonomy and specifically concerning operational and financial accountability). 
Collectively termed in this research as responsibility, legitimacy and accountability, they are 
considered to be essential components of effective partnership-working. As such, they are 
conceptualised in Figure 4.1 the delivery mechanism for the environmental governance 
concept. This environmental partnership-working model provides a conceptual as opposed to 
an operational framework, though environmental partnership-working needs the latter if 
environmental governance is to achieve its potential. This chapter analyses partnership- 
working with the aim of developing a more general delivery framework for the environmental 
sector to achieve more effective environmental partnership-working. 
8.3 Cross-sector, Multi-actor Partnerships 
8.3.1 Engaging Non-state Actors 
Paavola (2007) argued that the state is not a homogeneous entity, but a complex network of 
different actors operating at different levels that both govern and are governed. Thus, 
governance itself is a complex, multi-actor, multi-level process, with partnerships seeking to 
'join up' the diverse resources and competences of actors from the public, private and 
voluntary sectors (Lowndes and Sullivan, 2004). Analysis of the MTPN highlighted the 
complexities of these cross-sector multi-actor partnerships, with Figure 8.2 showing that 95% 
of survey respondents agreed (54% of them strongly) that partnerships bring together actors 
who would otherwise not necessarily work together. on exploring this statistic further at 
interview, it was found that this mainly referred to the inclusion of, (i) private sector actors; 
and (ii) local special interest groups. Interestingly, private sector actors are increasingly valued 
by environmental sector actors (both state and non-state) for bringing new resources and 
funding through corporate responsibility and market-based approaches. Local special interest 
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groups are highly valued for their local knowledge. Take, for example, Moor Trees, which 









Figure 8.2: 'They bring together Public, Private and Voluntary and Community Sector groups 
which would otherwise not usually work together' 
Source: Author's Questionnaire 
Although Survey Respondent No. 40 (from the third sector) commented that "Partnerships 
allow access to communities otherwise not engaged", it should be noted that the use of the 
term communities refers to actors and individuals from a wide range of backgrounds. 
Interviewee No. 3 (public sector) also noted that "They are also an important way of engaging 
the public and convincing them of a project's worth". The benefits of multi-sector engagement 
were also mentioned by Interviewee No. 2 (public sector): 
"As a public sector body the benefits of partnership-working really increase the 
ownership of local people on green space. This in turn has wider benefits not only for 
the stewardship of green space but the involvement in other volunteer organisations 
and friends groups. " 
Two examples of MTPN cross-sector partnerships include the Moor Trees partnership with 
MITIE plc and EDF Energy, both private sector actors. MITIE is a strategic outsourcing and asset 
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management company, employing over 54,000 people and with revenues in excess of f1.7bn 
per annurn (MITIE, 2008). The company was seeking to expand the environmental strand of its 
Corporate Responsibility policy through the support of an environmental charity. It did this by 
providing a new minibus (free of charge) to support the Moor Trees volunteering programme. 
EDF Energy is a wholly-owned subsidiary of the EDF Group. It is one of the UK's largest energy 
companies and the UK's largest producer of electricity, delivering electricity to around 8 
million customer homes and businesses. It employs around 20,000 people and has an ongoing 
staff volunteering programme as part of its wider corporate responsibility policy. EDF staff 
groups volunteer regularly with, and fundraise for, Moor Trees. The partnership brings much 
needed new resources to Moor Trees. The MITIE and EDF Energy partnerships provided two 
examples of third / private sectorss partnership-working. However, some respondents 
highlighted that these new collaborations also presents challenges in terms of engagement. 
Survey Respondent No. 30 (a QUANGO), commented: "It can be difficult to engage public, third 
and private sectorgroups - they tend to have one or two sectors, but not all". 
Further concerns were mooted about the accountability" of third / private sector 
partnerships, with it being suggested that the increasing complexity of environmental 
partnerships reduces the transparency of the internal management practices needed to 
maintain stakeholder support and advance legitimacy claims (Honders and Bruijn, 2008). This 
was certainly a priority with the Moor Trees / EDF Energy partnership, with Moor Trees 
stakeholders (especially its members) seeking clarification regarding the nature of the 
partnership due to EDF's high environmental impact, especially its carbon footprint. This raised 
concerns regarding greenwash (see Section 5.2), i. e. that EDF was seeking environmental 
brand association by working with Moor Trees, for relatively low investment and no 
behavioural change in its staff day-to-day activities, Moor Trees overcame this by monitoring 
:5 Both private sector partners engaged in the projects as part of their Corporate Social Responsibility programmes. 
6 Low (2004, Logan and Wekerle, 2008: 2099) cautions against an easy acceptance of new local, decentralized and 
multi-actor governance arrangements as indicators of new forms of local autonomy and democratic practice. He 
suggests the boundaries between public and private become blurred when business and other actors facking public 
accountability play key policy roles. 
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EDF's associated press campaign, and gaining feedback from their staff regarding attitudinal 
and behavioural change. This was then communicated to Moor Tree's stakeholders. 
If these challenges can be overcome through a more stanclardised approach as opposed to a 
case-by-case basis, then it is believed that relevant stakeholders in the policy process can be 
brought together to create more effective and coordinated delivery of EPPP (Greer, 2001; 
Wood and Gray, 1991). Greer (2001: 752) also argued that 'this has been particularly important 
within recent years because of the increasingly complex and multi-faceted nature of public 
policy and administration and the inter-connectedness of decisions taken at the local, regional, 
national, and supranational level. ' This 'multi-actor model', argued Hanberger (2009), 
represents a form of governance where the state shares power with non-state actors, and 
where public actors and institutions join networks and partnerships to resolve problems and 
challenges. in the environmental context, one of the most widely acknowledged benefits of 
this state engagement of non-state 'local' actors is the access to local knowledge that is 
required when aiming to contextualise EPPP to local settings. 
8.3.2 Local Knowledge 
Many EPPPs are formulated at state level, but delivery often needs to be contextualised to 
local requirements through grassroots engagement by public sector actors to improve impact. 
This local approach was brought to the fore of environmental policy-making by the 1992 Rio 
Earth Summit's Agenda 21 (LA21), which was the United Nations' acceptance that best starting 
point for the achievement of sustainable development is at the local level. This action plan 
recognised that, as a community of nations, we are bound together by a common destiny 
(Welford, 1997). Whilst a solution to these problems need to be found at the international 
level, action is required at the local level through governments engaging with citizens and 
actively involving business. Thus, Agenda 21 was localised via LA21 which included 
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approximately 2,500 action items for local councils. LA21 stated that each local authority had 
to draw up its own LA21 strategy following discussion with local communities to prioritise local 
sustainable development actions. The main aim of this approach was to make sustainable 
development a community issue, involving public, private and community sector actors. As a 
result of this, not only would local communities be engaged as global citizens, but it would 
create a resource of local knowledge, skills and expertise. 
When asked about the inclusion of local actors to deliver EPPPs, Interviewee No. 1 (public 
sector) stated that "Working in partnership brings a variety of good experience and knowledge 
to a project group. It allows a project to draw on a range of local resources and networks that 
might not otherwise be accessible. " The United Kingdom Biodiversity Action Plan, for example, 
is devolved to the local level through a series of Local Biodiversity Action Plans which are each 
contextualised to local species needs and requirements. This plan presents a compelling case 
for increasing the interchange between central policy-makers and frontline staff involved in 
devolved forms of governance, where there is a transferral of discretion and responsibility 
over resources to those with local knowledge to adapt policy to local circumstances (Pearce 
and Mawson, 2003: 57). This could include, for example, the allocation of funds to local (non- 
state) actors, although the legitimacy of the actors would need to be presented to, and 
accepted by, the wider community. An accountability structure would also need to be put in 
place that balances accounting for the use of state / public funds with the ability for the local 
actor to remain, to a degree, dynamic and flexible in their approach to plan delivery. 
The local approach is further illustrated by the Higher Level Stewardship scheme (highlighted 
in Section 4.3), which allows local flexibility and the use of local knowledge to adapt 
management to allow for variations in conditions over a period of time and across different 
areas of land (Franks and McGloin, 2006). Thus, local expertise, knowledge and enthusiasm are 
harnessed by this state-funding programme to generate innovative methods to plug the 
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'implementation gap' of policy and practice (Greer, 2001). However, it has been suggested 
that, despite acknowledgement of the benefits of the local approach, some scheme 
prescriptions lack flexibility and local knowledge is disregarded. indeed, Survey Respondent 
No. 29 (a QUANGO) stated that "We do bring local knowledge through our network of 
conservation advisors throughout the country", suggesting that whilst the need for local 
knowledge is acknowledged, it is (by some) still sought from 'in-house' expertise. Researcher 
experiences supported this suggestion, with a general avoidance of partnership-working 
evident within this particular QUANGO. Perhaps a rationale for this apparent avoidance of 
partnerships-working is Eden et a/. 's (2006) argument that environmental governance involves 
such a diverse range of stakeholders that it is too complicated and contentious to decide how 













Figure 8.3: 'Partnership increase the availability of local knowledge' 
Source: Author's Questionnaire 
However, Figure 8.3 shows that 97% of survey respondents agreed that partnerships increase 
the availability of local knowledge when national or regional actors work with local partners, 
with Interviewee No. 6 (a QUANGO) commenting that partnerships "... build on current skill 
sets and ensure a much more coordinated approach of otherwise disjointed projects / 
programmes". Survey Respondent No. 62 (private sector) further commented that 
"Partnership benefits are generally mutual. Small charities and NGOs generally benefit 
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financially from the private sector which then in itself benefits from knowledge and experience 
obtained from specialist charities like Moor Trees. "
In 1999, the DETR (in Raco and Imrie, 2000) reported that assumptions are made that local 
communities have a unique set of knowledge without which policy programmes are inherently 
limited, and that partnerships are required to establish mechanisms through which community 
representatives "play a full and effective role, supported by local structures that allow the 
community viewpoint to be heard and partnership decisions to be fed back to the 
community". Although this quote was in the urban context, it is also relevant to the 
environmental sector. Sampford (2002: 79) concurred: 
'Our 'knowledge' of our environment, it's almost infinite diversity, the threats to its 
balance and some of the means of limiting those threats and dealing with its consequences 
is daily growing. Extensive research utilising traditional scientific method is not only 
growing but also benefiting from the recognition of 'local' knowledge about the 
environment from traditional sources'. 
A central pillar of the governance concept is community involvement in decisions that affect 
them. Local knowledge that comes with this community involvement should, therefore, be 
respected and taken into consideration in these decision-making processes. Indeed, 
Summerville et aL (2008) argued that the inclusion of communities and the incorporation of 
local knowledge in these sustainable development decision-making processes should, morally 
and ethically, be basic community rights. Further, Wallington et at (2008) argued that local 
knowledge, experience and decision-making bring potential mutuality gains in a network- 
based governance strategy. The MTPN includes various small third sector organisations that 
are able to bring local knowledge and community involvement to partnerships. Moor Trees, in 
particular, provides woodland knowledge and expertise alongside extensive social networks 
234 
that present the opportunity for luger, regional or national actors to quickly and effectively 
access a diverse range of data, locations and beneficiaries. One such partnership is 'OPAL', the 
Open Air Laboratories network, which is reviewed in Section 8.5. These partnerships between 
actors of varying sizes (by size, I mean financial turnover, resources available, and area of 
operation) can often become synergistic, where outputs can become greater than would have 
otherwise been generated had the actors been working separately. 
8.3.3 Partnership Synergies 
The benefits of partnership-working need to be highlighted and then maximised, including the 
potential synergies and access to new funding streams that exist through state / non-state 
collaborations. Environmental partnerships are based on the principle of seeking collaborative 
advantage to solve complex environmental problems (Darlow and Newby, 1997; Huxham, 
1996; Healy, 1992). One of the main benefits of partnerships is the synergies created when 
two or more organisations work together to produce the outcomes greater than the sum of 
the separate parts (Hastings, 1996). Partnership synergies were widely acknowledged by MTPN 
actors, with Survey Respondent No. 23 (public sector), who commented that they enabled 
it more community involvement in a project than would be possible working in isolation or if we 
were working in parallel with other organisations". This working 'in parallel' referred to the 
synergy created by organisations coming together. Survey Respondent No. 51 (third sector) 
also said that "They allow things to be achieved that individual organisations (including 
government) could not do on their own". Interviewee No. 18 (private sector) concurred: 
"'Local authorities have been slow to understand the principles of partnerships but 
have slowly come to realise the possibilities for synergy and new opportunities. They 
are not always in "partnership" mode and will still steal ideas from smaller 
organisations and claim them as their own if they can get away with it". 
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Environmental -partnership synergies can also be seen in practice, one example Is forestry 
carbon sequestration as a climate change mitigation solution. On the one hand, private and 
third sector organisations work together to fund and manage the projects, whilst on the other, 
additional, synergistic opportunities are realised through sustainable development 
diversification initiatives such as short rotation coppice within new forests. It has been 
suggested by Martin (1995) that there have historically been few incentives for agencies to 
exploit the potential synergies offered by inter-agency co-operation. More recently, however, 
new opportunities have arisen in the UK via new Lottery and Europe funding programmes to 
encourage partnership-working. These new programmes have encouraged state and non-state 
actors to collaborate on EPPI)s to leverage these new and / or previously inaccessible funding 
streams. 
8.3.4 New Funding Streams 
Funding is high on the agenda of almost every MTPN actor. Partnerships are widely 
acknowledged by MTPN actors to provide new funding opportunities, with 85% of survey 
respondents agreeing that partnerships increase the financial resources available to individual 
partners (see Section 5.3). Public sector actors also actively pursue additional funding 
opportunities to subsidise increasingly constrained central government budgets (this is 
discussed in greater detail in the next section). 
Although data suggest that partnership-working provides new funding opportunities for EPPP, 
it also highlights how these new and often complex funding arrangements can be subject to 
resource-intensive financial and operational accountability regimes that can prove challenging 
to the partners if they are not resourced to manage them effectively (Section 7.4 provides the 
case study of the Community Boost Fund). Survey Respondent No. 69 (private sector) 
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commented that "If not well organised from the start, they can take up enormous amount of 















Strongly Agree NoOpinion Disagree Strongly 
Agree Disagree 
Figure 8.4: 'Partnerships increase the financial resources available to individual partners' 
Source: Author's Questionnaire 
Survey Respondent No. 48 (third sector) also stated that "Some wish to be partners but do not 
always have the capacity to undertake specific roles within the partnership". This point was 
supported by Interviewee No. 4 (public sector), who said that "The resources needed for 
project managing a partnership are often underestimated by funders. It is complex and time 
consuming, and if misjudged can impact upon the partnerships' ability to deliver". The point 
made by Interviewee No. 4 regarding under-estimation by funders was, however, contended 
by some MTPN actors, who argued that it is the responsibility of the funding applicant to 
properly budget for office cost. Although this is a reasonable assertion, I explored this point 
further through survey analysis and discussions with five funders. Survey Respondent No. 27 
(third sector) stated "Although working in partnership is not the easy option and can take 
more time and resources, more often than not the results are on balance more positive in my 
experience of partnership-working". Survey Respondent No. 13 (third sector) also said that; "if 
sufficient resources, appropriately trained staff and formal procedures are in place, then 
partnerships should deliver accordingly". Both of these responses provided positive feedback 
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regarding the benefits and resource implications of partnership-working. Each of the funders 
that I interviewed provided different responses to my question: 
'Do you feel that af under should fund an actor's core project management costs? ' 
The following responses were received: 
Funder 1. "Of course. We assume that project management costs, including the 
monitoring and review of milestones, aims, objectives and expenditure, are included in 
the grant application. It does not make sense to leave them out". 
Funder 2. "No. We like to feel that the grant applicant is contributing something to the 
project, otherwise, we end up funding a series of stand-alone projects that may well have 
been created by an organisation with the intention of contributing to their core activities 
instead of focusing on stated project aims and objectives". 
Funder 3. "Yes, but we set a limit of 10% of the funds requested". 
Funder 4. "We allow for up to 10% of the grant to be used for core office costs. This 
includes periodical monitoring and review, plus writing up the end of project report". 
Funder S. "Yes, we provide up to 10%, but experience suggests organisations often use 
the 10% for other purposes and then struggle to meet reporting commitments". 
With the exception of Funder 2, each funder allowed for project management costs. After 
merging this data with findings from the survey and action research, I concluded that these 
new funding streams do allow for project management costs, and that the issues raised by 
some actors resulted from their own operational efficiencies. It is important, however, not to 
confuse the allocation of project management funding with the wider issue of funding made 
available to the sector that was discussed in Section 5.3, which I have argued still remains a 
major constraint on the environmental sector. This study has, however, collected a rich set of 
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data regarding environmental partnership funding, with the above points made by various 
actors from across all four levels of the Policy Implementation Continuum. It has concluded 
that environmental partnerships bring new funding opportunities to what is otherwise an 
increasingly under-funded and competitive 87 sector. 
To meet these challenges, new operational frameworks and more flexible accountability 
models are constantly sought by MTPN actors with varying degrees of success. When 
identified, I support (Goodwin's (1998: 6) argument that they will 'mobilise the synergies 
between public and private funding and of a development policy based on partnership and co- 
operation between all levels'. Attempts to address these complex governance problems, 
Pearce and Mawson (2003) argued, have often foundered on systems based on function and 
hierarchy rather than territory, with inadequate resources, multiple funding streams, the top- 
slicing of local authority budgets, limited timescales and rigid monitoring procedures all 
hindering efforts. Further, potential synergies with local stakeholders are not exploited, with 
partnerships remaining dominated by lead (often state) organisations, leaving community 
organisations limited by lack of experience and resources. 
8.4 State-inclusive Environmental Partnerships 
Although many environmental partnerships rely on voluntary support and public help, the 
state remains a powerful player, with regional government offices such as the South West 
Regional Development Agency retaining responsibility for obtaining and monitoring state 
funding (Yarwood, 2002). Findings suggest that these state actors are seeking to retain 
influence and control beyond merely due diligence and management of the public funds for 
which they are responsible (see Section 7.3 Managerial Technologies), whilst also accessing 
87 Competitive in this context means the competition between actors for the allocation of funds. 
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new funding streams originally created for the benefit of the third sectorgs, Survey Respondent 
No. 29 (a QUANGO) highlighted this shift by state actors towards previously third sector- 
exclusive funding streams; "We are often able to make our limited resources go much further 
in partnership projects. We have external funding officers who are able to suggest sources of 
private or grant funding". Survey Respondent No. 23 (from the public sector), commented that 
"Working with the volunteer sector particularly allows us to access funding streams that are 
not open to local authorities for work on nature conservation areas". Survey Respondent No. 
28 (also from the public sector) stated that partnerships "Provide credibility and status which 
in turn may open doors to other funding sources". 
I explored these comments further at interview. Interviewee No. 18 (private sector) pointed 
out that this shift by some public sector actors was a recent one, when commenting that 
"Local authorities have been slow to understand the principles of partnerships but have slowly 
come to realise the possibilities for synergy and new opportunities". Interviewee No. 4 (public 
sector), also stressed that this is becoming the norm and that "Working with environmental 
sector trusts opens up funding streams that would not normally be available to a local 
authority, and thus provides resources for delivering corporate aims when delivered in 
partnership". Interviewee No. 8 (a QUANGO employee) discussed how his organisation "... is 
involved in numerous Lottery-funded projects with various third sector partners. We never 
used to apply for these funds, but now find that they make a significant contribution to our 
office overheads, as well as enabling us to keep control of the project". This statement also 
highlights how state actors seek to directly influence 'community' projects. 
With the state engaging in an increasing number of environmental partnerships to access 
additional funding, data highlighted how state actors may also seek to dominate partnerships 
and become partnership principals (see Section 7.2.2). The MTPN provided numerous cases of 
88 The OPEP case study (see Section 5.3.1) presents an example of a state actor (HMP Dartmoor) partnering with 
Moor Trees to access new funding streams, including the Learning and Skills Council and various charitable trusts. 
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state actors taking a position of power in partnerships that are funded by programmes aimed 
at supporting the third sector (see, for example, Section 6.2.2 regarding the Natural England 
Access to Nature programme). Survey Respondent No. 60 (third sector) commented that "We 
do not have the time to work with fully paid government o rga nisat ions". This suggests varying 
capacity and resources available between state and non-state actors, and that the under- 
funding of environmental partnerships primarily impacts on the very COMMUnity actors with 
whom the state weeks to engage. 
Some commentators, however, suggest that the voluntary effort and active citizenship alluded 
to by Survey Respondent No. 60 are necessary to compensate for the withdrawal of state 
provision of services and are a central pillar of sustainable development (see, for example, 
Kearns, 1992; Murdoch, 1997; Raco et ol., 2006; Sampford, 2002; and Stoker, 1998). Voluntary 
effort is indeed a core component of many third sector programmes, but I concur with 
Edwards et a/. (2001), who argued that despite the state seeking to engage a broad range of 
stakeholders in partnerships, partnership-working does not result automatically in 'real' 
participation and inclusion, especially when engagement is not constant and at best voluntary. 









Figure 8.5: 'Partnerships can be dominated by one or a few organisations' 
Source: Author's Questionnaire 
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This potential bias in power structures was highlighted by 78% (see Figure 8.5) of survey 
respondents agreeing that partnerships can be dominated by one or a few organisations. 
Survey Respondent No. 29 (QUANGO) highlighted how "... a lead individual can sometimes 
over-rule the views of partners, pursuing a course of action that not everybody agrees with". 
Survey Respondent No. 40 (from the third sector) commented that "Domination by a few 
organisations may be a problem in some partnerships. However, these will not be the 
successful ones and miss the point of partnership work". Although this data did not identify 
state actors as being the dominant ones, other data collected from the MTPN strongly suggest 
that this is the case. Domination by state actors is an issue to be explored further, both 
theoretically and empirically. Both Yarwood (2002) and Shortall (2004) argue that the power 
attributed to members at each level may vary in form, and that there are power struggles 
within partnerships. An example from within the MTPN is OPAL (see more detailed analysis in 
Section 8.5). 
OPAL was created by Imperial College, which also led the writing of the funding bid, though 
with significant input from certain partners, including Moor Trees. As such, Imperial assumed 
the lead on all strategic, financial and operational issues. In part, this is due to its control over 
finances as the grant recipient, though its significant existing resources also play a role in their 
domination of the partnership. With reference to the comment by Survey Respondent No. 60 
above, this dominance was arguably borne out of the community partners' lack of time and 
resources to attend meetings where decisions are made. I suggest that parallels can be drawn 
with state-dominated environmental partnerships, where actors such as local councils and 
QUANGOs are similarly resourced to a greater extent and to the same end. This was also 
argued by Survey Respondent No. 30 (from the third sector): 
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"in my experience of over 30 years of community and environmental projects, 
partnerships are usually led by a dominant organisation that commands most of the 
budget and influence over the projects. Community partners on government-led 
project are often relegated to a second tier - almost a token presence to demonstrate 
engagement by government with the Community and Voluntary Service. Cross-sector 
partnerships involving the Voluntary Community sector are often token unless there is 
an equal responsibility for delivery and a fair sharing out of funds". 
It is, therefore, evident that actors bring different resources to partnerships. Lowndes and 
Sullivan (2004) also argue that it is often a problem for citizens to get their voices heard 
alongside state actors 'possessing superior technical knowledge, confidence and negotiating 
skills' (see also Balloch and Taylor, 2001). It has been suggested that this community 
involvement is merely tokenistic as part of the community involvement agenda. In addition to 
the above statement from Survey Respondent No. 30, Survey Respondent No. 37 (QUANGO) 
said that "Most government departments are obsessed with getting evidence of partnership- 
working whether it brings any benefit or not". So if partnerships are to be more than 
tokenistic, well-resourced organisations need to act to address the challenges that these 
'filters' present (Sullivan and Skelcher, 2002, see also Section 7.3.1 Checks and Balances). 
If environmental partnership power structures can be constructed to provide an equitable and 
sustainable model, then they can provide third sector actors with a powerful tool to exert 
influence over the traditionally state-exclusive activity of EPPP formulation (as opposed to the 
typically community-based activity of delivery). It can also benefit advocacy groups wishing to 
reach new audiences (88% of survey respondents agreed with this). However, data suggest 
that the challenge often lies in resourcing the third sector to interact on an equitable basis 
with otherwise dominant actors. The next section highlights these, amongst other, challenges, 
and considers the benefits of partnership-working through the lens of the OPAL partnership. 
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8.5 CASE STUDY: The Moor Trees / OPen Air Laboratories (OPAL) Partnership 
This section explores OPAL as a case study from within the MTPN. OPAL is an example of a 
multi-actor, cross-sector environmental partnership that includes actors from across all four 
levels of the Policy implementation Continuum. My embeddedness within the network 
enabled action research, regular actor observation and interviews with OPAL members. Thus, 
it provided this study with an in-depth insight into the intricacies of the partnership-working 
carried out in and around this complex partnership. OPAL further provided an example of how 
the state (via the Big Lottery Fund) funded a project that was formulated primarily by state 
actors for subsequent delivery, for the most part, by non-state partners. It shows how local 
knowledge and community involvement are critical in meeting OPAUs aims and objectives, and 
how this local approach fits with national and regional state objectives. The lessons taken from 
this partnership then contribute to the collation of the components of effective partnership- 
working discussed later in Section of 8.6.1 of this chapter. 
8.5.1 OPAL Overview 
OPAL is a national consortium of environmental actors funded by the Big Lottery Fund's 
Changing Spaces Programme. The Big Lottery Fund is a state actor, having been officially 
established by Parliament in 2006. OPAL aims to celebrate biodiversity, environmental quality 
and people's engagement with nature by inspiring and supporting communities to explore 
study, enjoy and protect their local environment by working with leading scientists. The 
project started in October 2007 with an E11.7rn grant from the Lottery's Changing Spaces 
Programme. OPAUs lead partner is Imperial College (London), which created the original 
project concept and led the funding bid. It works through, amongst others, nine universities 
around the UK (Section 8.5.5 analyses these partners further), including the University of 
Plymouth. Moor Trees has been involved in the project from the outset as the Community 
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Delivery Partner (CDP), including input by myself (as Director of Moor Trees) on the funding 
bid. Moor Trees is responsible for the community involvement aspect of OPAL by engaging its 
own network of volunteers and community groups with the University of Plymouth (the 
regional partner for OPAL) to meet OPAL targets and milestones (see Section 8.5.3 for detailed 
analysis of community involvement and beneficiary engagement). OPAL's focus on community 
involvement and the subsequent creation of the CDP network was for two reasons; (i) to run 
projects based on the needs and priorities of the local communities; and (ii) to access the local 
knowledge on offer. Local knowledge was core to the partnership's aims and objectives from 
the outset, with Dr Michael Dixon 89 (Director of the Natural History Museum) stating in an 
OPAL press release that: 
"We urgently need to know more about the quality of our local environments. OPAL 
will provide the training, practical experience, tools and support needed for 
communities to record the plants, animals and fungi in their local environments. 
Communities will set up sites, or 'laboratories', where they will learn about their 
environment. Laboratories could be anything from a window box growing a single 
plant to a sports field from where soil samples are taken. information collected will be 
shared via an interactive website, and will help build a picture of the quality and 
biodiversity of local areas. Communities will be empowered to play a major role in the 
assessment and monitoring of local water, soil and air quality which in turn will raise 
awareness of wider environmental issues such as climate change and how all these 
aspects are related to the health and well-being of society. if we are to take full 
advantage of the opportunities for improving the quality of life offered by scientific 
knowledge and discovery, it is crucial that we bring scientists and the public closer 
together to explore issues such as the quality of local environment". 
Source: OPAL Press Release supplied via Moor Trees (Date Unknown). 
89 This statement is in the public domain. 
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As a CDP, Moor Trees has received new resources and funding from OPAL to assist in its 
community work and in the delivery of OPAL objectives. This includes the employment of a 
full-time Community Scientist by the University of Plymouth using OPAL funds drawn down 
from Imperial College. Line management is carried out by the university, but the scientist is 
based in the Moor Trees office. OPAL has also provided a fully-expensed 'people carrier' (8- 
seater) vehicle for use primarily by the Community Scientist, but also made available to Moor 
Trees members of staff. Additional funding is provided to cover core office costs, including 
project management, monitoring and review (this brings further empirical focus to the 
discussion of Section 8.3.4). Further, indirect benefits were gained through the funding of a 
PhD Student at the University of Plymouth, plus the provision of scientific and communications 
resources in the form of academic partner expertise and partnering with the Natural History 
Museum Communications Department (see Section 8.5.6 for further analysis of these benefits 
and the subsequent challenges presented). As per the earlier discussion in Section 8.3.4, this 
provision of additional core funding was critical to Moor Trees accepting the invitation to join 
the partnership, as it otherwise had no spare capacity to conduct the monitoring and review 
required by the funder. 
8.5.2 OPAL Aims and Objectives 
OPAL adopted the partnership approach to work across multiple sites and enable inter- 
disciplinary study. It acknowledged that partnering with CDPs, such as Moor Trees, was 
important for project legitimacy by aiming to engage with all members of the community. This 
included the creation of a hub for information, interaction, training and dialogue by collecting 
data from CDPs and local experts and offering resources from a range of cross-sector actors. 
The following stated objectives of the project include the creation of new, community-based 
partnerships (Objective 5, in particular, emphasises partnership-working): 
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*A change of lifestyle, inspiring people both to spend time outside and to contribute to 
improving biodiversity and wildlife habitats 
0A new generation of nature lovers 
0 An exciting and innovative educational programme that can be accessed and enjoyed 
by all ages and abilities 
0A much greater understanding of the state of the natural environment and its 
biodiversity, particularly in the most economically impoverished parts of England 
0 Stronger partnerships between the community, voluntary and statutory sectors 
Source: OPAL Press Release 
The desired outcomes for the five year project also include partnership-working, as well as 
building on the benefits of local knowledge (Outcome 5 emphasises partnership-working): 
* Over 1 million people will have increased knowledge and awareness of the quality of 
open spaces around them through community engagement programmes and 
interactive websites. They will have a greater appreciation of special conservation sites 
and the importance of protecting our heritage and of the contribution individuals can 
make. 
0 OPAL will create a new generation of nature lovers, many drawn from sections of 
society currently under-represented in amateur natural history groups. Active 
membership of twenty amateur natural history societies will increase by 10%. People 
will be better able to safeguard their local environment for local residents, their 
children and future generations. 
9 OPAL will deliver an innovative educational programme for all ages, backgrounds and 
abilities. It will design and distribute 200,000 teaching packs, associated with the OPAL 
thematic programmes on biodiversity and bio-monitoring. Through new approaches to 
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learning, people will gain the opportunity to become active participants and the 
knowledge and confidence to enter into debates on environmental issues. 
Local people will be able to participate in projects to monitor the state of the natural 
environment and its biodiversity. OPAL will help some of the most disadvantaged 
communities to identify, quantify and highlight environmentally deprived spaces. 
Partnerships will increase between the community, voluntary and statutory sectors. 
Scientists at nine regional universities, with the help of specialist national centres, will 
build connections with those who have an aspiration or need to improve local 
environments. The portfolio will engage with over 500,000 people to encourage a 
greater sense of ownership of their local environment. 
Source: OPAL Press Release received by Moor Trees9o 
Local community empowerment was also high on the OPAL agenda, with Dr Dixon adding: 
"We believe that through Changing Spaces and the Open Air Laboratories Network 
(OPAL) programmes we will pave the way for communities to share inspiring ideas and 
change the way they think about and use the spaces around them. We urgently need to 
know more about the quality of our local environments, but we are very aware that 
there are not enough trained people, nor sufficient funds to carry out this urgent and 
enormous task. We believe that we can achieve this through Changing Spaces funding 
and the OPAL projects. OPAL will enable local communities to collect information which 
will be used to produce the first community-led 'State of the Environment' Report. OPAL 
will provide the training, practical experience, tools and support needed for 
communities to record the plants, animals and fungi in their local environments. These 
communities will be empowered to play a major role in the assessment and monitoring 
of local water, soil and air quality which in turn will raise awareness of wider 
90 This information Is in the public domain. 
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environmental issues such as climate change and how all these aspects are related to 
the health and well-being of society". 
Source: OPAL Press Release supplied via Moor Trees (Date Unknown). 
The above statement from Dr Dixon highlights how working with local people is central to the 
success of the project and will both inform national objectives and facilitate grassroots change. 
But it goes further than purely suggesting that local knowledge and expertise will be utilised, it 
points out that OPAL will help further resource local experts and groups to share this 
knowledge with the wider community, as well as informing national initiatives, including 
climate change awareness-raising. This investment in local communities is by no means the 
norm in environmental partnerships, though I suggest later in this chapter that it is a 
component of effective partnership-working. 
By using Moor Trees as the CDP for OPAL South West (via the University of Plymouth), OPAL 
gained access to a portfolio of community woodland and tree nursery locations in and around 
Dartmoor National Park, the Tamar Valley, the South Hams AONB and the cities of Plymouth, 
Exeter and Bristol. The wide range of locations (including 'high moor', broad-leaf woodland, 
improved grassland, riparian, estuarine, urban and a site bordering a Ministry of Defence 
nuclear facility) provided a range of results and an exciting diversity of reports. Moor Trees' 
successful record of community involvement through volunteering and partnership-working 
enabled access to local communities. 
8.5.3 Community Involvement and Beneficiary Engagement through OPAL 
Moor Trees became OPAL South West's CDP because of its community links, demonstrating 
how third sector partnerships can bring community involvement for the delivery of EPPP. To a 
lesser extent, Moor Trees was also involved in the formulation of OPAL via its involvement in 
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the management meetings preceding the funding application. This gave Moor Trees the 
opportunity to influence the structure of the OPAL programme to maximise benefit at the local 
level. However, it has been suggested by some participants in the project and bid planning 
stages that this (third sector) involvement was purely to demonstrate public participation for 
the benefit of the lottery, which itself is accountable to the state and also directed to address 
national socio-environmental aims and objectives (see 8.5.4 Strategic Fit with state policy). 
Moor Trees' role as CDP was to introduce beneficiaries (local people) from a wide number of 
community groups linked into the charity as regular community volunteers. These included 
local and regional third sector partners such as BTCV and Groundwork, special needs groups, 
local conservation groups, refugees and asylum seekers, rehab groups, schools and colleges, 
young people training groups, and universities and colleges (staff as well as students) (see 
Appendix H for full list). These volunteer groups brought local knowledge and a network of 
data collectors to the partnership. in return, they received training in plant and animal 
identification, pollution monitoring techniques, sampling, and data presentation. 
Local residents are also actively engaged to increase appreciation of their environment and 
how it can be protected. In the 12 months preceding the OPAL funding bid, Moor Trees 
delivered over 1,800 volunteer days with a focus on deprived communities and isolated 
groups. These figures were adopted as a baseline by OPAL for year one's target beneficiary 
numbers against which part of the funding bid was allocated. This meant that a strict 
accountability mechanism was required, with a beneficiary tracking spreadsheet required to 
be completed by all CDPs on a monthly basis (see Appendix 1). As a result of Moor Trees 
involvement in the preparation of the funding bid, an office budget was also allocated to Moor 
Trees to meet this reporting requirement. 
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8.5.4 Strategic Fit with State Policy 
As discussed in Chapter 5 (Section 5.3.1), it has been suggested by some that the autonomy of 
state-funded partnerships can be restricted to addressing wider national objectives due to 
being under-pinned by state structures, thus leaving little or no room for response to local 
need (Greer, 2001; Jessop, 1997; MacLeod and Goodwin, 1999; Skelcher et a/., 1997; Taylor, 
2002). The OPAL partnership was analysed to substantiate similar claims made by MTPN fringe 
actors, with data suggesting that strategic fit with national and regional state objectives was 
also a priority in the funding decision-making process. The following PPP were referenced by 
OPAL in its funding bid (see Appendix J for further details): 
Plan, Policy or Programme Lead State Actor 
Outdoors For All Natural England 
Opportunity for All 2009 Strategy Document Department for Work and Pensions 
Regional Sustainable Development Framework Government Office for the South West 
Index of Multiple Deprivation Communities and Local Government 
Regional Spatial Strategy Government Office for the South West 
Dartmoor National Park Local Biodiversity Action 
Plan 
Dartmoor National Park Authority 
Local Development Framework (Core Strategy) Plymouth City Council 
Green Space Strategy (2008-2023) Plymouth ity Council 
South West Strategic Infrastructure Partnership Government Office for the South West 
Table 8.1: OPAL Funding Bid References to State PPP 
Examples of Moor Trees' 'fit' included the following: 
0 Two main volunteer centres (35% of its work) are based in (i) Keyham, Plymouth, 
classified IMD 'Urban Worst S%' and (ii) Diptford, South Hams, classified IMD 'Rural 
Worst 5%'. 
0 Work carried out across various 'Rural Worst 5% to 10%' locations in and around 
Dartmoor National Park. 
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0 Moor Trees is the single largest contributor to the woodland creation targets of the 
Dartmoor Local Biodiversity Action Plan. 
0 Work carried out in Plymouth deemed as 'Not accessible green space or linear access'. 
0 OPAL objectives are in keeping with the Plymouth City Local Development Framework 
- Core Strategy, in particular with policies CSIB and CS19 aims (3) 'Maintaining a 
citywide network of local wildlife sites and wildlife corridors, links and stepping stones 
between areas of natural green space' and (6) 'Supporting wildlife enhancements 
which contribute to the restoration targets set out in national, regional and local 
Biodiversity Action Plans' (Plymouth City Council, 2008). The City Council Local 
Development Framework aims to provide Plymouth's population with access to 
natural greenscape within 300 metres of their home, and to facilitate the designation 
of 100 hectares of new Local Nature Reserve by 2016. A baseline flora survey of 
Plymouth nature reserves was carried out in 1990 by Dr Andrew Stevens, then a 
member of University of Plymouth staff. 
PRIORITY GROUPS 
0 Works with Black and Minority Ethnic groups (referred to as 'BMEs'), people with 
disabilities and ill health, refugees and asylum seekers. 
0 Keyham (Plymouth) site located in an area with the 'Highest 10% of health deprivation' 
through lack of access to the natural environment. 
In line with the aims of the Department of Work and Pension's 'Opportunity for All' (2006) 
report, Moor Trees provides: 
* young people from deprived areas with improved education and training opportunities 
40 improved welfare through greater employability resulting from education, training and 
volunteering work 
0 social capital and cohesion through inter- and intra-community group networking 
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0 active and fulfilling practical conservation opportunities to retired people 
0 offenders with accredited land-based education and training to reduce reoffending. 
On speaking with the BLF representative (who wished to remain anonymous) it became 
apparent that the above detail proved crucial in the success of the funding bid. This supported 
my assertion that 'local' projects targeting national objectives and also providing opportunities 
for further research as discussed in the next chapter. 
8.5.5 OPAL Partners 
OPAL's partnership network includes a diverse range of actors from across all four levels of the 
Policy Implementation Continuum. However, data suggested that the network is stratified into 
two levels; Level 1 'Main Partners; and Level 2 'Community Delivery Partners'. Level one 
comprises only one third sector organisation, the rest are state or academic institutions (which 
are also state-funded entities). This was because OPAL's partnership approach was two-tiered. 
Third sector CDPs were only formally engaged after the funding had been agreed, despite their 
contributions towards community consultations and provision of local data proving an 
essential component in the successful bid. Distribution of the finding awarded was done on a 
tiered basis, with Imperial College as the main recipient who awarded funds to main partners, 
who then awarded funds to CDPs. This resulted in two amounts of top-slicing prior to the 
partners directly responsible for programme delivery receiving funding, plus a continuation of 
the complex governance problems highlighted earlier in this chapter by Pearce and Mawson 
(2003), i. e. the focus on function and hierarchy rather than territory, inadequate resources, 
multiple funding streams, top-slicing, limited timescales and rigid monitoring procedures. This 
approach by OPAL provided a valuable empirical focus when researching the components 
required for effective partnership-working, with a number of lessons learnt. 
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8.5.6 Lessons from the OPAL Partnership 
The OPAL partnership provides an example of a multi-actor, cross-sector partnership situated 
within the MTPN, with Section 8.5.4 highlighting how OPAL's outputs contribute to the 
delivery of state-formulated EPPP. Indeed, identifying this synergy was an important 
component of the funding bid and arguably proved crucial in the final approval awarded by the 
Big Lottery Fund. OPAL further provided an empirical focus regarding the three components of 
effective partnership-working identified by this research - responsibility, legitimacy and 
accountability. It demonstrated how the state has devolved responsibility for the delivery of 
EPPP (as highlighted in Section 8.5.4) to a partnership that includes both state (the 
Environment Agency is lead consultant) and non-state actors. Without the latter, lottery 
funding would not have been made available. Legitimacy for the partnership was also sought 
(and arguably received) through extensive community consultation via third sector actors such 
as Moor Trees. This included questionnaires, group visits, and informal discussions during 
Moor Trees volunteering days. 
Finally, OPAL included a number of accountability mechanisms imposed by the Changing 
Spaces programme and constructed by the funder to monitor and review the performance of 
the project. They stipulated a variety of monthly, quarterly and annual reports. These 
accounting procedures are robust and require significant detail, with the lead partner (Imperial 
College) having secured sufficient funding from the Lottery to resource both itself and OPAL 
partners to meet this requirement. OPAL provided a rich set of data enabling analysis of how 
these components of effective partnership-working both interact and work in parallel with 
each other. Findings suggest that OPAL provides an example of a successful multi-actor cross 
sector partnership. As such, I have taken a number of lessons from the network. 
Extensive stakeholder consultation resulted in a popular and successful programme. 
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The Changing Spaces programme stipulated a high degree of community involvement in 
project formulation and planning. This. is argued by, amongst others, Pearce and Mawson 
(2003), Raco (2006) and Thompson (2005) as a key component of environmental governance. 
This identified local need, benefited from local knowledge and increased the likelihood of 
grassroots uptake at the delivery stage. Perhaps crucially, OPAL also continued this community 
involvement after the funding had been awarded and through to the delivery stages. Data 
collected from the MTPN suggests that this is by no means normative behaviour for the lead 
actors in multi-actor partnerships, with community involvement often only engaged in by the 
funding applicant in the planning stage for funder benefit, with no continuation after funding is 
awarded (Moor Trees has contributed to a number of funding proposals but was excluded 
during project delivery, thus disenfranchising its stakeholders). This does, however, suggest a 
contention with the wider findings of this research i. e. that non-state actors are primarily 
involved in EPPP delivery, as opposed to formulation. 
The provision offunding to partners enabled effective monitoring and review. 
After extensive negotiation by Moor Trees, the University of Plymouth (as the OPAL South 
West main partner) agreed funding to Moor Trees' office costs of E4,500 p. a. This funding 
enabled Moor Trees, as an OPAL Community Delivery Partner, to allocate staff time to the 
monitoring and review processes required by OPAL. 
Investment in local communities through the provision of training, education, learning 
materials, event promotion and transportation improved project delivery through the provision 
of a rich variety and high quality of locolly-sourced data. 
The provision of OPAL learning packs, well-funded and resourced events, and an OPAL 'people 
carrier' vehicle, has resulted in high numbers of attendees at OPAL events. 
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Inter-partner communications and branding have on occasion been poor, resulting in some 
problems regarding awareness-raising and promotion of events and developments 
Effective communication is important for good governance (Evans, 2004). Communication 
between a large number of organisations for national and regional events has proven 
challenging. This has resulted in occasional poor attendance at events, lack of partner branding 
on printed and electronic materials, and lack of representation at events. These issues are 
important for many partners, especially smaller actors who benefit greatly from exposure at 
large events through membership and volunteer recruitment opportunities. 
The operational interface between large and small partners has proven challenging, especially 
concerning the management of the OPAL Community Scientist, Le. confused management 
structure and management of expectations. 
The power structures discussed in 7.2 and throughout this chapter have occasionally proven 
problematic during the management of the OPAL Community Scientist embedded at Moor 
Trees. This was due to the tensions caused by the employment of the Community Scientist by 
the larger University of Plymouth, whilst day-to-day management was carried out by the 
smaller partner (Moor Trees). This challenge was overcome by the reinforcement of a robust 
job description. 
The utilisation of shared resources needs to be agreed in advance and working arrangements 
confirmed. The use of the OPAL vehicle, in particular, proved problematic due to conflict 
between OPAL and Moor Trees staff (the vehicle was available for wider Moor Trees use). 
Stoker and Young (1993) argue that 'pooling of resources' is a factor of partnership 
sustainability (see also Edwards et al., 2000,2001; Jordan et ol., 2003). However, OPAL has 
proven that whilst this is, in part, correct, it also provides challenges regarding the subsequent 
allocation of these resources. 
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Taking the above and other experiences from the MTPN into consideration, the next section 
presents a potential delivery framework for effective partnership-working. 
8.6 Towards an Effective Delivery Framework? 
The multi-faceted and complex nature of the natural environment means that there is no one 
formulaic approach to environmental partnership-working that can be replicated to create a 
general framework. However, lessons can be learnt from the MTPN, where partnerships have 
adopted differing approaches with varying degrees of success. What is clear, however, is the 
intrinsic link between partnership-working and governance, whereby it is acknowledged that 
environmental projects require working with people as opposed to for them. As such, argued 
Edwards et aL (2000), there are inevitably trade-offs in terms of independence, power and 
central control in developing and then successfully maintaining these relationships. This 
suggests that when attempting to create an environmental partnership-working framework 
one must consider the complexities of state and non-state actors working together, i. e. the 
state benefits from greater resources and professionalism but is challenged by the inertia of 
bureaucracy, and non-state actors can be poorly resourced but bring benefit from their 
dynamic approach, local context and knowledge. 
Findings suggested that the inclusion of non-state actors ('community involvement') is a 
component, outcome and indicator of effective partnership-working. Achieving the three 
together demonstrates a sustainable and effective partnership, and by using this as a central 
aim, a delivery model can be developed to operationalise the environmental governance 
concept. However, community involvement as a component may in reality bring limited 
engagement, i. e. involvement in partnership formulation, but not necessarily delivery. Third 
sector actors, for example, are frequently consulted to provide evidence of local need to 
support a funding bid, but are not always included as delivery partners if / when funding is 
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secured and subsequently disbursed. Whilst it is not realistic to expect that every community 
consultee becomes a delivery partner, a partnership model should be developed where each 
actor will benefit either directly or indirectly. Thus, community involvement acts as an 
indicator of environmental partnership-working, enabling commentators to assess the success 
of the partnership approach. As this research has shown, however, bridging the 
implementation gap (moving from 'intent to action') is one of the main challenges facing 
environmental partnerships (Greer, 2001; Jordan, 2002; Lowncles et ol., 1997: 334). 
The next section draws on the conclusions drawn from the analyses of three critical areas of 
responsibility, legitimacy and accountability, plus experiences from the MTPN. 
8.6.1 Components of an Effective Partnership-Working Model 
A number of lessons have been learnt from this study. Firstly, EPPP democratic legitimacy 
should be secured via community consultation, with stakeholder engagement being designed 
into a project to avoid the assumption that the engagement with a certain number of non- 
state actors automatically secures legitimacy (Lowncles and Sullivan, 2004). This can be done 
via focus groups, open community meetings, surveys and questionnaires. Care should also be 
taken to consult the local community during the EPPP formulation process. As highlighted by 
OPAL, stakeholder engagement in the formulation stage improves project uptake when the 
project is being delivered. Care should also be taken to ensure representation from across the 
Policy Implementation Continuum. Conceptualised throughout this thesis as 'state' and 'non- 
state', actors are further stratified within this model to include government, QUANGO, third 
sector and private sector. Findings have concluded that inclusion of actors from all four levels 
contribute to EPPP success for reasons of legitimacy, new funding opportunities, professional 
expertise and local knowledge (Connelly et aL, 2006; Dryzek, 2001; Goodwin, 1998; Imrie and 
Raco, 1999; Stoker, 1998 and 2006). Although this consultation is key, it is important to avoid 
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'consultation overload' and 'participation fatigue'. There is a danger that problems may be 
compounded by additional, stanclardised, layers of 'partnership' activity. It was widely 
acknowledged by MTPN actors that partnership membership can prove to be a significant 
drain on resources, with meetings and events often blurring their focus of project delivery. A 
clear and concise strategy for partner and stakeholder communication and engagement is 
therefore beneficial. 
The equitable distribution of funding and allocation of project resources (i. e. transport, IT, 
office space and equipment, tools and equipment, etc) was also highlighted by mainly non- 
state actors. Findings, mainly through direct consultation, suggest that opportunities should be 
presented to non-state actors to play a leading role in the funding process i. e. through the co- 
writing of funding applications. As demonstrated by OPAL, the inclusion of third sector actors 
in the financial development stage of a project can ensure fair allocation of resources in line 
with operational responsibilities, i. e. the allocation to Moor trees of an annual office budget. 
This also leads to new investment in community partners with potentially wider benefits to 
non-project specific activities (see also Section 8.5.2). Moor Trees, for example, also 
negotiated use of the OPAL minibus for non-OPAL activities when not being used for OPAL 
work. 
Flexibility and variability of implementation strategy - it is important to avoid the over- 
regulation of partnership activity in order to protect adaptation to local conditions and to 
create room for innovation (Lowndes and Sullivan, 2004). Davies (2002: 197) also argued that 
partnerships need to retain a degree of flexibility to 'accommodate unthought-of of 
possibilities'. 
The transparency of internal management practices maintains stakeholder support as well as 
advancing legitimacy claims (Honders and Bruijn, 2008; Davidson and Lockwood, 2008; 
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Hernmati, 2002; Paavola, 2007; Savan et oL, 2004). Findings suggest that the adoption of a 
holistic as opposed to a hierarchical accountability structure increases outputs and the 
sustainability of outcomes (see Section 7.4), i. e. a more qualitative approach favoured by non- 
state funders, in contrast to the quantitative audit culture of most state programmes. This was 
conceptualised by Dixon et oL (2006) as 'downward accountability' to beneficiaries and 
'upward accountability'to the state. 
There should be defined roles and responsibilities, clear administration and accounting 
procedures, including mutual agreement between state and non-state actors regarding 
managerial technologies (see Section 7.3) (Castree, 2003; Jepson, 2002; Mackinnon, 2000; 
Ward and McNicholas, 1998). Inter-sector collaborations present new opportunities as well as 
threats of competition amongst members (Lowndes and Skelcher, 1998). Partnerships are 
unlikely to deliver enhanced public participation unless there is a specific value commitment. A 
strong vision, with common and clear understanding of roles and responsibilities is required. A 
clear internal and external communications strategy is required to underpin this. 
Defined timescoles. Lowndes and Skelcher (1998: 320) argue that partnerships go through a 
four stage life cycle; (1) Pre-partnership collaboration; (2) creation and consolidation; (3) 
programme delivery, and (4) Termination or succession. Interview and survey feedback has 
also strongly suggested that partnerships need to have a beginning and end. It has also been 
argued that partnerships have a natural life and that problems can occur when they are 
continued beyond it so an exit strategy should also be created. 
Power Structures. An equitable distribution of operational responsibilities in line with funding 
allocation is important, with open access to resources and decision-making processes and 
equal opportunity for effective participation by all. 
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8.7 Conclusion 
This chapter has analysed partnership-working in the context of the MTPN. Taking lessons 
learnt from the OPAL partnership, it has sought to implement the conceptual environmental 
partnership-working model (see Figure 4.1) through the development of a checklist to move 
from theory into practice. Concurring with Westholm (1999), data has also shown that tri- 
sectoral representation in partnerships, where public, private and voluntary actors work 
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together, is a fundamental defining feature of partnerships. Partnerships between these 
groups are also an important means of delivering action on the ground, developing new ideas 
and providing innovative solutions (HM Government, 2005). Partnership-working has further 
shown the advantages of local knowledge and contextualisation, community involvement in 
both EIPIPP formulation and delivery, and increased funding opportunities. However, these 
opportunities are also subject to the threats and challenges of power structures, under- 
resourcing and inter-actor communications (Franks and McGloin, 2006; Pearce and Mawson, 
2003; Sampford, 2002; Summerville et aL, 2008). Recommendations have been made in the 
environmental partnership-working checklist to overcome the above challenges. 
The funding of partnerships, in particular, received much analysis and discussions, with data 
suggesting that new opportunities via the National Lottery, European and government 
programmes have arisen to promote multi-actor, cross-sector collaborations. This 
encouragement of state / non-state partnerships has, however, become subject to a degree of 
acrimony by non-state actors, where it has been pointed out that the state is joining 
environmental partnerships to leverage these new funds (intended for the third sector) to 
subsidise their own budget-restricted EPPP: 
The Countryside Commission (along with English Nature) has been unusually successful in 
securing Lottery funding to promote its own general objectives (Bishop et aL 2000, in Curry, 
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2001: 567). The government, however, contends that it Is strongly committed to creating a 
framework in which the sector can continue to flourish, be strong and independent, and that: 
The Voluntary and Community Sector continues to make a significant contribution to 
service delivery and strengthening communities. It is a key partner in delivering 
government policies (HM Treasury, 2002: 5). 
As argued by Edwards et oL (2001), the aim, size, scale, power, balance, funding and duration 
of partnerships vary considerably, but commentators have suggested that they play 
increasingly important roles within policy delivery and the governance of the UK (Goodwin, 
1998; Marsden and Murdoch, 1998). Thus, it appears to be a government priority to make 
partnership-working a key EPPP implementation mechanism through the provision of start-up 
funding for new partnerships, and working to break down policy barriers to partnership 
activity (HM Government, 2005). What remains, however, is the adoption of an effective 
partnership-working model that will bring equitable distribution of resources across the Policy 
Implementation Continuum to enable non-state actors to occept the state's devolved 
responsibility, to ocquire stakeholder legitimacy and to provide sufficient levels of 
accountability whilst retaining the innovation and dynamism opportunities that partnership- 
working can create. 
Partnership-working and environmental governance continue to be, for the most part, studied 
in isolation from each other by policy makers and academics (Connelly et OL, 2006; Darlow and 
Newby, 1997; Goodwin, 1998; Hastings, 1996; Jessop, 1998; Marsden and Murdoch, 1998; 
Rhodes, 1997; Stoker, 1993; Healy, 1992; Huxham, 1996; Jessop, 1998,2002,2005; Mackinnon, 
2002; Rhodes, 1997; Stoker, 1998). This thesis has sought to fuse the two concepts to further 
the understanding of the partnership approach as a delivery framework for environmental 
governance. It has conceptualised partnership-working as a subset of governance where the 
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state is engaging in new partnerships with non-state actors to formulate and deliver EPPP. 
Further conceptualisation through firstly the Policy Implementation Continuum (an adaptation 
of Wilson et oL's (1999) EU Policy Implementation Adoption model) and, secondly, the 
Effective Partnership-Working model, have identified responsibility, legitimacy and 
accountability as key components of an effective partnership. Although each of these issues 
has independently received some attention by academics to date, little or no work has been 
carried out in the context of environmental partnership-working. 
it has also been noted that although scholars have provided much theoretical discussion 
regarding environmental partnership-working, comparatively little empirical focus has been 
given to the local and other non-state actor partnership which this thesis identified as 
important implementers of EPPP. To address this gap within current policy research, this thesis 
explored the MTPN as its empirical focus, with my embeddedness producing a rich set of 
qualitative and quantitative data through a mixed methodology. The network included a range 
of government, QUANGO, third and private sector actors, representing all four levels of the 
Policy Implementation Continuum. Actor attitudes and behaviours towards partnership- 
working were analysed, contributing towards a better understanding of partnership-working, 
in particular highlighting the continued prominence of the state in partnership-led governance 
and the challenges of putting policy into practice (Eden, 2009). It also highlighted how the 
legitimacy of EPPP increases grassroots uptake (Ferretti, 2006) and, therefore, the robustness 
of the governance approach. 
In this final part of the thesis, the empirical and theoretical analyses are drawn together. 
Conclusions and findings are summarised, ranging from the broad concept of environmental 
governance, to the narrower subset of partnership-working and finally the specific 
components of responsibility, legitimacy and accountability. Suggestions are then made for 
future research into environmental partnership-working. 
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Chapter 9: Conclusion 
9.1 Aims and Objectives 
By focusing on Moor Trees and its partnership network as a case study for environmental 
partnership-working, this thesis has addressed a gap in partnership research studies, as well as 
providing an insight into the world of the street-level environmental actor. To achieve this, the 
research addressed four objectives, the key findings of which are now surnmarised in the 
following section. 
9.2 Key Findings 
Objective one: Using the MTPN as a case study, to analyse whether and to what extent the 
state is devolving responsibility and authority for environmental decision-making and the 
delivery of EPPP to the non-stote, or grassroots, octor level through discourses of community 
responsibility, partnership-working and self-governing. 
Analysis revealed the consistent theme of the challenge of operationalising state-formulated 
EPPP through non-state partnerships, and the lack of resources made available to these 
partnerships as a consistent restraint. The continued top-down approach of state-imposed 
managerial technologies and an audit culture that has restricted non-state actor flexibility and 
dynamism suggests that ideas governance heterarchies need to be challenged. Instead, the 
study suggests that the state (in the UK, at least) is retaining control and power by governing 
through communities, despite of the environmental governance concept suggesting that the 
state should replace direct intervention with community responsibility and self-governing 
through partnership-working. 
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Objective Two: To assess if democratic legitimacy is lost through the inclusion of non-elected, 
non-state actors in the formulation and delivery of EPPP. 
Findings concluded that partnerships theoretically contribute to the democratic legitimacy of 
EPPP and, therefore good governance, but only if increased levels of stakeholder engagement 
are secured. However, it was argued that, in reality, community engagement in EPPP 
formulation can be lacking and unrepresentative, due to selective representation by a core 
group of non-state actors. It was concluded that the legitimisation of EPPP (through public 
participation) should be 'designed-in' and not 'assumed-in', and that the increasing complexity 
of multi-actor state / non-state partnerships can result in unclear decision structures and 
diminished accountability. 
Objective Three: To explore the financial and operational accountability framework(s) of the 
MTPN and to analyse the implications of quantitative and qualitative reporting mechanisms. 
Accountability from partnership actor(s) to stakeholder(s) emerged as the final step towards 
effective partnership-working. However, often complex accountability frameworks were 
considered by many MTPN actors to be a significant strain on resources, although they could 
also lead to improved support and actor commitment. The 'Partnership Principal' concept 
argued that (often state) donors can assume rights of authority over grantees through a top- 
down approach, as opposed to the proposed heterarchy of a governance system. Cases study 
analysis of the MTPN concluded that hierarchical accountability can lead to unsustainable 
resource implications, whilst holistic accountability can present a wider, more transparent and 
legitimacy-building form of accountability to stakeholders. 
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Objective Four: To critically assess the Moor Trees Partnership Network to further the 
understanding of the practical issues that environmental partnerships must address in order to 
become effective delivery vehicles for EPPP. 
It was concluded that the local knowledge and contextualisation offered by state/non-state 
partnerships are an increasingly important means of delivering action on the ground, 
developing new ideas and providing innovative solutions, although they are threatened by the 
challenges of power structures, under-resourcing (especially the lack of funding) and inter- 
actor communications. It was further concluded that an effective partnership-working model is 
needed to enable non-state actors to accept the state's devolved responsibility, to acquire 
stakeholder legitimacy, and to provide sufficient levels of accountability whilst retaining the 
innovation and dynamism opportunities that partnership-working can create. A checklist was 
developed to provide the baseline for such a model. 
9.3 Environmental Governance 
The governance concept was widely studied in the 1990s, resulting in numerous conclusions 
regarding the shift from top-down 'government' to bottom-up 'governance, a 'changed order 
of rule', the greater inclusion of non-state actors, community involvement and the blurring of 
boundaries between state and non-state actors (Goodwin 1998; Jessop, 1998; Marsden and 
Murdoch, 1998; Rhodes, 1997; Stoker, 1993,1997,1998). In part, through the adoption of 
Foucault's ideas regarding governing through community, New Labour's Active Citizenship 
agenda of the late 1990s was subsequently set out in the Rural White Paper of 2000. Thus, the 
governance approach has become embedded in both academic and governmental discourse. 
More recently, environmental governance has been awarded an increasing profile due to 
climate change, sustainable development, and food and energy security, with the 
commodification of nature, in particular, receiving much attention in recent years (Higgins and 
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Lockie, 2002; Liverman 2004; Mackinnon, 2002; McCarthy, 2004,2005; Sonnenfield and Mol, 
2002). As such, the mechanisms of environmental governance continue to evolve, with 
partnership-working appearing to be on the agenda of most actors within the Policy 
Implementation Continuum. For the purpose of this research, I contextualised governance to 
the environmental sector ('environmental governance') through the following definition: 
The devolution of power and responsibility by the state to non-state actors for the 
formulation and delivery of environmental plans, policies and programmes 
Source: Author 
The aim of this definition was to compare the concept of governance with practicalities of the 
environmental sector and to highlight the devolution of power and responsibility. It is this 
devolution that provided the basis for the key findings of the thesis through its subsequent 
unpacking of the issues of accepting responsibility, acquiring legitimacy and providing 
accountability. 
In the context of environmental partnerships, this research has found environmental 
governance to be an evolving construct, with its mechanisms continuing to 'evolve in response 
to new problems and the growing influence of neoliberalism' (Bailey, 2007: 546). The market- 
based approach has been a recurring theme in this thesis, especially with the increased 
involvement by non-state actors in EPPP and the growing hybridity in the way that 
environmental problems are governed through devolution of responsibility to the (partly state- 
controlled) markets and individuals (Bailey and Maresh, 2009; Boonstra, 2006; Bumpus and 
Liverman, 2008; Jordan et oL, 2005; Mackinnon, 2002). As argued by Bakker (2005,2009) and 
further supported through data collected from interaction with MTPN actors in this study, 
however, ideological differences run deep, with data also suggesting that free market 
environmentalism (or the commodification of nature) is at the same time disapproved of and 
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embraced by both state and non-state actors (see also Goldman, 1998; Liverman, 2004; 
McCarthy and Prudham, 2003). 
It has also been widely argued that governance includes a blurring of the boundaries between 
state and non-state actors, where the state engages in a new, less hierarchical forms of 
relationship with non-state actors, blurring the distinction between 'the public' and 'the 
private' (see, for example, Connelly et aL, 2006; Goodwin, 1998; Jessop, 1998,2002,2005; 
Mackinnon, 2002; Murdoch, 1997; Rhodes, 1997; Stoker, 1998; Winter, 2006). This study, 
however, contends that, instead of a withdrawal by, or clecoupling of, the state regarding 
EPPP, there is actually a thkkening of boundaries or deepening of involvement, whereby the 
state is instead embedding itself in previously marginalised stakeholder groups under the 
auspice of the bottom-up approach. This thickening could also be argued to be the state's 
efforts to maintain the reins of power whilst outwardly appearing to adopt a more devolved 
approach. Section 7.3 supported this argument through its findings regarding managerial 
technologies (see also Logan and Wekerle, 2008; Lockie, 2009; Mackinnon, 2000; Ward and 
McNicholas, 1998), whilst also finding parallels with the arguments of Rhodes (1996) and 
Stoker (1998) that the capacities of the state are limited but that its roles are changing from 
provider and controller to facilitator and enabler. 
This thickening has parallels with Swyngedouw's (2004: 25) argument regarding the rescaling of 
I glocalisation, i. e. that there is a shift in the locus of control upwards to global scales and 
downwards to the scale of the individual or to local or regional configurations as part of a 
reorganisation of society. Findings suggest that the state retains an arm's length controlling 
interest in environmental governance, primarily through funding (i. e. AES and EWGS, see 
Section 4.3 and 4.4), though also through legislation i. e. statutory designations. This thickening 
of the state would perhaps be contended by some who argue that society is actually 
experiencing a 'hollowing out' or 'rolling back' of the state through a redistribution of 
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functions to non-state actors (Jepson, 2005; Jessop, 1991,1998; MacLeod and Goodwin, 1999; 
Yarwood, 2002; see also Mackinnon, 2000; and Raco and Imrie, 2000 regarding 'governing 
from a distance'). The challenge, therefore, is to distinguish between the state-inclusive and 
state-exempt paradigm shift of environmental governance. If the former, then it could be 
argued that instead of a 'blurring', the environmental sector is indeed experiencing a 
'thickening' or 'dove-tailing' of state control that challenges state rhetoric regarding new 
bottom-up approach of governance and apparent support for a semi-autonomous third sector. 
If the latter, then Gains and Stoker's (2009) argument that the inclusion of new non-state 
networks challenges and complicates the roles played by state actors would also support the 
assertions made in this research regarding the EPPP implementation gap (defined by Lowncles 
at a/. (1997: 334) as the difference between intent and action) evident between policy and 
practice (see Section 5.4). 
Stakeholder engagement is widely acknowledged as a way to overcome the implementation 
gap through what could be termed the empowerment paradigm of joint responsibility and 
ownership (Evans, 2004; Fairbrass, 2003; Jepson, 2005; Lowndes and Skelcher, 1998; Raco et 
al,. 2006; Sampford, 2002). With the implementation gap described as a disjuncture between 
policy and practice, this research brought an empirical focus to analysis of this concept via 
actors stratified within the Policy Implementation Continuum, concluding that a bias remains 
towards state formulation and non-state delivery. This bias is, in part, responsible for poor 
uptake of EPPP at the local level due to disenfranchisement resulting from poor stakeholder 
engagement during the EPPP formulation process. Although it is asserted by some (Bulkeley, 
2005; Liverman, 2004; O'Toole and Burdess, 2004; Thompson, 2005) that governance includes 
state actors playing non-exclusive roles and the greater inclusion of non-state actors, findings 
have suggested that the state has devolved responsibility for EPPP delivery whilst retaining 
control of formulation. This disjuncture presents further research opportunities (see 9.6, 
Research Theme 1), including an analysis of continued 'top-down' (state) control of the 
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'bottom-up' (non-state) approach to EPPP formulation and delivery, I. e. the recent 
reintroduction of state actors into the environmental governance approach of non-state 
partnership-working (see 9.4). This is compounded by this study's findings suggesting lack of 
representation, partnership exclusivity and increasing state inclusion in third sector 
partnerships, which raises further questions regarding exactly how 'local' is the local approach 
(see 9.6, Research Theme 3). However, Rhodes (1996) argued that governance entails the state 
allocating resources and exercising control and co-ordination, whilst Bulkeley (2005) asserted 
that state actors are not necessarily the only or most significant participants, and that rather 
than seeing government and governance as necessarily opposite, they are part of a continuum 
of governing by state and non-state actors. These arguments, therefore, support the assertions 
of this thesis that the state remains the controlling and dominant actor in environmental 
governance. 
Empirical and theoretical findings suggest, therefore, that the state remains the dominant 
actor in governance networks. I have argued that environmental governance is in practice only 
an EPPP delivery vehicle that remains firmly embedded within a hierarchical state framework 
during the formulation process. I have also argued that the widely argued blurring of 
boundaries are in fact more a strengthening of state governing through its continuing control 
of the Policy Implementation Continuum through governance based on hierarchies (Paavola et 
aL, 2009). Herein lays a further research opportunity regarding this thickening of the state (see 
9.6, Research Theme 2). Situated within this research would also be an analysis of the differing 
governance regimes within the environmental sector, including aims, objectives, outcomes and 
process evaluations. The reason for identifying differing regimes, Paavola et aL (2009) argued, 
is the difficulty in disentangling the influence of one process from many. The environmental 
sector, for example, offers different frameworks for analysis, including AES (see Section 4.3), 
EWGS (see Section 4.4) and Local Biodiversity Action Plans (see Sections 5.3.1 and 5.4.1). 
Analysis of these governance frameworks will show how actors at different levels of the Policy 
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Implementation Continuum interact with each other, Including market-based approaches, 
state control, partnership-working and the representativeness of community-based Initiatives. 
9.4 The Partnership Approach 
The Rio Earth Summit's 'local approach' now underpins many approaches to environmental 
issues, with Local Agenda 21 providing an early environmental governance framework to 
implement global aims through national, regional and local policies (Evans, 2004; Vogler; 2005, 
Raco et at, 2006). This framework is, for the most part, based on the assumption that 
partnerships bring collaborative advantage (Darlow and Newby, 1997; Huxham, 1996) through 
self-governing networks aiming to influence policy and facilitate the delivery of EPPP (Edwards 
et a/., 2001; Goodwin, 1998; Rhodes, 1996; Stoker, 1998,2000). Whilst also part of the shift 
from government to governance (Marsden and Murdoch, 1998), partnerships also respond to 
the complex and multi-faceted nature of EPPP, the inter-connectedness of EPPP spanning 
local, regional and international levels, and 'widening the agenda from the environment to 
sustainability or sustainable development, with its economic, social, and political dimensions' 
(Fairbrass, 2003: 14). 
Unlike international regulations resulting from inter-govern mentally negotiated agreements, 
these new partnerships rely on the voluntary commitments of non-state actors, working in 
collaboration with states, in order to accelerate the implementation of sustainable 
development goals. Due to these features, many scholars of international relations and of 
environmental studies have recognised partnerships (within and outside of the UN system) as 
new institutions in environmental governance (Mert, 2009). Consequently, it is argued by 
some that partnerships are seen to be an improved method of problem solving as they apply a 
multi-agency approach to multi-dimensional problems (Greer, 2001; Scott, 2004). It is further 
argued that partnership-working is becoming increasingly important at the local level, as cross- 
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sector partnerships including public, private and third sector actors work to improve EPPP 
delivery and to overcome the bureaucracy of traditional state models (Edwards et aL, 2001; 
Lowndes and Sullivan, 2004; Yarwood, 2002). The government includes partnership-working 
on five occasions in its 'Securing the future - delivering the UK's sustainable Development 
Strategy' (HM Government, 2005) and on four occasions in 'The Role of the VCS in Service 
Delivery' (HM Treasury, 2002) white paper. Partnership-working became integral to New 
Labour's Third Way politics, where it sought to overcome the inefficiency of bureaucracy and 
the inequity of market solutions (Lowndes and Sullivan, 2004). However, Lowncles and Sullivan 
(2004: 52) argued that New Labour's approach has added to the 'complexity of the institutional 
terrain with the introduction of new regional structures and the proliferation of micro-level 
agencies operating 'below' the local authority level'. 
This thesis explored and analysed the partnership approach to environmental governance 
through the empirical lens of the Moor Trees Partnership Network. The researcher's 
embeddedness in the sector provided a rich mix of qualitative and quantitative data from a 
variety of state and non-state actors, with findings supporting Lowndes and Sullivan's 
assertions regarding institutional complexity, i. e. that the state is 'thickening', as opposed to 
'hollowed out'. A key feature of partnerships is stakeholder collaboration through an 
interactive and discursive process. Further analysis, however, identified inaccuracies in the 
incorrect assumption by state actors that partnerships are automatically more inclusive than 
bureaucratic or market-based approaches, i. e. that the governance model often assumes 
stakeholder involvement due to its inclusion of non-state actors. A lack of representation 
within partnerships was explored in Section 6.2.2, where it was found that partnerships can be 
accused of selective representation by a central core of arguably national policy-aligned actors. 
As such, the environmental sector can be subject to contested legitimacy, resulting in reduced 
uptake at the grassroots level (see Section 8.5.6, where the OPAL project provides an example 
of how extensive community consultation can lead to a successful grassroots uptake). 
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It was concluded that as a key aspect of governance (Stoker, 1997), community Involvement 
needs to be designed-in to local partnerships via the effective partnership-working model (see 
Figure 4.1), and not assumed-in. It was further concluded that community involvement should 
be seen as both an outcome and a component of partnership-working (see also Lowncles and 
Sullivan, 2004), supporting the case for an ongoing and evolving stakeholder engagement 
process throughout the partnership approach. Indeed, findings suggested that public 
participation and cross-sector involvement implies a heterarchy of like-minded actors involved 
in the formulation and delivery of EPPP. 
Lowncles and Skelcher (1998) also argued that partnerships are traditionally nested in 
mutuality and trust, with other commentators arguing that they increase funding 
opportunities (Hodge, 2007; Martin, 1995; Pearce and Mawson, 2009; Thompson, 2005; 
Yarwood, 2002). Researcher findings from the MTPN, however, contested these assertions, 
presenting an argument that mutuality and trust can be lost through the necessity to compete 
for the new funds that partnerships make available. This was evident in a number of MTPN 
partnerships. Natural England's Access to Nature programme, in particular, provided an 
example of a new (state-managed) funding programme aimed at partnership-working, which 
created numerous trust issues amongst partnership actors regarding the allocation of awarded 
funds (see Section 7.2.3). This new competitive approach to funding, findings suggest, can be 
attributed to the unsustainable growth of the third sector9l resulting from New Labour's 
enthusiasm for contracting out public services and its Active Citizenship agenda. To compound 
this problem, the sector is also suffering from a resource deficit (see Section 5.3) due to a focus 
on project-based funding whilst not simultaneously providing for the core9' costs of the 
organisation. It was also found that, as a result of these funding constraints, the power 
attributed and / or assumed to members at each level varied in its form and effectiveness with 
91 The Cabinet Office's Office of the Third Sector (2008) describes the third sector as including a variety of non- 
profit organisations, including; voluntary and community organisations, charities, social enterprises, co-operatives, 
mutuals, societies, housing association, faith groups, and trusts, It estimated that there were 104,391 third sector 
organisations in 2008 with approximately 634,000 employees, a rise of 65% since 2000/01. 
92 Core costs refer to the central office costs incurred in the running of projects. 
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an ensuing unequal power balance between 'technically equal' actors (Yarwood, 2002). These 
power structures became especially evident as it was found that actors came to partnerships 
with different resources, making it difficult, for example, for third sector actors to have their 
voices heard on funding requirements alongside better-resourced government and private 
sector actors (Balloch and Taylor, 2001). Experiences recorded from a number of MTPN third 
sector actors supported this argument, raising questions regarding the status and profile 
awarded by the state to non-state actors without whom governance networks would be 
deemed unrepresentative. 
Partnership power constructs and a lack of real community representation became a recurring 
theme throughout the MTPN. These findings supported the arguments by some scholars that 
community involvement in partnerships can be tokenistic and designed to placate public 
scepticism regarding the democratic legitimacy of the programmes the partnerships had been 
formed to deliver (Arnstein, 1968; Lowndes and Sullivan, 2004; Savan et al., 2004). A number 
of MTPN 'community involvement', 'stakeholder engagement' and 'public participation' 
initiatives were analysed, with broad agreement from actors involved that this capacity- 
building and creation of social capital was important in achieving sustainable development 
goals at the local level. However, many partnerships within the MTPN adopted a two-tiered 
approach to EPPP formulation and delivery. The first tier focused on formulation and consisted 
of state and an exclusive set of non-state actors. The second tier focused on delivery and 
included a wider set of grassroots actors often 'contracted-in' to bring legitimacy and provide 
the EPPP delivery mechanism. This thesis has conceptualised 'contra cting-in' as situated 
alongside Stoker's (1998) 'contracting-out' of public services and Jessop's (1995) 'hollowing 
out' of the state. Supported by the analyses of Section 7.3 (managerial technologies) and 
Section 8.4 (state domination), it becomes clear that further empirical focus is needed to 
further the theoretical and conceptual understanding of partnerships (see 9.6, Research 
Theme 4), as my findings have contended with arguments by many scholars regarding their 
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collaborative advantage and policy-influencing roles (Darlow and Newby, 1997; Goodwin, 
1998; Huxham, 1996; Healy, 1992; Marsden and Murdoch, 1998; Rhodes, 1996; Stoker, 1998). 
Although the partnership concept is not a new one, bridging the implementation gap still 
challenges both researchers and practitioners. Conceptualised by the 'Effective Partnership- 
working' model and placed in the environmental context, this thesis found the components of 
responsibility (Curry, 2001; Gibbs and Jonas, 2000; Jepson, 2005; Pearce and Mawson, 2003; 
Raco and Imrie, 2000), legitimacy (Connelly et ol., 2006; Dryzek, 2001; Goodwin, 1998; 
Lowncles and Sullivan, 2004; Stoker, 2006; Wallington et ol., 2008) and accountability (Erkkila, 
2007; Davidson and Lockwood, 2008; Goodin, 2003; Jepson, 2005; Jessop, 1997; Mackinnon, 
2000; Paavola, 2007) to be addressed through existing academic literature as separate but not 
as combined concepts and with little empirical focus. This study sought to combine these 
components to form a partnership-working framework through the development of the 
effective partnership-working Model. it was concluded that, placed within the framework of 
environmental governance, the components ran not concurrently, but sequentially. Firstly, the 
responsibility for EPPPs needs to be devolved by the state, secondly they need to acquire 
legitimacy, and finally, the partnerships created to formulate and deliver the EPPP need to 
provide accountability (see Part IV of this thesis). 
Despite state discourses of community responsibility and self-governing through partnership- 
working (Thompson, 2005), analysis of the responsibility component by this study highlighted 
the challenges faced by the state when seeking to put policy into practice. It showed that, 
whilst it is conceptually and strategically embraced by the state through working with levels 3 
and 4 of the Policy Implementation Continuum, non-state actors from the MTPN were found 
to be increasingly hesitant in accepting EPPP responsibility due to the bureaucratic drag and 
audit culture of state intervention (see Section 7.3.2 regarding Managerial Technologies and 
Section 7.4 regarding hierarchical power structures). Wider literature frames these issues as 
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I governing from a distance' (Raco and Imrie, 2000) and 'governing through communities' 
(Murdoch, 1997)'. MTPN actors supported these assertions by suggesting that the 
government's grassroots approach is more rhetoric than reality. To support these assertions, 
many MTPN actors referred to the lack of funding made available by the state to the 
environmental sector, with some suggesting that the state is, in part, devolving responsibility 
to benefit itself from new funding streams made accessible through working in partnership 
with non-state actors (see Section 7.2.3, regarding Natural England's Access to Nature 
programme). This conclusion does, however, contend with wider scholarly opinion and 
government white papers which suggest that partnership-working increases funding 
opportunities (Hodge, 2007; Martin, 1995; Pearce and Mawson, 2009; Thompson, 2005; 
Yarwood, 2002). This presents further opportunities for further empirical analysis by 
academics and policy-makers alike. 
This study placed acquiring legitimacy as the next step towards effective partnership-working. 
Dryzek (2001) argued that legitimacy requires reflective assent (that action(s) only become 
legitimate when the actor has the approval of society i. e. those affected by the action(s)), and 
Connelly et oL (2006) argued that partnership legitimacy is often asserted through direct 
access by previously marginalised stakeholders. These arguments were found conceptually to 
underpin environmental governance, with partnerships seeking to provide the delivery 
mechanism for stakeholder engagement (see also Wheeler, 1996 regarding partnership 
improving local democracy). Stoker (1993) and Hutchinson (1994) also recognised that 
stakeholder legitimation is required for local sustainability strategies (Dryzek 1997, Edwards et 
aL, 2000). However, this study concluded that the lack of democratic legitimacy of these 
unelected actors led to reduced stakeholder engagement in the case of the MTPN (Boonstra, 
2006; Bulkeley, 2005; Dryzek, 2001; Mackinnon, 2000). It also found a lack of community 
involvement in EPPP formulation, with further questions raised about the democratic 
accountability of non-elected actors due to the absence of the legitimation mechanisms of 
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representative democracy (Connelly et oL, 2006; Dryzek, 2001; Goodwin, 1998; Imrie and 
Raco, 1999; Jepson, 2005; Mackinnon, 2000 and 2002). In addressing these perceived failures 
of partnership-working, it was concluded that stakeholder engagement needs to be 
representative of the wider community, whilst at the same time including a holistic 
accountability structure (see Section 7.5). Indeed, the multi-actor, semi-autonomous networks 
of environmental governance provide significant accountability challenges, with this study 
having identified four accountability scenarios through both a review of existing literature and 
empirical findings from the MTPN: 
1. Environmental partnerships can become less accountable to the state by creating self- 
regulating operational and governance frameworks and structures (Goodwin, 1998; 
Imrie and Raco, 1998,1999; Jepson 2005; Jessop, 1998; Mackinnon, 2000,2002; 
Stoker, 1998). 
2. Perhaps conversely, MTPN membership and sta keholder-d riven environmental actors 
have diluted their accountability to members and stakeholders due to the increased 
accountability to funders' (often state) aims and objectives (Connelly et aL, 2006; Eden 
et aL, 2006; Goodwin, 1998; Jepson, 2005). Take, for example, the Moor Trees OPEP 
initiative, which is largely accountable to state actors whilst remaining largely removed 
from traditional member and stakeholder groups, in part, due to the privacy and 
security requirements of the programme. 
3. The contracting-out of public services lacks government monitoring and review 
methodologies, resulting in scape-goating, blame avoidance and difficulties for the 
citizen to attribute responsibility for programme quality, effectiveness and efficiency 
of delivery (Boonstra, 2006; Jepson, 2005; Raco et a/., 2006; Sava n et oL, 2004; Stoker, 
1996; Yarwood, 2002). 
4. The implied shift from hierarchical to heterarchical networks has been stifled by state 
managerial technologies implemented via third sector funding programmes and 
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environmental legislation (Jepson, 2005; Logan and Wekerle, 2008; Lockie, 2009; 
Mackinnon, 2000; MacLeod and Goodwin, 1999; Yarwood, 2002). 
This study concluded that whilst the state builds its environment governance approach 
through discourses of devolved responsibility, community involvement, partnership-working 
and a quasi-entrepreneurial third sector, in reality the state has created a framework where it 
retains control of both EPPP formulation and delivery, and community engagement rhetoric is 
far outpacing the reality of partnerships on the ground (Taylor, 2007). Although partnership- 
working is argued to be conceptually sound and a delivery model that is widely embraced by 
state and non-state actors, I have concluded that a more robust approach is needed for it to be 
effective. In support of this assertion, questions have been raised as to why partnerships are 
beset by the problems highlighted in this study. One argument is that EPPPs are deeply 
affected by European Union level policy-making and that British environmental governance is 
challenged by the state's need to preserve relations with the European Union from whom high 
levels of funding are provided and by whom much environmental policy is formulated 
(Fairbrass, 2003). indeed, I found funding to be central to many arguments and also that the 
state continues to dominate EPPP formulation (whilst in practice seeking to devolve 
responsibility for delivery). Further, state / non-state tensions are evident regarding EPPP 
subsidiarity, with policy analysts needing to merge theoretical and conceptual understandings 
of the partnership approach to environmental governance with wider empirical findings of 
environmental partnership-working. 
To conclude, there remains a knowledge gap surrounding the practicalities of partnership- 
working, about their successes, and about the obstacles to effective working (Edwards et OL, 
2000). This study has sought to address this knowledge gap through its empirical focus on the 
MTPN. The resulting Policy Implementation Continuum and Effective Partnership-working 
model provide a useful conceptual and methodological framework for further research. This 
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study has been situated within the environmental sector, but many of the findings and 
assertions are applicable to other sectors, with deeper analysis of partnership resilience and 
the development of implementation frameworks presenting exciting new research 
opportunities. 
9.5 Research Challenges, Positionality and Reflexivity 
This study collected and analysed data from the MTPN to assess the partnership approach to 
environmental governance. As pointed out by de Vaus (1996), whilst research should be 
methodologically robust, practically efficient and ethically sound, the three can conflict and 
require careful balancing. From the outset, it became clear that I was seen by some MTPN 
actors as both a researcher and a practitioner due to my Directorship at Moor Trees. I 
concluded that it was, therefore, critical to identify myself to all respondents as a researcher- 
practitioner due to the nature of the research i. e. the assessment of inter- and intra-actor 
relationships, including fiscal as well as operational analysis, presented methodological and 
ethical challenges. This conclusion was reinforced by the feedback I received from the 
sampling carried out within the network regarding willingness to take part in the study - whilst 
all agreed, many requested anonymity. My explanation of my Great Western Research 
sponsorship (as discussed in 3.6.5) was also an unexpected requirement at this stage. This 
further enforced my need to account for my positionality within the network and increased my 
awareness of the need to remain objective, as well as reflecting on my own influence on both 
respondent and researcher bias. Although these issues clearly formed part of an ethical 
approach, I also concluded that the reliability of the (mainly qualitative) data would be 
affected if respondents felt compromised regarding publication of their identification. Indeed, 
a large amount of rich and occasionally exclusive data was collected regarding the workings of 
environmental partnerships, some of which would be regarded by many MTPN actors as 
contentious. 
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The ethical challenge of my combined researcher-practitioner status was addressed by 
rigorous attention to informed consent and voluntary contribution. I also concluded that the 
sensitivity of some of the data collected necessitated further attention to the potential Impact 
of the research itself. Being a stakeholder-sponsored thesis, action research was a major 
theme in both the methodology and the subsequent potential impact of findings. It became 
clear from the start of the research process that I was more than a researcher embedding 
myself in the research topic -I was an established practitioner diversifying into a researcher 
role. Thus, I had a professional and ethical responsibility to professional and academic 
colleagues to respect confidentiality, research objectively and report with sensitivity. However, 
I also had a responsibility to my sponsors, with GWR seeking to benefit businesses in the 
south-west of the UK, and Moor Trees seeking to build academic and scientific credentials, and 
improve its reputation as an environmental actor through improved partnership-working. This 
meant that I had obligations to meet, including the reporting of occasionally privileged 
information. I approached this obligation by creating set of rules to ensure ethical soundness, 
including the constant review of data sources, including if and how findings could be 
published. Fortunately, assurances of anonymity were sufficient to enable my ultimate 
reporting of research findings, with further written consent also given by some actors to use 
some potentially contentious material. I was also fortunate (perhaps due to my researcher- 
practitioner status) that this study also benefited from high response rates to both the survey 
and interview requests, thus removing the need to compel individuals to participate, or to 
invade privacy through repetitive requests to participate (de Vaus, 1996). 
I would suggest that, due to the ethnographic nature of this study, my embeddedness within 
the environmental sector, the resulting access to all four levels of the Policy Implementation 
Continuum, and my dual researcher and practitioner roles resulted in the collection of high 
quality data. I also gained access to individuals from the most senior to the most junior within 
the Continuum's organisations. This itself presented further challenges due to the sensitivity of 
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some data collected (mostly through the semi-structured Interviews) from individuals 
commenting on their own organisation's approach to partnership-working, in particular, 
financial issues. I concluded that the availability of this data was partly through the position of 
trust that I held as a known practitioner, something that may not have been available had I 
only been known as a 'researcher'. Thus, I gained an insider's account of the MTPN whilst 
analysing through the eyes of an outsider. Indeed, some of the conclusions drawn from this 
study have challenged my own preconceived ideas and opinions about partnership-working. As 
such, I feel confident that I have remained as objective as possible and constantly allowed for 
my position as researcher-practitioner, including the retention of trust placed in me by the 
many MTPN actors with whom I have worked in carrying out this study. 
9.6 Directions for Future research 
Findings suggest that the state is increasingly acknowledging the limits of its influence and 
resources, and attempting to harness the powers of the third and private sector for the 
delivery of its EPPP. Evidence of entrepreneurialism, the commodification of nature and full 
cost recovery initiatives also suggests that non-state actors are beginning to work 
independently from the state to deliver state-formulated EPPP. Research is required to explore 
if these findings highlight contrasting approaches i. e. whether the state trying to engage, 
whilst non-state actors are seeking to retain independence and autonomy, or if non-state 
actors are indeed seeking to work more closely with the state to increase their influence on 
policy-making and to benefit from potential funding streams. I suggest therefore, that whilst 
governance is relatively easy to theorise and conceptualise, there is a limited understanding of, 
(i) the contemporary environmental context and the suggestion that the state is increasingly 
reliant on non-state actors for EPPP delivery; (ii) the commodification of natural resources and 
the assignment of property rights (especially in the climate change context) and (iii) the 
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practicalities and operational frameworks of these new approaches. As such, I suggest the 
following future research themes: 
1. The Governance Disjuncture: an analysis of the state devolution of responsibility and 
the empowerment of non-state actors. I suggest that discourses regarding the state 
devolving responsibility and empowering communities need to be explored in greater 
detail. In particular, by asking if the implementation gap between state governance 
policy and practice is intentional (by the state) so as to retain control of EPPP. 
2. The Thkkening of the State. I argue that instead of the state being 'hollowed out', it is, 
instead, actively 'thickening' its boundaries via an increasing involvement in multi- 
actor, cross sector partnership-working via managerial technologies. 
3. How local is the local? Examining partnership representativeness and exclusivity. 
Findings have suggested that partnerships can be selective in their representativeness, 
thus leading to the continued marginalisation of the community actors with whom the 
state wishes to engage to through environmental governance. 
4. An empirical focus to further the theoretical and conceptual understanding of 
partnerships, focusing on the realities of collaborative advantage and their potential 
for policy influence. 
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Appendix A: The Third Sector 
This sector consists of organisations sharing the common characteristics of being non- 
governmental 'not-for-profits' organisations which principally reinvest their surpluses to 
further social, environmental or cultural objectives. 
The Cabinet Office (2007) describes the Third Sector as encompassing voluntary & community 
organisations, charities, social enterprises, cooperatives and Mutuals both large and small (see 
Figure 3.3.1, level 3). In recognition of the growing role of this sector and the opportunities 
presented for the bottom-up implementation of PPP, The Office of the Third Sector (OTS) was 
created in May 2006 when the Home Office's Active Communities Directorate and the DTI's 
Social Enterprise Unit amalgamated. The decision to place the OTS at the centre of govemment 
in the Cabinet Office was taken in recognition of the increasingly important role the third 
sector plays in both society and the economy (Cabinet Office, 2007). 
The following information was sourced from the Cabinet Office (2007). 
Background 
The Office of the Third Sector was created in May 2006 when the Active Communities 
Directorate in the Home Office, and the Social Enterprise Unit, in the Department for Trade 
and Industry (DTI), amalgamated. The decision to place the OTS at the centre of government in 
the Cabinet Office was taken in recognition of the increasingly important role the third sector 
plays in both society and the economy. 
What is the third sector? 
The third sector is a diverse, active and passionate sector. Organisations in the sector share the 
common characteristics of being non-governmental organisations which are value-driven and 
which principally reinvest their surpluses to further social, environmental or cultural 
objectives. it encompasses voluntary and community organisations, charities, social 
enterprises, cooperatives and Mutuals both large and small. 
Our vision 
A thriving third sector, enabling people to change society. 
Our aims 
Our overarching aim is to develop an environment which enables the third sector to thrive, 
growing in its contribution to Britain's society, economy and environment. 
Our thematic aims are to work in partnership with the sector to: 
0 Enable campaigning and empowerment, particularly for those at risk of social 
exclusion. 
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" Strengthen communities, drawing together people from different sections of society. 
" Transform public services, through delivery, design, innovation and campaigning. 
" Enable social enterprise growth and development, combining business and social 
goals. 
Our role 
We deliver on our aims by: 
" Driving action to improve government and third sector partnership working and 
ensuring better terms of engagement, such as promoting the Compact. 
" Funding programmes to support the sector's development, such as Capacitybuilders 
and Futurebuilders. 
" Leading on the evidence base and analysis of the sector to better inform work of the 
government and third sector, such as the State of the Sector Panel and bespoke social 
enterprise research think pieces. 
" Ensuring a good regulatory environment for the sector, such as the implementation of 
the Charities Act 2006. 
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Appendix B: Survey Introduction Page 
My name is Clive Bastin. I am a PhD student at the University of Plymouth. I am studying 
environmental partnerships and am funded by Great Western Research 
(www. greatwesternresearch. ac. uk)- 
My main aim is to consider how partnerships play an increasing role in the 
environmental sector. My research looks at how these partnerships are used to deliver 
EPPP, and some of the issues involved. 
Thank you for sparing time to take part in this survey. This should take no more than 30 
minutes and no individual respondent or organisation will be identified in the published 
material. 
Please complete this questionnaire based on your organisation's experience of 
partnership working. 
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-Appendix C: Online survey Email Invitation 
Dear (inserted recipient name), 
As you may be aware, I am doing a PhD in Environmental Partnerships. 
One of my data collection methods is an online survey and I would be really grateful if 
you could spare me some of your time to complete it, it should take you no more than 
20 minutes. 




M: 07974 070384 
PhD Candidate - University of Plymouth, and 
Director of Moor Trees 
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Appendix D: Interview Times (Minutes) 
Interviewee Sector Time Exec. 
Summary 
Anonymity 
1 Government 58 N Y 
2 Government 60 y Y 
3 Government 75 y y 
4 Government 82 Y Y 
5 QUANGO 60 N y 
6 QUANGO 76 - y N 
7 QUANGO 74 Y Y 
8 QUANGO 78 N Y 
9 QUANGO 80 N Y 
10 QUANGO 66 Y N 
11 Third 66 N y 
12 Third 64 Y N 
13 Third 76 N Y 
14 Third 68 y Y 
15 Third 74 N Y 
16 Private 63 N N 
17 Private 77 y y 
18 Private 76 Y y 
19 Private 82 y Y 






Avge. 72 12 requested 16 requested 
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Appendix E: Online Survey Questions 
Web Survey 
My name is Clive Bastin. I am a PhD student at the University of Plymouth. I am studying 
environmental partnerships and am funded by Great Western Research 
My main aim is to Consider how partnerships play an increasing role in the environmental 
sector. My research looks at how these partnerships are used to deliver environmental plans, 
policies and programmes, and some of the issues involved. 
Thank you for sparing time to take part in this survey. This should take no more than 20 
minutes and your contribution will be anonymous (no individual respondent or organisation 
will be identified in the published material). 
Please complete this questionnaire based on vour organisation's experience of partnership 
working. 
Please feel free to leave any questions blank that you do not wish to answer. 
ORGANISATIONAL PROFILE 
Please note that this information isfor administration purposes only, all reports and results 




Are you familiar with issues concerning the partnership work of your organisation? 
Yes 
No 
Please select your organisation type: 
Public Sector 
Government-funded Programme 
Voluntary/ Community Sector 
Private Sector 
Other (please specify) 
Where is your organisation: 
Local area only 
Regional (South West of England) 
National 
International 





Please highlight your organisation's main area of partnership work: 
Carbon 
Conservation / Biodiversity 
Energy 
Waste 
Other (please specify) 
PARTNERSHIPS 
Please consider your organisation's experience of environmental partnership and tick one box 
for each of the following statements: 
Potential Benefits of Partnerships 






Partnership bring together public, private & community sector groups, which would 












They increase the availability of local knowledge, where national or regional partners work 































Please add any comments you would like to make regarding the benefits of partnerships 
from your organisation's viewpoint 
Potential Drawbacks of Partnerships 


























Please add any comments you would like to make regarding the drawbacks of partnerships 
from your organisation's viewpoint 
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RESPONSIBILITY 
This section considers if and how the responsibility for the delivery of specific environmental 
objectives (e. g. reduced waste to landfill, delivery of Biodiversity Action Plans, energy 
efficiency) are being shifted downward from Government to community level. Please answer 
the following based on your organisation's experience: 
































Do you have any thoughts on the benefits and drawbacks regarding the Government's 
shifting of their responsibility for the delivery of environmental objectives to partnerships? 
LEGITIMACY 
Legitimacy in this context means that decisions made (and actions taken) by environmental 
partnership (EP) are considered to represent aspirations and needs of the wider community, 
This means that the partners have consulted widely or include sufficient stakeholder numbers 
and diversity. 





































Please add any comments you would like to make regarding the legitimacy of environmental 
partnerships 
ACCOUNTABILITY 
This includes both financial and operational processes Le. accountability for meeting agreed 
aims and objectives. 
FINANCIAL ACCOUNTABILITY 



























Many partners in our partnerships are unaccountable regarding grant funding expenditure 






In our partnership arrangements, grant funding monitoring and review Is not clearly 















Our partnerships provide a clear structure detailing who Is accountable for the delivery of a 













In our experience, performance metrics Imposed on Government-funded partnerships 






In our experience, performance metrics Imposed on Govern m ent-fu nded partnerships 






Please add any comments you would like to make regarding the accountability of 
environmental partnerships 
VOLUNTARY CARBON OFFSET ('VCO') 
The VCO market has been selected as the case study for this research. This is due to the new 
environmental partnerships that are being formed between VCO programme providers ('PP') 
and organisations seeking to offset their carbon emissions ('offsetters'). 
Is your organisation directly involved in VCO? 
Yes 
No (please still complete this section) 
Please Indicate your thoughts on the following statements: 




















Programme providers and offsetters should be both transparent and accountable regarding 






Programme providers and offsetters should both be transparent and accountable regarding 






Are there any further comments you would like to add regarding the benefits and drawbacks 
of the VCO market and partnership? 
Defra Is planning the launch of a VCO industry kite mark to Improve standards and credibility 
of VCOs. It will be non-obligatory, but all programme providers will be encouraged to join. 
The following statements are drawn from stakeholder meetings held by Defra. 







The kite mark should require financial transparency of Its members, whereby project Income 







The kite mark should require operational transparency of Its members, whereby their 






The kite mark should require scientific transparency of its members, whereby rationales and 






The kite mark should stipulate independent verification of member programmes, thus 






The existing lack of regulation makes VCO less credible and therefore reduces the amount of 






Are there any further comments you would like to add regarding the proposed VCO kite 
mark? 
CONCLUSION 
As part of the ongoing development of this research project I would appreciate your 








Easy to follow 
The flow of the questions 
Not easy to follow 
No opinion 





Easy to understand 
I will also be conducting a number of semi-structured Interviews. Please click below if you 
would rather not participate 
No thanks 
Please click here if you would like an executive summary of my research when complete 
Yes please 
Powered by SurveySolutions: Conduct your own employee satisfaction surve 
297 
Appendix F: Community Boost Fund Guidelines 
devon 
working for rural prosperity 
Devon Renaissance - Community Boost Fund 
Guidance for Applicants 
Please read this guidance carefully before completing the application form. if you need further 
advice on anything in this guidance, please contact the CBF 
Project Team on 01837 658643. 
What is the Community Boost Fund? 
The Community Boost Fund (CBF) is a small scale capital funding scheme aimed at creating and 
supporting sustainable communities across rural Devon. The scheme has been designed to 
support the delivery of services to communities, with preference being given to projects In 
hard to reach areas that are currently lacking in service provision. By investing in projects to 
improve community facilities, the CBF aims to enable groups to work towards increasing their 
social and / or economic and / or environmental sustainability. Funding is allocated on a first- 
come, first-served basis, and funds are limited. 
What are the basic proiect criteria? 
Location 
Projects must be of benefit to rural communities (defined as settlements of fewer than 10,000 
people), and must be based and delivering within East, Mid and North Devon, the South Hams, 
Teignbridge, Torridge and West Devon. 
Applicant 
Applications can be submitted from new or existing 'not for profit' organisations with a 
constitution, such as community / voluntary sector groups, charities, social enterprises and 
'not for profit' businesses. Applications are also welcomed from Local Authorities, town / 
parish councils and individuals who are acting on behalf of a wider partnership or network. 
Religious organisations are eligible to apply to the CBF, but projects must be secular in their 
nature. 
Amount of Funding 
Minimum CBF Grant: E5,000 
Maximum CBF Grant: E15,000 
Contribution: The CBF can contribute a maximum of 50% of the total project costs. Applicants 
need to source the remaining match funding. 
Types of Match Funding: An upper limit of 10% of the total project costs can be covered by 'in 
kind' costs and donations, such as volunteer hours or donations of goods or services, costed at 
market value. The rest must be made up of cash contribution(s). 
Restrictions: Organisations are restricted to a maximum of 2 separate applications to the CBF, 
in order to ensure a fair distribution of the funding. 
Timescales 
All projects must be complete, with all expenditure finished and claimed back from CBF, by 31 
March 2008. 
What kinds of pro*ects are eligible? 
The CBF supports capital projects that are designed to solve an identified problem that people 
living in rural areas are experiencing in accessing services. The services to be delivered must 
be determined by local need, not just'what a community wants, and should fit with existing 
local plans and strategies. The more additional Tier I services a project can deliver, the higher 
priority it will be given, balanced with an appropriate delivery of additional Tier 2 services (see 




Projects will need to demonstrate that the whole community has been represented In 
establishing the need for the proposal and that a range of groups have had the opportunity to 
have their needs met by the project. This is to ensure that the available funding has the 
maximum impact possible, by not investing in the piecemeal provision of services. Every 
project needs to demonstrate that their project will enable more Tier 1 (essential) services to 
be delivered than are currently available, or planned in the near future, in the location or its 
immediately surrounding area. 
Sustainability 
Applicants need to demonstrate that their project is sustainable in the long term, and are 
encouraged to seek help and advice on becoming more sustainable from such organisations as 
the Community Council of Devon, Co-Active. Projects that are unable to generate some 
income to work towards increasing their sustainability will not be eligible for funding. 
Types of Delivery 
1. The improvement of, or new build of, a facility in a fixed location. 
Typically, this would be through new multi-use community facilities or upgrades to such 
facilities to enable a range of services to be delivered more effectively or broaden the range of 
services available or increase their usage. Multi-use community facilities are defined for this 
purpose as facilities that provide for the needs of a range of sectors in the community. In 
order to be eligible, a fixed location facility must deliver more than one Tier 1 (Essential) 
service (see below). 
2. The development of a mobile/outreach service delivery facility. 
The sorts of facilities that would be covered include remote service / advice delivery points, 
such as kiosks / outreach surgeries or mobile services. The projects costs might be the 
purchase of capital equipment and materials to deliver the project. In order to be eligible, a 
mobile / outreach facility must deliver at least one Tier 1 (Essential) service (see below). 
Tvnes of Servieps 
Tier Notes Examples 
Tier 1 (Essential) These are services that are 9 Social care 
Services essential to making a community 0 Health 
more sustainable, and are the 0 Education 
priority services within the CBF, 0 'Not for profit' retail 
including: 0 Finance 
0 Transport 
9 Democracy 
0 Legal advice 
Community safety 
Employment 
Tier 2 aeisure and These are non-essential services 0 Leisure 
Recreational) Services that contribute to the 0 Entertainment 
sustainability of the project and to 0 Recreational 
the blend of services delivered 
I within a community. 
What cannot be funded? 
The following list gives a guide to specific issues that would automatically make a project 
ineligible. Please note this list is not exhaustive. 
" Single-use facilities (defined for this purpose as those offering only one service / those 
used exclusively by one group of beneficiaries). 
" Projects with a predominantly amenity value, as the CBF is designed to support the 
delivery of services. 
Ongoing costs, such as overheads for utilities / staff. 
Statutory services that should be provided by Government / Local Authorities. 
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Projects that have already started. 
Costs relating to preparatory work that has been paid for prior to the approval of a 
grant from the CBF, such as planning permissions / consents / licences. 
Projects of a political / exclusively religious nature. 
Projects that seek to improve, or increase the value of, the applicant's own property. 
Projects that only seek to deliver Tier 2 services and do not Incorporate any Tier 1 
services. 
How are applications assessed? 
The CBF application process reflects the scale of the scheme and has been designed to be as 
straight forward as possible. The need for applications to be turned around quickly has been 
reflected in the scheme's assessment process. The CBF application / assessment process is as 
follows: 
" Contact the CBF Project Team on 01837 658643 or cbf@ruraldevon. org to discuss your 
project proposal. If appropriate, a CBF application form will be forwarded to you. If 
your project is ineligible we will always try to direct you to a funding scheme that 
meets your requirements. 
" Complete the application form (help and advice is available from the CBF Project 
Team) and submit it to Devon Renaissance. 
" Completed application forms are checked initially by the CBF Project Team, who will 
contact you should any clarification or further information be required. 
" Completed application forms are then appraised by members of the OF Project 
Steering Group, which comprises representatives from the voluntary, community and 
Local Authority sectors who are all experienced in community development. Each 
project is appraised against a set range of criteria, including need, benefits, value for 
money and deliverability (project timetable and management). 
" The CBF Project Steering Group then meet to make decisions on the appraised 
applications. The decision types are 
" Approve for funding 
" Reject as inappropriate for this funding stream, or as insufficiently high priority 
to receive funding. 
" Defer for further information to be submitted, or to develop the project 
further. 
" The CBF Project Team will inform you of the decision of the CBF Project Steering 
Group. Successful applicants will be sent a grant agreement detailing the terms and 
conditions of their award and the procedures for claiming the grant and reporting on 
the progress of the project. The CBF Project Team will maintain contact with you for 
the duration of the delivery of your project. Please note that successful applicants 
may be required to participate in publicity to promote the CBF. 
Annfiratinn nparilinpc and Timescales 
Application Deadline Steering Group Meeting 
Tue 13 March 2007 Tue 27 March 2007 
Tue 24 April 2007 Tue 8 May 2007 
Tue 5 June 2007 Tue 19 June 2007 
Tue 17 July 2007 Tue 31 July 2007 
Tue 28 August 2007 Tue 11 September 2007 
Tue 9 October 2007 Tue 23 October 2007 
Tue 22 November 2007 Tue 6 December 2007 
IMPORTANT NOTES 
1. Grants are allocated at the discretion of the CBF Project Steering Group. The CBF Projecl 
Team cannot guarantee the success of any project. 
2. Grants cannot be paid retrospectively, so do not start your project or commit expenditure 
on It before the date of your grant agreement. 
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How to complete the CBF Application Form 
Please contact the CBF Project Team on 01837 658643 for assistance with completing the CBF 
application form. 
The form has been split into two parts; Part 1 is a Word document and Part 2 Is an Excel 
spreadsheet. Please complete both parts of the form electronically if possible as this will make 
it easier for you to amend and resubmit the application if required. 
Application Form - Part 1 
The form has been designed to guide you through the questions. Please ensure that you do 
not exceed the word limits on questions where specified. 
Special Note on Question 21 - Project Outcomes 
Outcomes are the changes and effects that happen as a result of your project. Identifying the 
outcomes should lead directly from the identified problem you are addressing in question 11. 
You are particularly encouraged to consider the effects your project will have on the local 
economy, as a strong local economy will, in turn, provide support to the community. 
In addition, any appropriate community and environmental outcomes should be listed, and 
may include: 
Community outcomes 
" Greater interest / participation / representation in community activities 
" Increased involvement in the democratic process / community decision 
making 
" Increased volunteering / mentoring 
" Improved understanding between different sections of the community 
improved relations between them 
" Improved access to information 
Environmental outcomes 
" Protection of landscape / visual amenity 
" Improvement / protection of historic environment 
" Improvement/ protection of local biodiversity 
" Improvements in efficient use of resources 
" Reduction in use of cars / promotion of sustainable transport 
" Opportunities for the use of renewable energy 
" Use of local labour/ materials 
" Increased environmental awareness of the community/ visitors/ businesses 
Tracking outcomes 
In order to assess the success of the project, you will need to measure whether or not it has 
achieved the outcomes you have listed. To do this, you should consider the following 
guidance: 
Decide what Information you need to collect 
You will need to set some indicators to specify when an outcome has been achieved. For 
example, if one of your outcomes is to provide a health awareness campaign you could 
measure the number of sessions / attendances. 
Decide how to collect the information 
At a later stage of your project you may wish to gather information on how effective your 
campaign has been to members of the community. An information gathering exercise could 
be based around a questionnaire, a consultation, observations or interviews. There are several 
ways to collect information. You will need to decide which is the most suitable for your project 
and agree it through your project application. 
Decide when to collect the Information 
The intervals that you use to collect the information will depend on the type of information 
you wish to collect. if you want to measure how many sessions of health advice there have 
been or how many people attended, it is just a matter of recording that information as and 
when the events take place. if you wish to gather information on the effectiveness of the 
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campaign overall you may wish to gather those opinions in one concentrated effort towards 
the end of the project. 
Application Form - Part 2 
Grants of between f 5,000 and f 15,000 are available up to a maximum of 50% of your total 
project costs. Up to 10% of your total project costs can be 'in kind' e. g. volunteer hours 
(please contact the CBF Project Team for agreed rates) or donations of goods or services 
costed at market value. VAT that your project is unable to reclaim may be included In your 
costs. Please complete your "Project Name" and summarise your anticipated project costs 
against the given capital headings. You only need to select the headings relevant to your 
project. Do not insert your own headings. If any of the figures in the "Total Costs by Category" 
column exceed E1,000 you will receive an electronic prompt asking you to list the category 
heading and provide a breakdown of all individual costs of over E1,000. Please add extra lines 
to the table if required. 
Quotes - Please ensure that you obtain and submit copies of a minimum of 3 written quotes, 
based on a clear written specification of requirement, for your project costs. 
Please identify all sources and amounts of funding for your project, including the contribution 
you are requesting from the CBF. Please provide the name of the funder, indicate whether the 
funding is confirmed or pending, give the date the funding was secured or is expected and 
show the amount. Remember that any 'in kind' costs must be balanced by 'in kind' 
contributions listed under capital funding. 
Your total capital project funding must equal your total capital project costs. If there is a 
mismatch between these figures you will receive an electronic prompt asking you to check and 
amend the figures accordingly. 
How to submit your completed CBF Application Form 
Please email both completed parts of the form to cbf@ruraldevon. org and send the following 
information: 
a signed hard copy of page 5 (Part 1); 
a copy of your organisation's constitution; 
copies of relevant consent documents; 
copies of quotes; 
copies of match funding confirmation. 
to: 
The Community Boost Fund Project Team 
Devon Renaissance 
7C Cranmere Road 
Exeter Road Industrial Estate 
Okehampton 
Devon EX20 ME 
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Appendix G: Moor Trees Funders 
All data collected from publicly available records, including Annual Report published on Moor 
Trees website. 
State Funders 
" Awards for All (Part of the Big Lottery Fund) 
" Access to Nature 
" Big Lottery Fund (via OPAL) 
" Breathing Places (BBC initiative managed by the Big Lottery Fund) 
" Community Boost Fund (managed by Devon Renaissance, an SWRDA programme) 
" Dartmoor Sustainable Development Fund 
" Southwest Foundation (from the European Social Fund) 
" Teignbridge Leader Plus (from the European Union) 
" Tamar Valley Sustainable Development Fund 
Non-State Funders 
" Bromley Trust 
" Charles Hayward Foundation 
" Dulverton Trust 
" Esm6e Fairbairn Foundation 
" Elmgrant Trust 
" JP Getty Charitable Trust 
" Lankelly Chase Foundation 
" Restore 
" Steel Charitable Trust 
v 
Will Charitable Trust 
Woodland Trust 
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Appendix H: Moor. Trees Community Volunteer Groups 
BBC Autumnwatch, Breathing Places, Radio Devon, 
Springwatch 
BiTC Community volunteering from Businesses 
BTCV National volunteering practical conservation charity 
Private Sector (CSR partnerships) Awards for All, Child Support Agency, Devon County 
Council, EDF Energy, MITIE, Natural England, Toshiba 
Councils for Voluntary Service 
(CVS) 
Exeter, Okehampton, Plymouth, South Hams, 
Tavistock, Teignbridge 
Dartmoor National Park Education groups 
Devon Mammal Group Special interest conservation/community science 
group 
Devon Youth Service Young offenders and excluded groups 
Devonport Regeneration Company 
Disability groups Colebrook Housing Association 
Groundwork National Volunteer and training body 
HMP Dartmoor Offenders 
Local Colleges: Duchy, Kitto Community, PCFE, PCAD, Tamarside 
Local Schools: Barley Lane, Exeter Cathedral, Ratcliffe, South Brent 
Primary, St George's Primary, St Peter's Primary, 
Widecombe Primary 
Millennium Volunteers Young people's volunteering project 
Mothers and Toddlers Devonport support group 
Plymouth Tree Partnership Citv Council partnership to promote value of city trees 
Refugee & Asylum Seekers Supportgr up 
Tavistock Taskforce Excluded young people 
Tree Wardens Community groups (South Hams and Plymouth) 
Universities Exeter, Leeds, Plymouth 
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Appendix 1: OPAL Beneficiary Tracking Spreadsheet 







Field days 1 
site visits 
other activities 
Opal web registrations 1 
National Opal web registrations I 
National survey packs distributed 2 
Teaching materials 2 
downloaded from the web 
publications 
TV 
Opal young environmentalists 
scientists registrations 3 
Voluntary sector membership 
(number of organisations) 3 




Organisations working with Opal 5 
pis add name of orgonisation 
Env. information sources provided 
on Opal website 
1 
5 
Source: Moor Trees 
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Appendix J: OPAL Funding Bid References to State PPP 
1. Outdoors For All 
An Action Plan by DEFRA resulting from the Rural White Paper 2000 Our Countryside: the 
future to increase the number of people from under-represented groups who access the 
natural environment (Natural England, 2008c). 
2. Opportunity for All 2009 Strategy Document 
A report by the Department of Work & Pensions setting out the government's strategy for 
tackling poverty and social exclusion (Department of Work and Pensions, 2009). 
3. Regional Sustainable Development Framework 
Commissioned by the Government Office for the South West (Oursouthwest. com, 2001). 
4. Index of Multiple Deprivation (IMD) 
The IMD is produced by the government Department of Communities & Local Government. It 
combines indicators, chosen to cover economic, social and housing issues, into a single 
deprivation score for each small area in England (Communities & Local Government, 2009). 
5. Regional Spatial Strategy 
A strategy by the South West Council which aims to locate development in places where jobs 
and homes can be more in balance (South West Council, 2006). 
6. Dartmoor National Park LBAP 
Each Local Biodiversity Action Plan works on the basis of partnership to identify local priorities 
and to determine the contribution they can make to the delivery of the national Species and 
Habitat Action Plan targets (United Kingdom Biodiversity Action Plan, 2007). 
7. Plymouth City Local Development Framework (Core Strategy) 
The set of documents produced by Plymouth City Council which guides planning and 
development in the City of Plymouth until 2021 & beyond. 
B. Plymouth City Council Green Space Strategy (2008-2023) 
The strategy to protect and improve Plymouth's green spaces, providing the vision and 
objectives for planning and management. 
9. South West Strategic Infrastructure Partnership 
A document produced by the South West Forum promoting third sector involvement in local 
service delivery. 
Source: OPAL Funding Bid 
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